Issue - Article

Protecting civilians through humanitarian mediation

January 16, 2023

Jérôme Grimaud

Disengagement, disassociation, reintegration and reconciliation (DDRR) programme in Central African Republic. Credit: UN

Community members are the experts in their own protection: they are the ones directly facing violence, they know the threats, when and where they occur, and the actors and motives behind them. Community members are also the first to engage with stakeholders who can influence their protection, usually through informal and spontaneous negotiations.

There is no doubt that humanitarians negotiating on behalf of affected communities – being ‘the voice of the voiceless’ – can be relevant, for instance when interlocutors have no immediate interest in negotiating with communities, or when community members have no access to the interlocutor they wish to negotiate with. But if this is done on the assumption that communities cannot speak for themselves, it can be a patronising and disempowering process. There is also a risk that humanitarians will be perceived as partial and as taking sides.

Humanitarian mediation can reconcile these different opportunities and challenges. It allows for community members and relevant actors to engage directly in a safe environment, framed by mutually defined and accepted ground rules upheld by the mediator. In this process, the humanitarian actor acts as a neutral and impartial facilitator of a process from which mutually acceptable solutions emerge.

What is humanitarian mediation?

Humanitarian mediation is defined as:

an inclusive and voluntary process addressing humanitarian concerns in emergency contexts in which a neutral and impartial humanitarian actor facilitates the communication and the collaboration between stakeholders involved in and/or affected by conflicts, in order to assist them find, by themselves, a mutually acceptable solution.

Humanitarian Mediation Network, Humanitarian Mediation and Dialogue Facilitation: A Reference Guide for Training Participants, August 2018, p.7.

It has four specific objectives:

  • preventing or mitigating violence
  • preventing forced displacement and facilitating voluntary returns
  • improving access to aid and basic services
  • enhancing respect for basic rights.

A humanitarian mediation process follows 10 steps and 10 principles. The steps begin with:

1. Conflict analysis, often involving a training workshop with key stakeholders.
2. Separate meetings with parties involved and/or affected by the conflict (pre-mediation).

If, and only if, the parties are willing to engage in the mediation process then the steps continue:

3. Mediation opening and agreement on ground rules.
4. Sharing each party’s experience, story and concerns.
5. Defining the agenda and the problems to be discussed and resolved.
6. Exploration of the agenda.
7. Generating solutions.
8. Adoption of commonly acceptable solutions.
9. Agreement and plan of action.
10. Follow-up sessions, sometimes coupled with a crisis management mechanism.

The 10 principles are:

  1. Support without advising.
  2. Question without evaluating.
  3. Understand without endorsing.
  4. Frame without influencing.
  5. Listen: hear, look, feel.
  6. Share the process, verify, validate.
  7. Promote inclusion and participation.
  8. Reaffirm your role, engage the parties.
  9. Feel the pulse, be in the moment.
  10. Build and generate trust.

Throughout this process the mediator maintains their role as a neutral and impartial intermediary and facilitator, and to embody the principles during the process and in front of the parties. This is the keystone of the trust between the parties and the mediator, and of the trust of the parties in the process itself.

Humanitarian mediation is an inclusive process involving not only belligerents, but all segments of society affected by conflict and able to contribute to the decision-making process. It is also voluntary: parties and participants come to the mediation by choice, with a clear understanding of what the process is about and the ground rules that frame it. No incentives or per diems are paid. And it is empowering: stakeholders and participants own the outcome of the process and the decisions made.

The first step of a humanitarian mediation process is a conflict-sensitive analysis inspired by the Do No Harm framework. This is conducted through workshops with relevant stakeholders, often met separately first, such as community members, civil society organisations, authorities, and armed actors. Initial conversations enable the mediator to assess the readiness and willingness of the stakeholders to engage and to abide by agreed ground rules. It also enables stakeholders to assess whether the process is appropriate and relevant to their situation and interests. Participants engage in the process voluntarily, with full knowledge of what the process is about and how it will be conducted. They agree, prior to the mediation process, to the rules and guidelines that will frame the discussion. They also agree that any agreement should reflect the priorities and concerns of all participants, and not be harmful to the parties involved or a third party not present in the mediation. The mediator ensures that the process is safe and secure, that it safeguards the equality and dignity of everyone around the table and that all voices are heard and taken into account.

Humanitarian mediation differs from political mediation in several ways. Participants are not prominent national political/armed group leaders, the issues at stake are not political, and the process of mediation is purely facilitative, meaning that it is in line with the humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence.

