Managing counterterrorism challenges within climate resilience and humanitarian and development initiatives in Niger

Humanitarian needs in Niger remain significant and geographically uneven. The Global Humanitarian Overview 2026 reports that, as of December 2025, around 2.6 million people in 32 of the country’s 63 departments require aid.

Internally displaced persons and refugees are present in significant numbers in Niger as of February 2026. Food insecurity and malnutrition continue to affect millions of people, with projections indicating that 2.4 million people are expected to face severe food insecurity during the June−August 2026 lean season. Climate shocks further intensify vulnerability: recurrent flooding has affected large numbers of people in recent years, with significant impacts also reported in urban areas such as Niamey.

Regional dynamics highlight the operational context: Diffa hosts large displaced populations affected by Lake Chad Basin insecurity, Maradi hosts tens of thousands of refugees from Nigeria, and Niamey faces increasing exposure to urban flooding and internal migration pressures. Many of the communities experiencing the highest vulnerability are located in areas where administrative, access and compliance constraints also affect programme feasibility.

Agricultural development programmes and operational constraints

Agricultural development programmes constitute a central pillar of resilience strategies in Niger, where rural livelihoods depend heavily on rainfed farming and pastoral production. National and international partners have invested in irrigation systems, climate-smart agriculture training, seed distribution, livestock vaccination campaigns and rural infrastructure to reduce vulnerability to climate shocks. These initiatives aim to stabilise household incomes, strengthen food availability and support local markets that are frequently disrupted by insecurity and displacement. Despite their importance, agricultural development programmes operate within an environment increasingly shaped by counterterrorism compliance systems and rising counterterrorism alert levels.

Rising counterterrorism alert levels

Rising counterterrorism alert levels have become one of the most consequential operational factors shaping humanitarian and development programming in Niger. Security risks intensified following the January 2026 attack on Diori Hamani International Airport and the adjacent military airbase in Niamey, carried out by Islamic State-linked militants using coordinated assaults. Such incidents typically trigger strengthened national security measures, increased monitoring of financial flows and enhanced scrutiny of partner organisations, slowing the disbursement of humanitarian funds and delaying payments to local implementing partners. In several instances, humanitarian agencies have reported temporary suspension or additional screening of mobile money and bank transfers to field offices, complicating the timely delivery of cash-based assistance to displaced households.

Operational access can also be affected. Due to insecurity, authorities have imposed movement restrictions and required escorts for access to certain areas, particularly in border regions. These measures can delay field assessments, agricultural input distributions and monitoring visits. In addition, enhanced due-diligence requirements for local partners have sometimes prolonged the contracting process, requiring organisations to conduct additional compliance reviews before activities can begin in higher-risk districts. While these measures aim to protect national stability and reduce diversion risks, they also produce cascading operational effects that influence programme feasibility, implementation timelines and targeting decisions.

Rising counterterrorism alert levels often lead to the introduction of additional administrative requirements, including enhanced partner verification procedures, stricter reporting standards and additional authorisations for project approvals and financial transfers. In high-risk regions, these requirements can extend implementation timelines and increase operational costs. For climate resilience programmes dependent on seasonal agricultural cycles, even short delays in financial transfers or procurement approvals can significantly affect programme effectiveness.

Several humanitarian organisations operating in the Sahel illustrate how counterterrorism compliance systems affect programme implementation. Counterterrorism frameworks and donor-imposed safeguards have significantly reshaped the operational environment for humanitarian actors, particularly in high-risk contexts, as highlighted in the Norwegian Refugee Council’s study on the impact of donor counterterrorism measures on principled humanitarian action. International non-governmental organisations (NGO)s such as the Norwegian Refugee Council and the Danish Refugee Council report that these measures require extensive partner due diligence, vetting and screening procedures, alongside heightened administrative demands related to financial monitoring and compliance verification, as further outlined in the Charity & Security Network’s guidance on NGOs’ due diligence and risk mitigation. While intended to prevent diversion of aid, such requirements often increase bureaucratic burdens, delay programme delivery, and can inadvertently constrain humanitarian access and principled action in complex emergencies. These procedures aim to prevent diversion of funds to armed groups but can also delay funding transfers and project approvals. At the same time, national NGOs working in the region face complex compliance procedures that limit their ability to access direct humanitarian funding and often require partnerships with international NGOs to meet donor verification standards.

The operational implications of rising counterterrorism alert levels extend beyond administrative procedures. Financial institutions operating in fragile environments frequently adjust risk thresholds following major security incidents, sometimes introducing additional compliance checks for transfers to certain geographic areas. These adjustments can slow the disbursement of programme funds, complicate cash-based assistance delivery and require implementing agencies to develop alternative transfer arrangements. As a result, programme teams must increasingly plan for compliance-related delays and incorporate contingency implementation strategies into programme design.

Operational vignette: adapting targeting decisions under compliance constraints

Development actors operating in Diffa illustrate how programmes designed to strengthen livelihoods and resilience must adapt to fragile and conflict-affected environments. The International Fund for Agricultural Development implements the Family Farming Development Programme in Diffa and Agadez, which supports more than 63,000 rural households through irrigation development, farmer training and rural entrepreneurship initiatives. By 2025, the programme had rehabilitated nearly 50,000 hectares of land and expanded farmer support networks in the region. However, the programme operates in a fragile context affected by insecurity and displacement, requiring flexible implementation arrangements and close coordination with humanitarian actors. Similarly, the World Bank’s Agricultural and Livestock Transformation Project supports agricultural productivity and market access in vulnerable regions of Niger, including areas affected by conflict and climate shocks. Development projects in these regions must integrate risk-management and adaptive implementation strategies because insecurity and counterterrorism operations can affect mobility, programme timelines and the delivery of agricultural support services.

