Response analysis and response choice in food security crises: a roadmap

In brief

- The range of response options available to deal with food security crises has increased significantly, requiring more choices on the part of implementing agencies. While significant effort has gone into improving needs assessments and situation analyses to inform programme response choices, there is still often a disconnect between the kind of information typically provided by assessments and the kind of information that response choice requires.
- Many agencies are attempting to diversify their response strategies, and a number of tools have been developed to facilitate the process of response analysis. However, they are under-utilised, there is little in the way of common currency among them and certainly no overall 'roadmap' to help field staff understand the overall process of response analysis, and determine which tools to use, much less how to use them effectively.
- This Network Paper provides guidance to decision-makers by presenting response analysis and the overall process of response choice from several different perspectives. This is not a prescriptive tool. Rather, it is an in-depth discussion of the process of making an appropriate response choice, and an analysis of the most important factors involved in that choice.

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Chapter 1
Introduction

There was a time not so long ago when response to a food security crisis was based on a limited handful of options, and information and analysis played little role in response planning. Donor resources now support a much broader range of response options than they did a decade ago, requiring more choices on the part of implementing agencies. Significant effort has gone into improving needs assessments and situation analyses to provide evidence about the extent of need, the populations affected and for how long they might need assistance. In theory, assessments are intended to inform programme response choices, but while needs assessments have improved, there is still often a disconnect between the kind of information typically provided by assessments and the kind of information that response choice requires. The process is best described as ‘response choice’, but is often called ‘response analysis’.

The term ‘response analysis’ implies that response choices are made solely on the basis of evidence and analysis. However, many factors contribute to how agencies select a response, and ‘response choice’ does not always involve an evidence-based, analytical process. Recent research (see Box 1) by The Feinstein International Center at Tufts University suggests that response choices are also driven by the capacity and organisational ethos of the implementing agency, the personal experience of programme staff and a range of external factors, including donor resources and policy, government policy in the recipient country, media and political influences, the costs of reporting and compliance associated with different resources, the capacity of partner organisations and considerations (or assumptions) about the risks associated with different responses. Sometimes the complexity of the context can severely constrain response options.

These factors often combine to create a tendency for a preferred, dominant – if not singular – response option, which in turn may inform a powerful organisational ethos that provides a rationale for that preference and the organisational capacity to support that response. While this may be positive in that it builds capacity and specialisation in a certain response option, it may also preclude more appropriate response options in a given context. Programme staff face numerous challenges in responding to crises – very short time-frames for planning responses, high staff turnover, restricted access, reporting requirements and a shortage of skilled staff. As a result, they often have to rely on assumptions – rather than analysis – when choosing emergency food security interventions. This makes the need for more evidence-based decision-making processes more urgent than ever. Many agencies are now attempting to diversify their response strategies, and a number of tools have been developed to facilitate the process of response analysis. However, they are under-utilised, there is little in the way of common currency among them and certainly no overall ‘roadmap’ to help field staff understand the overall process of response analysis, and determine which tools to use, much less how to use them effectively.

Purpose and outline of this paper
Most of the individuals interviewed in the course of this research emphasised that the creation of another prescriptive tool would not be very helpful. But there was a recognised need for guidance that would help decision-makers to navigate the complex set of choices and existing tools, manage the constraints and risks and make the best use of the evidence and analysis that exists in order to inform the most rational and needs-based approach to response. This Network Paper addresses this need. It provides guidance to decision-makers by presenting response analysis and the overall process of response choice from several different perspectives. This is not a

Box 1

The ‘Food Security Response Analysis’ study

From early 2011 to mid-2012, a team from The Feinstein International Center at Tufts University conducted a study on food security response analysis. Funded by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the objectives of the study were to document how organisations make choices regarding food security interventions in emergency-affected and risk-prone areas. The study included interviews with approximately 150 key informants, including staff from donor agencies, UN organisations, the Red Cross, international and national NGOs, government authorities and coordination mechanisms (UN- and government-led), as well as global experts. An extensive documentary review was also conducted on the methods and tools used by agencies or clusters to decide on their responses. The study was qualitative and exploratory in nature, relying on an open-ended interview guide.

The study was proposed for the Greater Horn of Africa in early 2011. The intention was to consider food security programmes in both acute emergencies and among at-risk populations (hence safety net or social protection programmes, risk-reduction programmes and transitional and resilience programmes). As a result of the major crisis in the Horn in 2011–2012, the fieldwork focused on acute emergency response more than was initially intended. The practices described in the study are intended to cover all the above types of programmes, and are not limited to emergency response.
prescriptive tool. Rather, it is an in-depth discussion of the process of making an appropriate response choice, and an analysis of the most important factors involved in that choice.

The paper is in four parts. The following section reviews definitions and suggests a roadmap of the decision-making process about response choices, based on the interview results. No single agency or individual interviewed suggested precisely this kind of approach – this emerged from the analysis of numerous key informant interviews. The second section explores the factors that decision-makers take into consideration when making response choices. The third part examines the constraints to evidence-based decision-making and outlines good practice in managing them. The fourth section examines existing response analysis tools, explores the reasons why they are often not utilised and maps existing tools to the specific types of decisions for which they are designed. The final sections of the paper outline the challenges of incorporating response analysis information into assessments, and raise some questions for future practice.
Chapter 2
What is response analysis?

