Five key lessons from multi-hazard preparedness in Nigeria

November 20, 2026

Olayinka Afolabi

A presenter holds up a colour-coded chart while participants seated around a table review handouts at an emergency preparedness workshop for stakeholders in Borno State, Nigeria.

Nigeria does not lack information about humanitarian risk. Flood forecasts, conflict analysis, disease surveillance and community reports regularly identify where threats are increasing. The more salient question is whether that information changes what institutions do before people are affected.

I confronted this question while serving as UNICEF’s technical focal point in support of government-led emergency preparedness processes. These included the 2021 Nigeria Countrywide Risk Analysis, its 2024 update, the National Contingency Plan and preparedness exercises in the Northwest. The analyses covered all 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory and examined risks at local-government level. The national plan subsequently provided an overarching framework across Nigeria’s six geopolitical zones, with State Emergency Management Agencies expected to adopt and adapt it.

This was important progress. Yet our experience also showed that producing an analysis or plan is only the beginning. During preparedness work, the same questions kept returning. Who has authority to act on a warning? Which locations should be prioritised? How will state plans reach local government areas and communities? Are supplies available, and who can release them? What happens to agreed actions after a workshop ends?

The lessons below come from supporting national and subnational institutions to answer these questions. They do not suggest that every gap has been resolved. They show how risk information can be moved closer to operational decisions, and where sustained leadership is still required.

1. Risk analysis must guide practical decisions

A risk map has limited value if it remains a technical product. Its purpose is to help leaders make choices: where to focus preparedness, which population groups may need support, what capacity is missing and what action should be triggered when a threat reaches an agreed level.

The countrywide analyses created a shared picture of multiple risks across Nigeria. The 2024 update also reflected increasing government ownership through the National Emergency Management Agency’s (NEMA) Geospatial Centre. NEMA now develops more granular maps using information from the Annual Flood Outlook and disseminates them to states and local government areas. This is a significant shift because the institution responsible for coordinating emergencies is increasingly able to produce and use its own analysis.

In practice, however, the hardest step is not reaching agreement that a risk exists, but converting that agreement into an assigned, financed and authorised action. A high-risk classification should lead to a clear decision: which local governments require simulations, which evacuation routes need verification, what supplies should be positioned and who will communicate with communities. Without these links, risk analysis can inform discussion without changing readiness.

My professional judgement is that a useful analysis should be assessed by the decisions and investments it influences, not by the sophistication of the map alone. Every priority risk should therefore be connected to an owner, trigger, action, resource requirement and review date.

2. Bring preparedness closer to at-risk locations

National frameworks matter, but emergencies are first experienced and managed locally. State agencies, Local Emergency Management Committees, sector officials, traditional and religious leaders, women’s groups, volunteers and community organisations often hold the knowledge needed to turn a general warning into action.

In 2026, government-led preparedness workshops and simulation exercises were conducted in flood-prone Northwest states, including Katsina, Kebbi and Sokoto. Local government areas identified through NEMA’s risk mapping were invited to work with state and national actors. Local authorities in Zamfara conducted a two-day flood preparedness workshop and simulation in Gusau on 3 and 4 June 2025, followed by further multi-hazard planning in 2026.

The Sokoto exercise used a compound scenario involving riverine and flash flooding, displacement, cholera risk, damaged access routes and insecurity. Participants had to interpret warnings, consider evacuation, activate coordination arrangements, request rapid assessment, address access constraints and plan a multisector response. The scenario was deliberately difficult because real emergencies do not respect sector plans or institutional boundaries.

This approach exposed issues that a meeting alone could miss: whether alerts reached the right people, whether local actors understood their roles, whether communication moved quickly between community, local-government and state levels, and whether decision-makers had enough information to act. The lesson is simple: preparedness should be tested where risk is experienced, with the people who will make or carry out the first decisions.

3. Simulations must lead to institutional change

A simulation is not successful merely because participants complete it. Its value lies in what changes afterwards. Each exercise should end with a structured debrief, an honest record of gaps and a time-bound improvement plan.

The Northwest exercises identified recurring needs: simpler warning messages in local languages, clearer emergency communication flowcharts, stronger Local Emergency Management Committees, agreed rapid-assessment tools, improved media engagement, functioning sector coordination and political support for difficult measures such as relocation from high-risk areas. These findings were captured in workshop communiqués and action plans rather than treated as observations for facilitators alone.

