Syrian RLOs and the earthquake response: have we learned a lesson?

Since the start of the Syrian uprising in 2011, against the backdrop of the Arab Spring, hundreds of thousands of grave human rights violations have been committed, mainly by the Syrian regime (headed by Bashar al-Assad) and its allies. There has been overwhelming evidence that the Assad regime has engaged in repeated violations: disproportionate attacks on civilians, siege tactics, use of prohibited weapons such as chemical weapons, rape, torture, and attacks on humanitarian aid and medical facilities. According to former war crimes prosecutor Stephen Rapp, there is ‘better evidence’ against the Syrian president than was used against ‘the Nazis at Nuremberg’.

During the Syrian uprising, the international community attempted to hold the perpetrators accountable in Syria, either through the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) or the Human Rights Council. Unfortunately, these attempts failed for numerous reasons. First, the international geopolitical interests in Syria perpetuated the conflict and caused it to grow rapidly, by supporting the regime with air and land military forces. The most prominent support comes from Russia and Iran. The second reason is that there are limited ways to hold the Syrian regime accountable through existing justice mechanisms because Syria is not a signatory to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The adherence of the 123 states to the Rome Statute would allow a referral from the Security Council to attribute jurisdiction to the International Court of Justice with the objective of investigating the war crimes, genocide, or crimes against humanity committed by all conflicting parties in the Syrian conflict. The third reason is that the referral for responsibility to protect civilians under humanitarian intervention from the Security Council has failed because of the veto system at the UNSC, which allows the five permanent member states to use the veto to block international intervention to protect civilians and to maintain peace and international security. Thus, ‘the double vetoes’ by Russia and China represent one of the major obstacles to bringing Syria to the International Court of Justice or allowing the international community to intervene.

Therefore, these human rights violations were not only the result of a dictatorial regime but also a consequence of the international community’s apathy. Throughout the conflict, discussions about the crisis in Syria have been driven more by political interests than a focus on human rights.

Silence kills

During the past 13 years, Syrians have been subject to international complicity and apathy, even when confronted with a natural disaster that disregards borders. During the February 2023 earthquake that hit northwest Syria, over 4.5 million individuals were affected, 60% of whom were internally displaced persons (IDPs) who had already experienced multiple displacements in the past. The earthquake tragically claimed the lives of 4,191 Syrians in northwest Syria, 394 in regime-held areas, and 5,439 Syrian refugees in Türkiye. Among the casualties, one-third were children and women, while many others were injured or forced to flee their homes.

This raises the question of whether this lack of concern stems from the identity of the victims: the international solidarity with Ukraine wasn’t equalled when it came to other countries located outside Europe. The broken aid system failed people in Syria and beyond.

While humanitarian aid and rescue teams swiftly arrived in Türkiye within 24 hours of the earthquakes, the northwest region of Syria received zero international assistance. The border remained closed to humanitarian aid, but Türkiye opened it for the repatriation of the bodies of Syrian refugees who lost their lives in southern Türkiye. The White Helmets (or Syria Civil Defence), an IDP-led organisation, have used their expertise gained from rescuing victims of bombardments since 2014 to extricate survivors from under the rubble. They worked tirelessly, though they lacked even the assistance of search-and-rescue dogs to identify trapped victims. The White Helmets declared a state of emergency in northwest Syria, emphasising the crucial importance of the first three days, known as the ‘golden period’, during which the chances of finding survivors are highest. During this critical period, international assistance should be deployed in the form of personnel and equipment to support local rescuers.

Local actors were left to face this natural disaster alone with few resources and an already weak infrastructure. The White Helmets usually receive funding from governments and individual donors, with an annual budget of $21 million. Yet, the earthquake flipped the power dynamic because it was the support that the White Helmets received from local communities in northern Syria, rather than international funding, that enabled them to significantly ramp up their response capacity and cover approximately 60% of the affected areas in the first three days. In the first six days, the daily reports shared by the White Helmets pointed out that zero international assistance was received while daily donations continued from refugee-led organisations (RLOs), IDP-led organisations, and civilians who donated their fuel, funding, trucks, cars, and equipment. These donations saved lives.

The White Helmets rescued 2,950 injured individuals and recovered the bodies of 2,170 deceased individuals. Their search-and-rescue operations spanned 182 sites across 60 communities during the initial phase, witnessing the destruction of over 551 buildings and partial damage to more than 1,578 structures. It took the UN seven days before the first aid convoy entered northwest Syria. Martin Griffiths, the head of the UN’s relief efforts, acknowledged the failure of the UN’s response and the profound sense of abandonment felt by Syrians when the expected supplies still had not arrived.

