How narratives on climate mobility are contributing to a failure to protect

Climate change and migration are each deeply politicised and emotive topics. Combined, they are even more emotive. The image of a tide of climate migrants causing global chaos and insecurity dominates. But this is a misleading narrative, and one which risks causing harm, including the failure to protect both people impacted by climate change and people on the move, and a failure to galvanise effective action to combat climate change impacts.

For years, wildly varying – but consistently enormous – projections have been circulating around the population movements that will be triggered by climate change, suggesting anything from hundreds of millions to billions of ‘climate migrants’ or ‘climate refugees’. The prospect is one of ‘food shortages, water crises, and catastrophic flooding driven by climate change’ leading to displacement See also, for example, the Danish Refugee Council’s Global Displacement Forecast 2023, ‘Changing Climate, Changing Displacement’: https://pro.drc.ngo/resources/news/new-report-displacement-is-projected-to-increase-by-more-than-5-4-million-people-in-the-coming-two-years/ . Scarcity of resources may also lead to conflict, which itself triggers displacement. Or displacement can lead to conflict, as tensions between new arrivals and host populations flare. And the headlines persist in 2023: ‘Oxfam: 216 million climate migrants by 2050’ (the figure was taken from a Groundswell report); ‘There could be 1.2 billion climate refugees by 2050’ (the number was sourced from the Institute for Economics and Peace); ‘We need to prepare for mass climate migration’.

While the scenarios described by experts and scholars are all possibilities, and there are real and very valid concerns about how climate change impacts are going to affect human settlements and migration, the dominant narratives do not consider the likelihood or scope of these scenarios, but rather emphasise the worst case, are selective in the information they highlight, and foster images of global catastrophe. This apocalyptic approach is being taken by a range of stakeholders – some of whom have the best of intentions to achieve climate action and to protect vulnerable populations – with the aim that it will provoke action. The image of hundreds of millions of people on the move is used to trigger fears of instability and insecurity, often purely to attract readers, but also to prompt action on climate change, and on migration governance.

Indeed, it seems from the frequency of the headlines that the numbers are effectively attracting attention and stoking fear, but are they prompting action? And if they are, is it action that will address climate change impacts, reduce the likelihood of conflict, and foster safe migration? In short, is it action to protect?

Stoking fear of climate migration

It might be helpful to reflect on the response so far to fears of mass migration. Fear of large-scale population movements, used for political gain even in countries reliant on migrant labour, has prompted two main policy approaches globally: prevention and deterrence. Fear has led to migration now being widely perceived as a threat, and closely linked to security. Destination countries, often more industrialised countries, have followed a trend of securitising migration and criminalising irregular migration, by increasing surveillance, border controls and detention, alongside addressing the so-called root causes of migration through development interventions to deter people from migrating, while failing to scale up regular migration pathways.

The current securitised approach to migration governance, prompted by fear of mass movements, is to a large extent failing to protect people in need. As of 23 October 2023, the International Organisation for Migration’s Missing Migrants project has counted 4,817 deaths, including 958 in the Americas, 2,445 in the Mediterranean, and 1,188 in Africa in 2023. Compare this to 5,321 deaths in 2014, when monitoring began, and it appears that the policies chosen by states have failed to prevent migrant deaths.

The securitised approach is also arguably stoking tensions between communities. The headlines on climate migration seem to be feeding into and amplifying existing narratives that migration is a something to be feared, and that the response is therefore to counter the threat by countering migration, primarily through deterrence. Such narratives of fear of climate migration and climate migrants are likely to lead to more of the same – securitisation, criminalisation – and unlikely to direct us towards improved protection of people on the move, the facilitation of regular migration, or the devotion of more attention to and investment in sustainable climate adaptation.

Transcontinental migration will not be the main climate-related mobility outcome

Let us return to the figures in those headlines and consider how climate change is being instrumentalised in the migration debate, to the detriment of serious attempts to understand the challenges of climate change for migration dynamics and find appropriate ways to address them. The ‘216 million climate migrants by 2050’ is, first, an estimate of the number of internal migrants. Second, it is at the high end of a pessimistic scenario. Presuming that we are heading towards such a scenario, the predicted range of internal migrants is between 125 million and 216 million, with an average of 170 million. The ‘1.2 billion climate refugees by 2050’ refers to the entire populations of 31 countries with low resilience to climate change impacts. It considers that these populations will be ‘contributing to mass population displacement’. Again, this figure is very far from a precise prediction of displacement figures, even less a helpful representation of the kind of displacement.