Humanitarian mediation differs from social cohesion programming, which mainly aims at fostering or reconstructing the social fabric after an episode of violence. Humanitarian mediation primarily aims at improving the protection of civilians through prevention and mitigation. In other words, it is a problem-solving process intended to improve safety, security, freedom of movement and access to basic services. For the same reasons, Humanitarian Mediation also differs from peacebuilding, which is a multifaceted and much longer-term process.

There is, however, no contradiction between humanitarian mediation, social cohesion and peacebuilding. In fact, these interventions are to some degree complementary approaches. All of these approaches might use mediation as a process to reach different goals. In addition, a humanitarian mediation process leading to a significant reduction in or an end to violence can give way to a longer-term process aimed at reconstructing the social fabric and establishing durable peace.

Humanitarian mediation is a confidential process. It is also worth stressing that humanitarian mediation is an informal, voluntary process that is not a substitute for formal justice. Even if the process leads to a significant reduction in violence through a local agreement, it does not provide participants with immunity for acts or crimes for which they could be pursued and sentenced.

Humanitarian mediation in the Central African Republic

The Central African Republic (CAR) has experienced a repeated cycle of coups since its independence in 1960. In March 2013, Michel Djotodia led the Séléka – a coalition of rebel groups from the disadvantaged Muslim north – in overthrowing President François Bozizé. What began as a political coup, soon resulted in intercommunal violence. In response to the lootings, abuse and arbitrary detention and killing of civilians by the mainly Muslim Séleka, Christian self-defence militias, referred to as the ‘anti-Balaka’ (anti-machete), formed. The anti-Balaka not only targeted Séléka combatants, but also civilians from the Muslim minority who were suspected of sympathising with or supporting them. It is important to note that although the conflict pitted Muslim and Christian communities against each other, the conflict was not religious in nature. In less than a year, thousands of people were killed and hundreds of thousands forcibly displaced. By early 2014, an estimated 40,000 Muslims were trapped in seven enclaves throughout the country, with a total restriction of movement, no access to basic services, and constant threat of attack. Despite the launch of French (Sangaris) and African Union (MISCA) military operations, and their subsequent replacement by 12,000 United Nations peacekeepers (MINUSCA) deployed to protect civilians and support the political process, violence remained widespread.

Several organisations, including the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the Norwegian Refugee Council, have carried out humanitarian mediation (known then as ‘emergency mediation’) interventions. Using the systematic neutral and impartial third-party facilitative mediation model, Humanitarian Mediation Network, Humanitarian mediation and dialogue facilitation: a reference guide for training participants, August 2018. interventions were carried out in the enclaves of Boda, Berberati, Carnot (West) and Dekoa (Centre), and in the PK5 neighbourhood of Bangui.

The longest mediation process, in Boda, lasted over a year. When the mediation team, comprising one European and one Central African mediator, reached the area, Boda was the second-largest Muslim enclave in the country, with over 15,000 civilians and self-defence group members trapped there. The process started with a conflict-sensitivity analysis, which drew on the outcomes of a ‘training session’ organised with multiple actors from the Muslim and Christian communities. From this initial phase it was clear that levels of grievance and hatred were such that there was no willingness from either community to enter into dialogue. Even use of the word ‘mediation’ was unacceptable for many as it implied dialogue with the ‘enemy’, and possibly forgiveness and reconciliation. There were also tensions within communities themselves, with disagreements on how to deal with the crisis.

But it was also clear that all the actors who had participated in the training (militia and self-defence groups included) shared a common concern: security for themselves, their loved ones and their communities. There was a willingness to discuss this shared concern, though not jointly. Separate but parallel dialogue processes were therefore organised in the two communities on how to improve security in Boda. These processes involved community members and leaders, self-defence groups, representatives of the local authorities and representatives of international forces. These separate dialogues led to plans of action which, when implemented, led to reduced violence in Boda. In parallel, workshops were implemented in both communities on conflict management, targeting influencing groups (including women’s groups). As violence decreased, one participant suggested that the minutes of the separate meetings should be shared across communities. At the same time, informal contact between communities gradually resumed, though conducted discretely and kept secret, and a first joint meeting was finally organised. By early 2015, life in Boda began returning to normal, and in 2017 UN troops were withdrawn from the town.