There is no formal definition of response analysis. The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) manual defines response analysis simply as the link between situational analysis and programme planning.\(^1\) At a workshop convened by the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) in 2011, several points of convergence on a definition emerged. In general, the workshop concluded that response analysis:

- is the link between situational analysis (broadly speaking, needs assessment and other contextual information) and programme design;
- involves the selection of programme response options, modalities and target groups; and
- should be informed by considerations of appropriateness and feasibility, and should simultaneously address needs while analysing and minimising potential harmful side-effects.\(^2\)

This list was clearly only a beginning, but even so there was no clear consensus on precisely what was meant by ‘appropriate’ or ‘feasible’. Our research concludes that response analysis involves analysing appropriateness and feasibility, as well as other factors, such as cost-effectiveness, efficiency and risk. Response analysis is about collecting and analysing evidence on these factors in order to guide an evidence-based decision-making process. Therefore, our definition of response analysis is:

*The analytical process by which the objectives and modality of programme response options in an emergency are determined, and potentially harmful impacts are minimised.*

As concluded in the FAO and WFP workshop, response analysis certainly does link assessment information or situational analysis to programme design, by facilitating the choice of specific response options. The IPC definition tends to depict response analysis as a static, one-off activity done prior to designing (and acquiring funds for) a programme or intervention. However, the *process* of response analysis is not limited to only one part of the programme cycle. The process can be time-consuming, especially if it involves relatively sophisticated tools. If a programme team waits until the dimensions of a food security crisis are known (i.e. until a needs assessment is complete) and a crisis is declared by the authorities before considering response options, the team will either not have adequate time for good analysis, or doing such analysis will significantly delay the response. Good practice would therefore suggest beginning the consideration of response options and gathering the necessary information prior to a shock (along with other measures of preparedness to enable a range of appropriate responses). Thus, response analysis is perhaps best thought of as part of emergency preparedness and contingency planning.\(^3\) Response analysis also informs ongoing programmes, noting when it might be important to introduce different modalities or even different programme objectives. In this sense, it is not only a link between assessment and (initial) programme design; it is also a link between monitoring and evaluation and (ongoing) programme adjustment.

Response analysis is intended to help make a choice about how to intervene in a food security crisis, both in terms of the overall objective and in terms of what intervention or modality to use. Then it is a process of ensuring that the selected intervention is the most feasible, appropriate and cost-effective option, and has the least harmful effects. The study identified many gaps in the process. ‘Feasibility’ boiled down to the questions of donor resources and organisational know-how or capacity. These are important, but donor resources are more flexible now and agency capacity is rapidly evolving. ‘ Appropriateness’ is partly about what works best, but also about minimising harm. But there is also a strategic coordination element to appropriateness – and there are the often-overlooked (though frequently assumed) preferences of the potential recipients. We explore all of these factors in this paper.

**A roadmap to the process of response analysis**

One kind of roadmap that guides programme designers through the process of linking assessment and situational analysis to programme design is suggested in Figure 1. This map was constructed on the basis of the ‘ideal’ way in which response choices are made. It is oriented around the various options that should be considered when making decisions, and the logical order in which these decisions are made (note that the ‘logical’ order is not the way that decision-making always occurs). While this roadmap to response analysis is depicted as linear, the first-, second- and third-order options sometimes overlap and are not always chronologically linear.

**First-order options or choices**

Although it is often not explicitly noted, the first level of decisions about response choice concerns the strategy by which food security and nutritional status will be protected in emergencies. Some agencies label this the ‘objective-setting’ step. This is the decision whether to intervene to address malnutrition or protect food security directly through food aid or cash-based transfers, or more indirectly through protecting livelihoods (or some other kind of intervention, including water, health or protection interventions, although these tended to fall outside the scope of this study). This decision is depicted in Figure 1 as ‘first-order’ response...
options. This is not always an either/or decision; it may be appropriate to implement direct food assistance, livelihoods and nutrition interventions at the same time. This first order of decision-making tends to set the boundaries of the response, but it does little to fill in the details. This choice, or set of choices, should be informed by good contextual analysis, causal analysis and needs assessment information, but our research suggests that these choices are mainly shaped by programme history, organisational capacity and agency mandate rather than by any assessment.

Second-order options or choices
Once the overall direction has been decided the next step is choosing the modality in which to achieve the general objective set by the first-order decision. Indeed, this step is referred to by some agencies as ‘modality choice’: the choice of specific activities or modes of intervention. Many of the specific tools reviewed are aimed at making choices in this category of response analysis, and in many ways the most progress has been made here.

The most common example of this kind of decision is the choice between in-kind food aid and cash transfers or vouchers. This example is applicable only if the first-order option was to provide some kind of food assistance. As opposed to first-order options, some second-order options may be of an either/or nature. It may be preferable to provide in-kind assistance or some kind of cash transfer, but it is unlikely that the same agency in the same place would implement both at the same time (note however that a cluster or group of agencies may deliberately, as a matter of strategy, decide to have a diversified response; or a single agency may have a sequenced or phased approach that involves changing modalities over time).

