In their own words: local civil society engagement with armed actors in practice

We are civilians, we are brothers, you cannot claim you are fighting for us and at the same time you are killing us.

Message from communities in Cameroon to separatist armed groups

There is increasing recognition by the international community of the key role communities and local civil society actors play for effective community protection and respect of humanitarian norms by armed actors. Nevertheless, more can be done to involve local civil society and community-based actors in the protection agenda. In this article, three representatives from civil society organisations (CSOs) look back on several years of engagement efforts, showcasing different approaches and strategies: direct versus indirect engagement, forms of cooperation with international actors, capacity-building of community representatives, mediation efforts, among others.

Cameroon: Barrister Felix Agbor Nkongho, Centre for Human Rights and Democracy in Africa

Context and reasons for engagement

Conflict between anglophone separatist armed movements and the central government began in 2017. Civilians in the anglophone part of Cameroon have been victims of violations of humanitarian norms by different armed actors, among other attacks by separatist armed groups. At the start of the conflict, communities in favour of the separatists’ goals were very supportive and were reluctant to criticise the separatists, whose stated purpose was to fight for the rights of these very communities. This has changed over time with increasing civilian targeting and other violations of humanitarian norms. Some communities have come to fear the separatists, and in many cases have fled their homes.

What challenges did you encounter in engaging with armed non-state actors?

Displacement and the consequences of the conflict on the livelihoods of many communities has made the community’s prioritisation of engaging with armed groups difficult, particularly where access to food and other means of survival are an immediate challenge. Supporting communities in their engagement efforts often means also providing humanitarian assistance. Conflicting priorities also make it difficult for communities to formulate and agree common messages. While infrequent, there have been cases where communities disagreed with what the individual speaking on their behalf discussed with the armed group and considered it to not reflect the views of the community. Additional challenges have been initial community perceptions of us as pro-separatist or as being ‘too moderate’. Some communities don’t understand the principle of neutrality and expect civil society and humanitarian actors to take sides. These communities were very hostile at first, and some communities would refuse to talk to our staff. We had to gain acceptance step by step. We had to adapt. For example, we changed which staff we sent to which communities (people perceived as pro- or anti-separatist), and how we tailored messages so as to be more sensitive to the political views of communities (i.e., when we talk about humanitarian norms, not giving the impression that our goal is to denounce separatist armed groups or, to the contrary, legitimise their fight). This was a learning process for all of us and we have since grown into the work. Now that we have adopted a more sensitive and tailored approach and communities know us, acceptance for our work is very high. A final challenge is that, while in the case of small armed groups communities can easily reach the top decision-makers, with larger armed groups this is a challenge, with leaders of armed groups considered too important to engage with communities, and armed groups seeking to keep their leaders from potential risks and out of the public eye.

Can you give examples of engagement activities?

We have been disseminating humanitarian norms in communities and conducting capacity-building activities with community leaders and representatives to support them in their engagement efforts with armed groups on protection issues. We developed dissemination and training materials in English, French and local languages, and with the help of several embassies we drafted a handbook on the conduct of war, which resonated well with armed groups. With international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), we developed training on international humanitarian law (IHL) norms for armed actors. We are also developing new strategies: one idea is to ask comedians and actors from the Cameroon entertainment industry to channel and disseminate messages regarding humanitarian norms, so that these messages spread further and deeper, and are better heard.

How were norms accepted by armed non-state actors and what was the impact of engagement?

Communities have realised that avoiding or ostracising armed groups is not a solution: ‘If you consider them your enemy, then you cannot achieve anything.’ Many communities have moved from being in favour of armed groups to being against them to adopting a middle ground. Communities have become emboldened and are telling armed groups, including through social media, that ‘enough is enough’, and that groups have to stop killing and kidnapping people.

When communities decide to engage armed groups, most of the time they agree on the messages they want to convey and on who is going to be the spokesperson/representative. The most important message they try to convey is that ‘we are civilians, we are not part of the conflict, we are brothers, you cannot claim you are fighting for us and at the same time you are killing us’. Communities have also advocated with armed groups to ensure that schools continue to function normally.

In some communities, leaders of the armed group come from the community itself. Community leaders are friends or relatives of the armed group’s leaders. This greatly facilitates discussions with the armed group and the chances of a positive impact. In some communities, religious leaders play a central role and have the legitimacy to advocate with armed groups. In others, there are credible community-based organisations that have gained the trust and respect of armed groups and can convey messages from the community.

Messages from communities have been gradually heard and understood by many armed groups. In some areas, armed groups have toned down their violent rhetoric and are now speaking out against attacks on civilians and on schools. We have seen a decrease in violence against the civilian population. Some groups have even laid down their weapons and are now advocating for peace and reconciliation. The main motivation for armed groups to change behaviour has clearly been to gain or maintain legitimacy and community acceptance.