If the narrative on mass migration is not an accurate reflection of climate migration and displacement, what is? People affected by climate change may move across continents, however, this is likely to occur on a very small scale compared to other kinds of mobility outcomes See, for example, modelling for Africa, which suggests climate impacts will contribute 10% to cross-border migration figures, most of which will be within the region: https://africa.climatemobility.org/about .

Here we again observe a similar pattern to the current crisis narrative around migration at Europe and North America’s borders. The numbers of people taking irregular pathways to reach Europe and the United States in fact make up a tiny proportion of people on the move, despite popular perceptions to the contrary.

In fact, rather than cross-border movement, most people moving for climate-related reasons are migrating – and will migrate – internally. Perhaps even more important, most people will not be moving at all. This may be because they do not wish to, or because they cannot, or both. Whatever the case, people who are trapped are likely to be among the largest – and most vulnerable – populations impacted by climate change and most in need of assistance.

In short, while it is true that countries and communities are not well prepared for the impacts of climate change on mobility, the current headlines are forcing our attention to the wrong ‘problem’, and to the wrong ‘solutions’.

People impacted by climate change will move in different ways, or not at all

Climate change impacts are likely to contribute to a range of mobility outcomes, including immobility For more on the diverse decision-making, outcomes and potential responses to climate-related mobility, see Jane Linekar and Bram Frouws, Climate change, environmental stressors and mixed migration: Insights and key messages drawn from a decade of MMC research and 4Mi data collection: https://mixedmigration.org/resource/climate-change-environmental-stressors-mixed-migration/ . The research of the Mixed Migration Centre (MMC) in locations in Africa affected by climate-related events found that, predominantly, people have no intention of moving MMC conducted seven case studies as a contribution to the work of the Africa Climate Mobility Initiative. For details on each study as well as the synthesis report, see Climate and mobility case studies: perceptions, attitudes, and decision-making: https://mixedmigration.org/resource/climate-and-mobility-case-studies/ . Many, particularly those who were working on the land, hold a strong attachment to place. Most participants in MMC’s research considered adaptation strategies as ways of being able to stay. Despite being repeatedly affected by severe weather events, or observing the progressive deterioration of environmental conditions, people were not considering migration – the majority were not thinking about moving away, even from crisis-affected areas. In many places, we found ‘acquiescent immobility’, people who did not have the resources or the capacity to move, but who also did not wish to move. But almost a quarter of those we spoke to were people who wanted to move but could not.

For those who had been forced to move for their immediate survival, many expected to return, or had developed a cycle of displacement and return (to take two examples, the fishing community in the city of Beira, Mozambique, which is frequently displaced by storms, or farmers near the town of Chikwawa, Malawi, displaced by storms and flooding). Movement of any kind was most often to local urban areas, or to the country’s capital.

Our study followed up with participants who had moved, or whose relatives had moved, to explore outcomes of migration from areas affected by climate change. Results were mixed, with some finding and enjoying new opportunities and integration; others returned, after difficulties making a living or integrating, or sought to move onward.

Climate migration is being used to stoke fear and promote securitisation and so will not result in an effective response

There is no doubt that climate change is impacting – and is likely to further impact – mobility dynamics around the world. However, it is vital to step back from narratives peddling fear in order to understand the full range of those dynamics, how people make decisions around mobility, and the contexts in which those decisions are being made. While numbers can be helpful to try and estimate the scale and scope of an issue, the big numbers we see in the headlines – and the way they are being used – are distracting and likely harmful.

The prevailing response to transcontinental, predominantly South–North migration, is one of prevention and securitisation measures, which are being applied similarly across countries. Intensifying this response will not address the issues raised by climate-related mobility; rather, it risks increasing the vulnerability of people on the move, or who need to move. To respond effectively to climate impacts on lives and livelihoods, responses need to focus on sustainable adaptation strategies. Where people can stay, and want to stay, the response will be about adaptation in place. Where people have to or want to move, it is about formulating a response supporting safe and positive migration outcomes for all. This means working on climate-smart livelihood opportunities and integration, involving migrant communities alongside host populations, and not neglecting the family members who may remain in places of origin. It is likely to mean a lot of work in cities, as climate mobility amplifies urbanisation trends, and climate change impacts on urban populations. And, to an extent, it will also be about encouraging safe and regular cross-border migration.

Jane Linekar is Head of Research and the 4Mi project at the Mixed Migration Centre.

The author would like to thank Bram Frouws and Jennifer Vallentine for their review of this article.