In Syria, civil society work was and still is prohibited, even in the northwest, which is an opposition-held area. Local organisations can’t register without a legitimate government in the northwest, which is needed to regulate the activities of organisations led by Syrian refugees. Thus, they had to register in Türkiye to receive funding and manage grants. Since mid-2011, the city of Gaziantep has been a hub for Syrian civil society. Consequently, the earthquake’s devastating impact on Gaziantep had an unforeseen and overwhelming effect on RLOs, given their limited capacity. In the first week after the earthquake, banks in Gaziantep were closed, preventing and complicating any financial transactions, and making it difficult for RLOs to raise funds.

Additionally, Syrian RLOs lost their offices and colleagues, resulting in a significant setback for Syrian civil society in its recovery efforts. However, despite this tremendous loss, Syrian RLOs (including the White Helmets) were at the forefront of the humanitarian response. It was remarkable to witness my bereaved and displaced colleagues participating in response meetings via their mobile phones while on the streets or in their cars. Despite the political circumstances, including control of the area by the Türkiye-backed Syrian National Army and extremist groups such as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, as well as ongoing aerial bombardment, numerous RLOs continued their recovery work in the northwest. Nevertheless, the ability of these organisations to secure funding remains uncertain due to the current humanitarian aid system and the business-as-usual approach to aid delivery, which devalue the role of local actors and limit them to a passive role. The main challenge is that, when it comes to aid funding, preference is given to international organisations rather than local groups or RLOs. Even if the local organisations receive funds, these are very limited in terms of priorities and the scope of work, which have already been identified by international actors who have neither lived experience nor relevant connections to affected communities in the conflict countries. Adopting a one-size-fits-all approach without considering the politics behind the flows and the priorities where money is spent doesn’t work.

Fixing the system through accountability

The genocide in Rwanda, the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the use of chemical attacks in Syria – these are just a few examples where the same system has failed civilians. Over the years, the international aid system has not changed its approach; it considers survivors only as victims who are waiting for it to save them, rather than enabling survivors and local initiatives to achieve meaningful solutions.

The unequal power dynamics and the absence of meaningful roles for local organisations have contributed to the mismanagement and failure of aid efforts. Unfortunately, this pattern repeats itself because no significant structural changes have been made to address the gap between local organisations and international actors, which is necessary to prevent future failures.

In Syria and Haiti, the challenges faced in responding to and recovering from earthquakes vary. Yet in both countries, the political dynamics and geopolitical interests impacted decision-making processes, resource mobilisation, coordination, and the overall effectiveness of the response efforts. Therefore, some parallels can be drawn regarding the shortcomings in responding to these crises:

1. Inadequate international coordination: In both cases, there were challenges in effectively mobilising and coordinating resources from various countries and organisations. The lack of a unified and well-coordinated response hindered the delivery of timely and efficient assistance to those in need.
2. Slow humanitarian response: In both Syria and Haiti, there were delays in providing essential supplies, medical assistance, and other forms of aid to affected communities. The delays were partly due to logistical challenges, limited access to affected areas, and difficulties in coordinating relief efforts.
3. Insufficient local capacity-building and preparedness: The response to the earthquakes in both Syria and Haiti revealed the need for stronger local capacity-building. There were challenges in effectively utilising and empowering local organisations and responders. Strengthening local capacity to respond to emergencies can help ensure a more timely and effective response, as local actors possess knowledge of the context and can navigate challenges more efficiently.

Finally, there is an enduring asymmetric power dynamic between RLOs and international actors. Even in Ukraine, where there was the international political will to help civilians there, local organisations and RLOs were still overlooked by the international community. According to Humanitarian Outcomes, Ukrainian national non-governmental organisations ‘have received only 4.4 million in direct funding, or 0.003%’, between February and May 2022.

Decision-making in humanitarian aid does not include the voices of local organisations. While the importance of localisation is often emphasised by the UN system and donors, the rhetoric does not always align with the practical reality. Responding effectively to such a large-scale tragedy requires strong coordination between local and international actors to avoid duplication and efficiently meet the needs of affected communities. RLOs in Syria and beyond must have a seat at the decision-making table. Power asymmetry must be addressed to ensure agency for local actors. In conflict-affected countries, local organisations and leaders should be involved at every level of the humanitarian response including clusters and donor conferences as well as in other related forums such as the UN General Assembly, the Human Rights Council, and the Grand Bargain, among others.

Muzna Dureid is Advocacy and Partnership Manager at Nobel Women’s Initiative. She was a former Senior Program Development Officer with the White Helmets and a former refugee from Syria, now based in Canada.