The exercises also had to reflect different levels of institutional readiness. Sokoto, Kebbi and Zamfara had already developed and validated state procedures for coordinated response to sudden-onset emergencies in July and August 2025. The 2026 exercises helped test, disseminate or strengthen these arrangements; they did not create them. Katsina’s preparedness process, by contrast, identified the development and testing of a state activation procedure as an outstanding action.

This distinction matters. A common weakness in preparedness reporting is to present participation as an outcome. Attendance does not show that roles are clearer or that response will be faster. Leaders should instead ask what the exercise changed: Was an approval secured? Was the procedure revised? Was a communication chain tested? Was responsibility for a gap assigned? A simulation becomes an operational investment only when its findings are converted into institutional decisions and then checked in the next exercise or real response.

4. Connect plans to supplies and release arrangements

Even a well-tested plan will fail if responders cannot access essential supplies at the required time. Pre-positioning is important, but it is only one part of readiness. Agencies also need current stock information, assessment and targeting arrangements, release authority, transport, last-mile distribution plans and accountability for use.

This became visible in Sokoto in 2026. In one response, government agencies and the Nigerian Red Cross, with UNICEF support, distributed 991 WASH kits to displaced and vulnerable households in five local government areas. The kits had been pre-positioned as contingency supplies. (This example should not be read as evidence that a particular workshop or simulation directly caused either distribution.)

Their practical value is different: they show why planning, stocks and release arrangements must be treated as one chain. Supplies in a warehouse do not protect people unless the need is identified, release is authorised and delivery is possible. Likewise, a contingency plan that lists commodities but does not specify where they are held, who controls them or how they will reach an affected location creates false confidence.

Preparedness reviews should therefore test the entire pathway from forecast to delivery. Leaders need to know what is available, where it is, when it expires, who can authorise movement and what access constraints could delay distribution.

5. Follow through, monitor implementation and learn

Preparedness does not end when a workshop closes or a simulation is completed. The difficult part is ensuring that agreed actions remain visible, assigned and monitored after participants return to their institutions.

Following the Northwest exercises, State Emergency Management Agencies were expected to coordinate implementation of action points. This included communication flows linking community, local-government and state levels, as well as overall and sector-specific coordination arrangements for functions such as assessment, search and rescue, security and response planning. Simple communication platforms, including WhatsApp groups, connected women’s groups, community organisations, vigilante groups, civil society organisations and Red Cross detachments with Local Emergency Management Committees. These committees could then transmit warnings, incident reports and requests for support to state agencies.

The UNICEF Nigeria mid-year humanitarian situation report for 2026 records examples of progress: Katsina validated an emergency communication flowchart, established inter-sector coordination, began local-level early-warning dissemination, and secured state funding for preparedness activities in 37 affected communities. Kebbi completed humanitarian-access mapping and disseminated its emergency coordination procedure. Sokoto activated a disaster-risk stakeholder platform and strengthened multisector assessment and planning, while Zamfara improved inter-agency coordination and access mapping.

Several actions nevertheless remain under implementation. Follow-through can lose momentum because of limited technical capacity, inadequate funding, late preparation, competing institutional priorities and overlapping mandates. Changes in focal persons or the absence of decision-makers can also delay approval.

For me, the lesson is that follow-up must be designed as part of preparedness. Every recommendation needs an owner, timeline, resource requirement and evidence of completion. Progress should be reviewed regularly, and unresolved decisions escalated early with practical options. An after-action review is valuable not because of how many recommendations it produces, but because those recommendations improve the next preparedness and response cycle.

Conclusion

Nigeria has made important progress in building a chain from countrywide risk analysis to contingency planning, early warning, simulations, state procedures and operational response. Experience from the Northwest shows, however, that every link must work.

Risk information must guide practical decisions. National plans must be domesticated at state and local levels. Simulations must lead to institutional improvements, while contingency supplies must be connected to assessment, release and delivery arrangements. Most importantly, agreed actions must be monitored until gaps are closed.

Preparedness becomes meaningful when institutions and communities can use risk information to act. Its measure is not the number of maps, plans or workshops completed, but whether they enable earlier, coordinated and locally owned action before a crisis escalates.


Olayinka Afolabi is an Emergency Specialist with UNICEF Nigeria. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of UNICEF or the United Nations.

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