Gaza’s humanitarian siege: cross-border solidarity for rescue

Since 7 October 2023, Gaza has been experiencing a devastating humanitarian catastrophe. The death toll has exceeded 62,000, with over 155,000 Palestinians facing life-threatening injuries. Around 90% of the population has been displaced, numerous times.

Under a tightened siege, civilians remain in urgent need of comprehensive humanitarian assistance. Some areas in Gaza, including Gaza Governorate, have been declared famine-affected, with famine-related deaths recorded. Other regions remain on the brink of famine; one in every three people goes for days without food, and children under the age of five (totalling 320,000 children) are at risk of acute malnutrition.

In response, humanitarian actors – both local and international – have struggled to lead effective aid efforts. The humanitarian plight is exacerbated by Israel’s blockade on aid and the direct targeting of humanitarian personnel, depriving Gazans of essential supplies. Although some strategies have helped navigate the blockade and adapt operations under siege, they remain constrained and inadequate. This demands not just urgent action but a reformation of the prevailing humanitarian approaches in such contexts.

Navigating aid delivery under siege

Throughout the crisis, humanitarian response has largely relied on local efforts, involving both local organisations and affected communities. However, this reflects a form of forced localisation, since it was the only viable option amid the Israeli-imposed aid blockade and extreme security risks that forced the withdrawal of international staff. Beyond the romanticisation of local actors and their sacrifices, this situation reflects the failure of the global humanitarian architecture, evident in severe access restrictions and the blockade, the withdrawal of international actors, and the resulting operational burden on local staff.

These failures have had numerous impacts on the ground, ranging from the increased role of the Palestine Red Crescent Society (PRCS), to the shifting of critical operational responsibilities to local staff. The PRCS emerged as a key local actor in addressing the gaps created by access restrictions and the blockade. Operating under extreme risk, the PRCS activated its Central Emergency Operations Room in Gaza and has functioned continuously to provide aid, treat casualties and run ambulance services. Therefore, the minimal international humanitarian presence is instead filled by local actors, where their willingness to take personal and institutional risks is the backbone of Gaza’s survival. And the threat to these aid workers is omnipresent: on 23 March, eight PRCS medics, five Civil Defense workers, and one United Nations (UN) staff member were killed following Israeli targeting of ambulances in al-Hashaashin, Rafah, during aid operations.

Even within international organisations operating in Gaza, the operational weight has shifted to local staff. As a local humanitarian worker noted, ‘almost 95% of the field work was done through local staff, who had to go into the field and do the actual work. Much international staff contribution was restricted to office work, organising and planning.’ The quotes used in the article were collected through semi-structured interviews with local humanitarian workers in Gaza. Ethical approval was secured prior to conducting the interviews, and participants provided informed consent, including permission for the use of anonymised excerpts in publications. This underlines the indispensable role played by Palestinians – particularly Gazans – in conducting humanitarian operations. For instance, of approximately 13,000 UN staff in Gaza earlier this year, only 100 were international personnel – which was further reduced to 70 due to security concerns – while the critical humanitarian tasks, such as healthcare delivery and aid provision, are performed by local personnel. This demonstrates the forced localisation in Gaza, situating it as a structural necessity to adapt to the devastating crisis.

Beyond formal organisations, local communities serve as key partners in meeting humanitarian needs. Strong social cohesion and community engagement enabled participatory and horizontal methods of aid delivery. Through training, procurement of supplies and community grants, Gazan communities lead critical aid efforts, such as food distribution and education and other services for children. This places affected communities at the heart of aid efforts.

Moreover, another local humanitarian worker emphasised the vital role of local institutions, highlighting ‘the impressive, unique and crucial work of municipalities. They have done whatever possible.’ They addressed the service gaps that resulted from international organisations’ forced withdrawal from Gaza. This level of localised response and the involvement of these actors highlighted the sense of ownership and transparency, while breaking dependency on external actors, which carries the risks of aid politicisation.

In sum, Gaza’s experience shows how resilience and social cohesion enabled local actors and communities to sustain life amid humanitarian paralysis. Forced localisation shifted leadership and responsibility onto Palestinians themselves, with local organisations, communities and municipalities carrying the operational burden under siege. This resilience, while remarkable, underscores both the systemic failures of the global humanitarian system and the urgent need for risk-sharing and protection mechanisms that do not abandon local actors to face crises alone.

International actors’ role in Gaza – and the limits of the humanitarian sector

Local efforts have been significant and relatively effective, especially considering the limited capacities and resources available. But complementary forces and mechanisms are essential in sustaining local aid efforts in Gaza.

The solidarity of regional actors with local humanitarian responders is instrumental in navigating Gaza’s complex crisis. The Egyptian Red Crescent had critical involvement by conducting almost 900,000 health services, easing the burden on local actors. As explained by a humanitarian worker in Gaza, ‘there is a coordination between the two red crescents – the Red Crescent of Palestine and the Red Crescent of Egypt – which provides a logistical and technical support for aid efforts in Gaza’. This action not only supported local organisations’ humanitarian operations but also enhanced their resilience, showing that they are not alone in this mission.