Many factors have led to this behaviour change. But the role of the communities has been key. Capacity-building and training efforts in communities as well as direct engagement by civil society and humanitarian actors have step-by-step been bearing fruit. Communities are now much more skilled and knowledgeable when talking about protection and peacebuilding. The greatest challenge now is to not let the guard down and to continue supporting communities’ engagement with armed groups. Many people (fighters and communities) still don’t know about IHL.

The ground dynamics of the conflict are also changing. There are new powerbrokers (new leaders, new warlords) who come into play. They also need to be engaged on the protection of civilians. If capacity-building and engagement efforts lack continuity, we are afraid that the gains made will be lost and we will have to start all over again. There is a real need for constant communication on protection and peacebuilding. It is not a one-off thing.

What was your experience of cooperating with international actors on engagement?

Several international actors have been engaging and training armed groups on humanitarian norms, and have conducted capacity-building activities with communities on those norms. They have often worked as a bridge between communities and armed groups. This work has had a positive impact and has contributed to helping armed groups understand that civilians should not be targeted. International actors have tried to respect the realities of the country and have not transferred risks of engagement with armed groups to communities. When there have been tensions between communities and international humanitarian actors, this has been related to other issues. For example, certain communities feel that the international community has not fulfilled its promises, not only in terms of humanitarian aid, but also in terms of finding political solutions to the conflict. Furthermore, communities sometimes don’t understand that international actors need to have relations with the state: international actors need the consent of the state to enter the country, and have to respect the rules and regulations of the state. Some communities don’t understand that when international actors meet with the state, this does not mean they endorse the attitudes or positions of the state. This perception has led to tensions and humanitarian workers have been attacked in some areas because of this.

What are the main lessons you’ve learned?

At the beginning, our strategy was ‘one size fits all’. We have realised that you cannot apply the same strategy with religious leaders as with traditional leaders, for example. Who in a community is the best person to engage armed groups directly can also differ. In some cases, it is a religious leader who is highly respected. In another community, the church might not be very popular. We further translated dissemination and training material into vernacular languages because we realised not everybody understands English sufficiently, and that we can have more impact using local languages. We learned to adapt our strategies to different communities. Some communities are very politically savvy, they want to engage armed groups, participate in the larger peacebuilding process, and they want to be engaged by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) on humanitarian norms. But for other communities, particularly those that have lost their sources of livelihood, this is not the priority. Therefore, when planning to support communities with the engagement of armed groups, before meeting them, you have to do a ‘background check’: how are the members of the community looking at the conflict (pro-separatists, unionists, etc.), are there divisions in the community regarding the conflict or regarding engagement? Who are the community leaders and what are their priorities? One needs a clear picture on all those questions to fully understand what is of interest to the community.

Lebanon: Zafer Al-Khateeb, Nashet Association

Context and reasons for engagement

In late 2000 and early 2010, there were tensions in Palestinian refugee camps between pro-Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and anti-PLO armed factions. Those tensions at times resulted in clashes. During clashes, fighters did not take precautions to avoid harming civilians, resulting in instances of civilian deaths and injuries. Civilian casualties were mainly due to a lack of education and training of fighters. As a result of such clashes, parents no longer sent their children to school. Additionally, in the past there had been a strong sentiment by the factions and communities, that Palestinians in the camps need to be prepared to defend themselves in further conflict with Israel. A consequence of this was that Palestinian factions trained youth on how to handle weapons and recruited them into their ranks. In some cases, the youth did not reach the age of 18 years.

What challenges did you encounter in engaging with armed non-state actors?

Talking to armed factions directly was very sensitive. We felt we lacked the legitimacy to talk about protection, especially child protection issues. Furthermore, there was a lack of awareness of international humanitarian norms, not only among armed factions, but also within communities. For example, in our communities, boys of 13 years are already considered men. Therefore, the prohibition of recruitment below the age of 18 clashed with local traditions and norms. There was further a political consensus that all Palestinians in the camps are victimised purely by factors external to their communities. To say that Palestinians are victimised by Palestinians was not well received. Never before had attention been drawn to the differentiated impacts that the clashes caused to communities, particularly to vulnerable groups, or on the livelihood of Palestinian communities. Discussing such delicate topics publicly or, even worse, with outsiders from INGOs, which could be suspected of collaborating with Israel, was initially met with great suspicion.

Can you give examples of engagement activities?