To avoid missing the agricultural support window, agencies temporarily prioritised activities in accessible communes of Maradi and peri-urban Niamey, where verification procedures were completed more rapidly and financial transfers could be executed without interruption. Activities in Diffa were introduced in phased stages once compliance procedures were finalised. The experience highlighted how rising counterterrorism alert levels and associated compliance requirements can indirectly shape the sequencing of programme delivery even when needs-based targeting remains the guiding principle.

Rising counterterrorism alert levels also influence donor compliance frameworks. Donor agencies responding to evolving security threats often strengthen due-diligence requirements and monitoring expectations, requiring implementing organisations to demonstrate enhanced compliance capacity. While necessary for safeguarding assistance integrity, these additional requirements can create operational asymmetries between regions where compliance procedures can be completed rapidly and those where verification processes are more complex. Over time, these asymmetries can contribute to geographic variations in programme continuity.

These alert levels influence agricultural programming in several ways. Following major security incidents, counterterrorism alert levels in Niger often trigger operational restrictions that affect agricultural and resilience programmes. For example, on 21 March 2024, militants from the Islamic State–Sahel Province ambushed Nigerien forces between Téguey and Bankilaré in the Tillabéri region, killing at least 23 soldiers and injuring several others. The attack took place in the Liptako-Gourma tri-border area, where jihadist groups frequently target military units and civilian communities. In the aftermath of such incidents, authorities and humanitarian security mechanisms often impose movement restrictions and escort requirements for organisations operating in affected areas. Humanitarian and development actors working in Tillabéri have reported that recurrent attacks by non-state armed groups have made humanitarian access increasingly difficult, requiring adapted delivery modalities and limiting field presence. These constraints directly affect programmes supporting rural livelihoods.

For organisations implementing agricultural resilience projects such as seed distribution, irrigation rehabilitation or livestock support, restricted access to farming zones and pastoral corridors can delay field assessments, monitoring visits and the transport of agricultural inputs. In regions where interventions must align with planting seasons, even short disruptions caused by security incidents can significantly reduce programme effectiveness.

Finally, sustained donor engagement is required to ensure that agricultural resilience programmes remain viable under evolving security conditions. Flexible funding arrangements, multi-year programme cycles and explicit risk-sharing provisions enable implementing partners to continue operating in higher-risk rural areas without shifting investments solely toward low-risk zones. Aligning agricultural development strategies with broader compliance dialogue between governments, donors and operational agencies can help maintain needs-based targeting while preserving the integrity of counterterrorism risk-management systems. Such alignment ensures that farmers and pastoralists in insecure environments are not excluded from long-term resilience investments essential for sustainable national food security.

Conclusion: a call for policy and practice change

Counterterrorism compliance systems are now a structural component of humanitarian and development operations in Niger. While these frameworks are essential for safeguarding assistance from diversion, they also shape the operational geography and continuity of programmes, particularly in regions experiencing the highest levels of climate vulnerability, displacement and insecurity. The escalation of insecurity following the Niamey airport attack illustrates how rapidly changing threat environments can intensify compliance scrutiny, influence financial transfer systems and indirectly affect humanitarian access and targeting decisions.

Addressing these challenges requires coordinated policy and operational adjustments across the humanitarian and development sector. Donors and regulatory authorities should review counterterrorism risk-management policies to ensure that compliance measures do not unintentionally restrict assistance to the highest-risk populations. This includes expanding humanitarian and resilience financing instruments that incorporate explicit risk-sharing provisions, flexible implementation timelines and simplified approval procedures for operations in high-risk environments. Multi-year financing arrangements that allow adaptive programming are particularly important for climate-related resilience initiatives, which require continuity to achieve meaningful impact.

Humanitarian and development organisations should systematically integrate compliance feasibility analysis into programme design and strategic planning. This means assessing not only vulnerability indicators but also financial transfer reliability, partner due-diligence timelines and access constraints when determining delivery modalities. Establishing contingency delivery approaches at the outset, including phased implementation, alternative transfer channels where permitted and diversified partnership arrangements, can help maintain programme continuity when compliance or security conditions shift.

Localisation strategies must also evolve to reflect the operational realities of compliance-driven environments. Investments in local partner compliance capacity, including financial management systems, due-diligence readiness, legal advisory support and predictable funding flows, should be treated as a central programme function rather than an administrative add-on. Without such investments, localisation risks transferring operational risk to local actors without strengthening their ability to manage it effectively.

Finally, system-wide coordination mechanisms, including humanitarian coordination platforms and humanitarian–development nexus frameworks, should incorporate compliance and access analysis into joint planning processes. Regular monitoring of geographic assistance coverage can help identify emerging targeting imbalances early, allowing corrective measures before disparities in programme delivery become entrenched.

Embedding these policy and operational adjustments across the humanitarian and development sector is essential to ensure that counterterrorism risk-management frameworks protect assistance integrity without undermining the delivery of climate, resilience and humanitarian support to the communities most exposed to conflict and climate shocks. Strengthening the alignment between compliance systems and needs-based programming is therefore not only a technical requirement, but a strategic priority for maintaining effective humanitarian action in increasingly regulated operating environments.

Maria Luna Itriago is a humanitarian and development and political affairs specialist with over 10 years of experience in migration governance, protection, and humanitarian diplomacy and negotiation across Africa, Europe and Latin America. She is presently employed in Niger as a Project Manager, overseeing development initiatives that address agricultural livelihoods and climate resilience.