In 2018, three years after the process ended, an evaluation was conducted in Boda that included Interviews with more than 80 people who had participated in or observed the process. The interviews showed that the mediation/dialogue process and the training were instrumental in reducing violence and improving freedom of movement. As one woman noted:

The dialogue contributed to decreasing tension […] During the crisis we were not talking to the Muslims but thanks to those meetings we started talking again and it help[ed] [in] calming the spirits […] Even Between Christians we had problems, including with anti-Balakas. The meetings allowed us to find agreement between us first before we could reconcile with Muslims […] We couldn’t be together at the market but now we are together.

Interviewees also stressed that the mediators had remained neutral and impartial. As one said:

It was us who were deciding. All the decisions were coming from us. They were only giving the floor to everyone and remained neutral. It was us who did the work.

Similar processes were implemented in other enclaves and areas of CAR (Bambari, Bangui PK5 and Boy-Rabe, Bocaranga, Carnot, Dekoa, Mongumba, Ndelé and Obo) mostly focusing on protection concerns, sometimes on access, often with the two overlapping. These followed the same methodology, but adapted to local dynamics (in most instances, direct dialogue between communities was possible from the start). The outcomes of these processes led to significant, and mostly long-lasting, reductions in violence. As the Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation (IAHE) of the response to the crisis in CAR noted,‘Humanitarian mediation led to reduced conflict, increased access, and Protection of Civilians (POC)’. ibid., p.91.

The organisations involved in humanitarian mediation processes in CAR were not mediation specialists at that time: rather, they became engaged because they saw a need for these interventions in a context where communal violence was at the core of the protection crisis and was also hindering humanitarian access. In addition, very few or no actors were involved in local mediation processes during the early stages of the crisis, and there was internal capacity (trained mediators) within these organisations. Even so, the decision to get involved was not straightforward, and there were internal disagreements about mandate (‘Should we be doing this? If not us then who? What if no one does it? Do we have the capacity to do it?’); about neutrality and impartiality (‘Can we be neutral in such a context? Should we involve armed groups in the dialogue? What are the risks of letting people decide by and for themselves? What are the institutional risks of being seen as mediating between communities?’); and about the meaning of protection (‘Are humanitarians there to protect or to provide assistance to victims?’). It took strong leadership and a focus on the need for protection and freedom of movement to overcome these objections and decide to act where and when needed.

Conclusion

Improving protection of civilians affected by conflict necessitates a solid understanding of the context, based on communities’ own experience and analysis. It also means mobilising appropriate strategies: protection by presence, early warning systems, negotiations for protection, civil–military coordination and, at times, evacuation. Humanitarian mediation is one additional proactive protection approach and possible strategy in emergency settings. It has proven to be effective in CAR, leading both to a reduction in violence and improved freedom of movement and access. The approach is currently being promoted by the Danish Refugee Council and the Norwegian Refugee Council in Mali, Burkina Faso and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Danish Red Cross and the International Committee of the Red Cross have conducted pilot projects in South Sudan. The Center for Humanitarian Dialogue also has, besides its involvement in private diplomacy, a range of interventions in the field of humanitarian mediation.

Several obstacles remain to the development of humanitarian mediation. The first of those obstacles is the misperception that mediation is always political in nature. A second obstacle is that mediation skills take a lot of training and practice. The third is growing risk aversion among humanitarian organisations, which prevents them from acting where they are most needed. Last, and sadly most important, is the reluctance of humanitarian organisations to let go of power. Humanitarian mediation promotes the autonomy, self-determination and ability of community members to decide, for and by themselves, what is good for them and what their future should look like – a starting point and a keystone which, despite official statements and repeated commitments, is far too often overlooked.

There are several reasons to support the development of mediation in the humanitarian sector. First, it addresses the most pressing need of populations at risk in conflict settings, namely physical security and freedom of movement. Second, it is an empowering process in line with the inclusion and participation agenda, which promotes mutual understanding and a culture of dialogue, and allows people to address their own concerns and priorities and find solutions that are the most appropriate for them. Third, it has a very light footprint, both in terms of interference in local traditions and values, and in terms of logistical resources. Fourth, it improves acceptance and access for humanitarian actors, as they are genuinely seen as neutral and impartial. This is an aspect worth emphasising: the four core humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence, which the large majority of humanitarian actors abide by, are similar to the principles of third-party, neutral and impartial mediation. Humanitarians and mediators share the same ethical framework. They share the same DNA. Humanitarian mediation is an opportunity for humanitarians to do more in the field of protection and act directly to reduce violence affecting civilians. It is also a responsibility.


Jérôme Grimaud is a humanitarian worker, accredited mediator and trainer. He is currently Senior Protection Advisor with the NRC Protection Standby Capacity Project (ProCap).

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