We started by participating in and organising demonstrations against the clashes. Protesters sometimes even physically put themselves between fighting factions to try and convince them to stop the fighting, despite the potential risks of doing so. We were trying to raise awareness of the risks posed to civilians by the clashes, reaching out to local political representatives, but not much was changing. We therefore used a step-by-step approach. In 2010 we developed a joint programme with Geneva Call: while Geneva Call engaged in direct dialogue with the armed factions on norms related to the protection of civilians, Nashet created a safe space for girls to access education and recreational activities – the Girls’ Club. We started with 60 girls from the age of eight. We chose to start with girls, as due to tradition girls often find it more difficult to access NGO programmes because parents fear they would mix with boys. Now the programme is well established, with 250 girls and boys participating. The programme gave us the necessary legitimacy to organise a conference with civil and political actors in the camps. The purpose was to raise awareness on the need for increased protection for people with specific vulnerabilities (children, the elderly, women, etc.) from armed violence, and discuss how this awareness could be increased.

The second step was to organise a roundtable with the armed factions to speak about the protection of civilians, particularly the most vulnerable in our communities to ensure they are not harmed during clashes, and discuss how to ensure clashes don’t impede children from accessing education. We were the first to bring all factions around one table, which was quite revolutionary at the time.

We also presented the factions with concrete evidence of violations, making it impossible for them to pretend that they were not occurring. We collected evidence during and after clashes (using smart phones, information from social media, etc.) on harm caused to civilians (deaths, injuries, houses damaged and cars burned, etc.) and on types of weapons used by the fighters, evidencing the disproportionate harm and damage caused by these weapons. We drafted a report recording humanitarian norms violations. The fact that we were able to collect and present evidence to the armed factions in a timely manner made it difficult for the factions to deny that violations had been committed.

We also conducted a broad study on patterns of child recruitment in the camps by the armed factions. The study also addressed the rights of children to play, to move, to be educated, etc. This helped increase awareness, knowledge and acceptance in the camps of international child protection norms. We then organised a conference and invited the different factions to talk about the results of the child protection study and the protection of the most vulnerable groups in our communities (children, women, elders). This led to factions signing a unilateral declaration on child protection in 2013.

How were norms accepted by armed non-state actors and what was the impact of engagement?

When we started working, the different factions were not talking to each other and the divisions were very deep. Neighbourhoods, houseblocks and roads were divided by the different factions exercising tight control of their territories. It was difficult for civilians to move from one neighbourhood to another. Through our activities we helped build trust between factions and served as a space for mediation. They agreed to sit down together and talk to one another.

We further managed to create a space where armed factions agreed to learn about humanitarian norms and discuss these norms with us and among themselves. When we started working, there was little acceptance of humanitarian norms. Armed factions were mainly referencing Islamic norms and did not see the need to take into account international – perceived as foreign – norms. Now, humanitarian norms are well known and understood by fighters and civilians: people know that recruiting children, targeting civilians, schools and cultural sites, etc., is against the law. Communities are now monitoring whether factions comply with the norms. The main message has been: ‘You say that you care and fight for Palestinian children and civilians, so how come you hurt people who are not involved in the fighting? How come you use such weapons in this way?’. The fact that the factions started to accept criticism, including from external actors, was a big step. The accumulation of pressure from Palestinian communities more aware of international norms and the outside attention of an INGO (Geneva Call), coupled with the realisation that their actions could make them subject to prosecution before Lebanese courts, contributed to a change in behaviour.

Today, the situation in the Palestinian camps is much calmer. The number of civilians affected by clashes has decreased, child recruitment is no longer taking place and the age of new recruits is verified to ensure they are at least 18 years old. Various factors (political, etc.) led to the current situation. Some factions are no longer active. But the joint efforts of Palestinian communities, Geneva Call and our organisation have certainly been one contributing factor.

What was your experience of cooperating with international actors on engagement?

With Geneva Call we had a clear division of tasks and facilitated and supported each other’s work. On one hand, Geneva Call would not have succeeded in talking to Palestinian factions directly without an introduction by a local Palestinian NGO: a local NGO that understands the context (risks and vulnerabilities of civilians) and was not afraid to tackle protection of civilians issues or to get involved in discussions perceived as political. Many are afraid. On the other hand, the purely bilateral discussions with armed factions, which were touchier, were mainly done by Geneva Call. Cooperation with Geneva Call really made a change and launched a new dynamic of engagement with the armed factions on protection issues, which also influenced other international actors. For example, in the last couple of years the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) has regularly issued statements on clashes and risks to schools, which it had never done previously.

What are the main lessons you’ve learned?

With the knowledge and experience we have today, we would not wait for the support of an INGO to conduct systematic and direct engagement. Now we have experience of how to talk to factions and how to initiate and conduct mediation. Now we can do it more directly, quickly and efficiently.

