Liberia (May 1997)

Major progress has been made in the Liberian peace process in the last few months. Implementation of the Abuja II accord, signed in August last year, has proceeded, with over 20,000 fighters disarmed, relative security throughout the country, and preparations under way for elections.

The elections were initially planned for 30 May, but have been postponed due to delays in seating the Electoral Commission, and to allow enough time to ensure that preparations are completed. In spite of the new optimistic climate, many observers remain cautious. Thirteen peace agreements have so far failed in Liberia. Caches of hidden arms have been periodically discovered by ECOMOG, the West African peace keeping force, and factional command structures upcountry have in many places been transformed into civilian entities, enabling factions to retain control over their previous areas of influence. The most powerful faction leader, Charles Taylor, remains one of the strongest candidates in the elections, giving rise to fears about his course of action whether he wins or loses.

The postponement has been called for by various sections of society in Liberia, including the Electoral Commission itself, to gain time for logistical organisation as well as for voter education and campaigning. Many have been worried that Taylor’s high profile and command of public relations techniques may give him an advantage over civilian candidates including Ellen Johnson Sirleaf who only declared her candidacy in late April. She appears as one of the more credible candidates, having had only a spectator’s involvement in the civil war, and having served in many top administrative posts in Liberia and internationally over her long career. Although postponement will help ensure that the elections are held in as free and fair a manner as possible, it is likely to be a destabilising factor, and allows the status quo of factional control over the government and economy to continue.

The issue of whether democratic elections can in themselves solve the deeper conflicts in Liberian society that led to the current war, has been little discussed. If Charles Taylor wins a majority mandate, the pattern of illegal use of economic resources and political impunity may remain in place. The political economy has developed during the war with violence used as a direct means of expropriation by the elite, both politicians and fighters. Even if the terroristic violence perpetrated by fighters against civilians is reduced, the structures of illegally-based patronage systems may not disappear. Until the transparency and accountability of the government and its institutions can be assured, the basis for conflict will remain. These areas have so far not been a priority among donor governments or ECOWAS countries, led by Nigeria, who are overseeing the peace process.

These issues are particularly relevant for the aid community as it moves towards planning rehabilitation and reconstruction activities. In Liberia this will involve the resettlement of over a million refugees and internally displaced, and assisting with the rebuilding of the vast economic and social infrastructure that has been destroyed in the war. The UN agencies and NGOs are making tentative plans, with UNHCR having decided to encourage ‘voluntary’ repatriation, and relief work becoming more oriented towards rehabilitation activities. Good co-ordination on operational issues continues within the aid community, with consultation on policy at all levels. However, the pressure from donors to expand activities has to be juggled with the commitment by the NGO community in particular to minimising any negative effects of aid including contributing to the legitimisation of factional authority. Many agencies are currently able to work relatively independently of the government, but if larger-scale rehabilitation is to take place, the issue of the role of the Liberian state structures in welfare provision etc. will have to be faced.

The strong commitment at diplomatic and donor levels to the current peace process, which has led to improvements in the funding and structures of both ECOMOG and UNOMIL, has contributed to the real progress in the implementation so far of Abuja II. Many observers believe however that the threat of sanctions against faction leaders and politicians was the key factor in bringing them to the current position. The emphasis that has since been put on ‘normalisation’ has led to a more pragmatic approach of appeasement towards the warring factions. The release of former ULIMO-K faction leader Alhaji Kromah by ECOMOG, following his arrest for possession of large amounts of arms in March, demonstrated this approach.

It is crucial that political pressure is maintained during the coming months until the elections are held. The factions have shown on numerous occasions their willingness to diverge from agreed arrangements, as the Liberians say, “the leopard does not change its spots”. The coming months will present, as ever, a difficult and dangerous policy environment in Liberia. Unless political pressure is stepped up, fighters and factions may resort to violence again, to maintain their access to resources and power. Unless efforts are made to support accountability and transparency within state institutions, the elections themselves may achieve little for Liberia’s search for peace. The recent fighting in neighbouring Sierra Leone highlights the failure of democracy there to resolve the conflict, and underlines the importance of addressing the deeper issues, which in this region are centred around the distribution of resources within the political economy.