Beyond regional solidarity, international actors employed multiple channels to bypass the Israeli aid blockade on Gaza. The UN and widespread protests have called for Israel to end the blockade on Gaza and prevent famine. Such efforts pushed Israel to approve aid entry into Gaza, establish a humanitarian corridor and implement temporary humanitarian pauses for aid delivery.

But a major barrier to effective humanitarian response is deliberate aid denial and the targeting of aid workers. This is evident in, for instance, the intentional killing of 30 PRCS members and the destruction of critical resources for aid operations. The absence of accountability and legal mechanisms to prevent such attacks has normalised such violations, thus undermining localised efforts in Gaza. This also negatively affects international solidarity endeavours, with the absence of protection frameworks meaning aid ships cannot enter Gaza.

Global solidarity has also failed to achieve sustainable impact. The initial ceasefire in Gaza collapsed just two months after it was reached, significantly limiting the effect of localised efforts. Leading solidarity efforts in a context like Gaza where humanitarian workers are seen as legitimate military targets must be accompanied by a political decision, beginning with a redistribution of influence within the international system. The significant influence of the United States (US) over the global humanitarian architecture, combined with its steadfast support for Israel, has shaped the conditions of aid efforts in Gaza, including solidarity efforts.

While national governments play the bigger role in this regard, state-led solidarity has been conditional and contingent on non-humanitarian factors. Although 28 countries (including the United Kingdom, Japan, and several European nations) attempted to influence the Israeli government and called for an end to the war in Gaza, Israel was able to count on US support – its most powerful ally since the country’s establishment in 1948 – to evade such pressures. This exposes not only how countries lack influence over Israel, but also how Israel’s profound alliance with the US undermines legal frameworks that are crucial for holding all parties accountable for violations.

More importantly, Gaza’s neighbouring countries are in critical positions to lead, facilitate and support cross-border solidarity, yet several factors limit their political will to engage in such efforts. One critical factor is US influence, rather than Israel itself, over the region. For instance, Jordan, as a key regional ally to the US and a trade partner with Israel, fears Washington’s plan to forcibly relocate Gazans to its territory, which discourages Jordan from engaging in cross-border solidarity movements. This was reflected in Jordan’s efforts to impose barriers in the face of humanitarian efforts directed towards Gaza. For instance, reports reveal that Jordan instrumentalised Gaza’s humanitarian needs, profiting up to $400,000 per Gaza aid airdrop and $2,200 for every aid truck entering Gaza. Yet, the Jordanian government and the Jordan Hashemite Charity Organization, an official body overseeing humanitarian aid into Gaza, denied such claims.

Beyond that, the US leverages its power to ensure that Egypt refrains from actions that contradict Israeli interests and instead remains a strategic ally both to the US and Israel. Amid the devastating economic crisis in Egypt, the US government has pressured Cairo to enhance its economic and security relations with Israel in exchange for continued economic support from Washington. While the immediate pressure comes from the US, the ultimate aim is to help Israel achieve its agendas, effectively compelling neighbouring countries to be cooperative and silent on matters related to Gaza. The Egyptian government, for example, delivered aid through Rafah’s crossing border only when Israel gave it permission. Therefore, Egypt’s aid delivery remains contingent on Israel’s approval and Jordan’s approach to aid provision involves conditional measures that align with its own political and economic interests.

These actions, although helpful in keeping some people alive temporarily, reduce solidarity to a political instrument employed to serve state interests, risking the lives of almost two million people in Gaza.

Resilience under siege: key lessons for future crises

Gaza’s experience shows that in crises defined by violence and blockade, local actors are often the only ones able to sustain life-saving assistance. As one local humanitarian noted, ‘local communities are the first responders… they do the work. They should be given the bigger roles.’ Localisation should therefore be embedded in preparedness strategies, not just deployed as an emergency measure, through pre-crisis resource delivery, coordination with regional and international actors, capacity-building, and leadership structures that function in high-risk contexts.

While international actors were forced to suspend their in-person operations due to access restrictions and security risks, local responders have remained in Gaza, carrying the full operational burden. Strengthening their capacity requires regional cooperation that shares information, exchanges expertise, and coordinates with neighbouring countries to create humanitarian ‘bridges’ during crises. The international humanitarian cluster system could provide a platform for such cross-border partnerships, enabling timely and context-appropriate responses. Additionally, international and regional actors must adopt systemic risk-sharing mechanisms. Among other strategies, these mechanisms include rotating international humanitarian workers to relieve local staff and reduce fatigue, using humanitarian diplomacy and advocacy to protect aid workers and ensure aid entry, and facilitating the exchange of expertise and information between local and international actors. Without these, local resilience will continue to erode. Support from well-trained external teams should complement, not lead, local efforts, ensuring respect for local agency and ownership.

Neighbouring states such as Egypt and Jordan have a critical role in sustaining humanitarian action by facilitating solidarity efforts, given their geographic proximity and shared historical and cultural ties with Gaza. Together with states having the greatest influence over Israel, mainly the US, they must use political leverage to press for an immediate ceasefire and mobilise global actors to enforce legal and accountability measures. This would help lift the aid blockade and protect aid workers, including those arriving from abroad. With local resilience stretched to its limits, such actions are no longer optional gestures of goodwill but essential measures to protect the lives of those still inside Gaza.

Manoug Antaby is Research Assistant at the Center for Conflict and Humanitarian Studies.