Iraq: the interviewed CSO representatives would like to stay anonymous as the information shared is sensitive

Context and reasons for engagement

In territories liberated from the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) by the Iraqi authorities, the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) – militias endorsed by the Iraqi government from different religious, tribal and political backgrounds – now exercise substantial control over the population. The PMF frequently harass the civilian population – particularly returnees – by preventing access to humanitarian or civil society actors and seriously hampering internally displaced person (IDP) returns by instigating complicated return procedures and vetting processes.

What challenges did you encounter in engaging with armed non-state actors?

The major challenge we encountered in engaging with any PMF was the risk of being perceived as supporting one particular PMF over another. There are instances where a PMF controlling a district is forced out by another PMF through political manoeuvres and/or simple use of force. Consequently, if we had engaged the first PMF in that district directly, the risk was that we would be perceived as close to that PMF and would not have been given access to the district by the other PMF. Being perceived as not neutral could further jeopardise our other activities in peacebuilding, reconciliation and social cohesion. Thus, we chose to engage the different PMFs primarily indirectly and with caution to avoid damaging the perception people have of our organisation.

We capitalised on our contacts within the local authorities in the districts or representatives of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) that had good connections with the different PMFs. Our contacts transmitted messages on our behalf to the PMFs. In some cases, we reached out to community leaders to engage with specific PMFs. This was the case, for example, when we faced access challenges to certain districts. One PMF regularly harassed and even threated to kill or detain our field staff. We reached out to religious and tribal leaders in the community, who talked with the PMF on our behalf and helped us regain acceptance with the armed actor and safe access for our staff.

Generally, many (but not all) local PMFs are receptive to receiving training and being engaged by CSOs to improve their behaviour. This is likely due to the fact that these PMFs emerged from the communities where they are present. They are less ideological and their agenda and goals are focused on their communities. Other PMFs are more difficult for CSOs to engage with. They are more ideological and have more uncompromising views on their objectives and on who their ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’ are. This is why they are less inclined to change their behaviour.

An additional challenge to conducting sustained and comprehensive engagement work has been funding. Very few donors specifically support engagement work by local CSOs. Some donors consider this work too sensitive.

Can you give examples of engagement activities?

Through local and regional authorities’ representatives and community leaders, we have engaged PMFs on a number of issues regarding the protection of civilians. For example, we called on PMFs to stop hampering and delaying the return of IDPs and to simplify the security vetting process. We asked that a unified process be put in place with a single contact point where returnees could submit their application of return and be vetted. This was in the end accepted and implemented. Together with an INGO we also organised training for PMFs on humanitarian norms. Our contacts invited many of the PMFs to this training, which was very successful and appreciated, effectively raising participants’ awareness of humanitarian norms.

How were norms accepted by armed non-state actors and what was the impact of engagement?

Direct and indirect engagement efforts have achieved tangible results. After the training for the PMFs, we witnessed a change in how PMFs were communicating and behaving with civilians. PMF members were more respectful towards civilians. It is still far from how it should be, but there have been notable improvements. The intervention on IDP return procedures and vetting processes also led to concrete change. With some PMFs, achieving positive changes in behaviour is very arduous. Nevertheless, engaging with them is imperative. Establishing meaningful dialogue is a complex process, and it may take some time to see the fruits of engagement. Many PMFs are now aware that they need to improve their public image. Previously they were a highly visible presence on the street and closely monitored the activities of communities. Now they have started to withdraw from public spaces. PMFs’ efforts to gain recognition as official security actors, like the police and the armed forces, gives them an incentive to be perceived as respecting humanitarian norms.

What was your experience of cooperating with international actors on engagement?

The only engagement cooperation with an INGO we have had so far, around training on humanitarian norms, was a very positive experience. Joint activities have been impactful.

What are the main lessons you’ve learned?

Our experiences have reinforced our view that the way we are conducting indirect engagement is the best and safest method to engage with these actors effectively without jeopardising the safety of our staff and our other activities. Carefully choosing contacts who can effectively pass on our messages has led to concrete, positive impacts. It is not so much a question of better, but rather a question of doing it more, and more systematically.

Conclusions

The experiences described here show how joint engagement efforts by CSOs, affected communities and international actors can lead to effective behavioural change among non-state armed groups, and concrete improvements in the protection of communities. Each case highlights the importance of listening to communities and understanding their perspectives and priorities. Protection engagement is a long, step-by-step process requiring continuity and perseverance, and the complementary use of different approaches. As one interviewee said, there is no one-size-fits-all approach to engagement on protection issues. Each approach, in order to be effective, must be precisely tailored to and driven by the context, the community, the non-state armed groups in question, and the protection issue being addressed to lead to effective improvements in the protection of communities.

Carla Ruta is Coordinator at Strengthening Community Protection (SCP). SCP is a newly created Swiss NGO with the purpose of enhancing the effectiveness of communities in their negotiations with armed actors for their own protection in situations of armed violence and conflict.