Similar decisions must be made if the first-order choice involves direct nutritional assistance. The second-order options regarding nutrition programmes are a bit better established, given the fact that, when acute malnutrition levels reach a certain point, certain evidence-based treatment programmes – i.e. community-based management of acute malnutrition (CMAM) – are put in place, in which protocols vary little according to context. There is a great deal of evidence that the CMAM model is effective. However, if a response is possible prior to high malnutrition rates,
then preventative programmes can be considered, which opens up a much wider range of options including linking nutrition programmes with other sectoral programmes. Still other choices involve whether to implement Infant and Young Child Feeding in Emergencies (IYCF-E) and micronutrient programmes, and how best to address moderate acute malnutrition.

Third-order options or choices
Third-order options deal with slightly more detailed decisions; however, many of these details weigh heavily in the response decision-making process, even to the point of solely determining the overall objective or modality of a programme. Thus, these choices are still considered a part of response analysis, rather than programme design (albeit the line is fuzzy between the two).

A critical decision about third-order choices is the issue of conditionality. In some cases, choosing to provide conditional or unconditional aid should be easy: it should have to do with whether or not recipients are physically strong enough and have adequate household labour (or not) to make a contribution to community works in return for access to assistance. It is also about whether there are other productive tasks that recipients must attend to, and whether the agency has the capacity and budget to usefully engage the labour. (Sometimes conditionality is in regard to specific behaviour, such as school attendance or attending a clinic.) However, few of the agencies interviewed in this research collected such empirical evidence regarding their specific recipient populations. The choice about conditionality is frequently made on the basis of agency assumptions and mandates, including strong opinions about whether free hand-outs lead to dependency or whether it is ethical to force people to work amidst a food crisis.

While much emphasis has gone into improving targeting in recent years, considerable controversy still exists about the most appropriate form of food assistance targeting (administrative, community-based or self-targeting), and about criteria for targeting. More progress has been made in the targeting of nutritional interventions, aimed as they are at specific individuals or groups that can be clearly screened according to objective criteria.

Determinations of food basket size or food and nutrition products can ultimately change programmes significantly, affecting efficiency, cost-effectiveness, feasibility and other issues around choosing the most appropriate programme response. Similarly, consideration of the types and number of traders who can be included in a voucher scheme may cause a programme to think twice about the benefits of cash transfers as against vouchers. Hence, these issues must be examined in relation to the first- and second-order options when choosing a programme.

Cross-cutting considerations
In all choices, there are other factors and adjacent decisions that must be taken into account. Figure 1 depicts various forms of risk assessment and other considerations across first-, second- and third-order options because they tend to be cross-cutting. Risk analysis can include all kinds of things – in current practice, most of the emphasis is on the potential distortion of markets. But the issue of risk assessment also includes whether the intervention might fuel conflict or corruption, undermines livelihoods or distorts livelihood incentives, leads to harmful environmental impacts or undermines ongoing interventions. Some of these tools were among the first to be developed, long before the term ‘response analysis’ was coined. There may be other cross-cutting issues not depicted in Figure 1, depending on the context, but the point is simply to note that many considerations can force an agency to change its primary mode of response or programming.

Figure 1 is a linear simplification of a complex and iterative process. For example, as noted above, some decisions about interventions may have (in effect) already been made based on the kind of assessments undertaken. Some potential harms (which appear last in Figure 1) may actually preclude the selection of certain modalities of intervention. In chronic or protracted crises there may not be a specific ‘event’ that triggers the crisis (as depicted in Figure 1). In these cases programme decisions may be triggered by annual assessments, a Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) or donor calls for proposals. We should reiterate that no empirical example of the process depicted in Figure 1 was actually noted in reality. Figure 1 is our amalgamation of factors from numerous interviews and from various existing response analysis tools.
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Chapter 3
Response analysis in practice

In all our interviews, we asked staff members how they made decisions in their organisations about the response to food security crises. The crises that agencies were engaged in ranged from chronic food and livelihoods crises, in which there were both safety net and transitional programmes, to acute humanitarian emergencies and famines (much of the fieldwork for this study was done in late 2011 and early 2012, and some of the agencies interviewed were working in Somalia).

Procedures for analysing response options varied widely, from little or no systematic analysis to the use of sophisticated processes and tools. But for the most part these processes were not explicit, and were not necessarily labelled ‘response analysis’. The majority of agencies did not have any particular process written out, and did not rely on any particular tools. Decision-making processes were mainly the domain of experienced members of staff who knew the context and had some of the institutional memory of past responses in their own minds. Response choices revolved around informal discussions, rapid assessments, recollection based on experience and, where other information was not available, assumptions.

Table 1 summarises interview responses regarding the factors that agencies and staff consider when choosing a response. Again, no single respondent touched on all of these issues, and certainly no one organised it like this; Table 1 is very much a compendium of issues raised, and is organised by the emergent logic of all the interviews. Much of the discussion in the interviews was about feasibility and appropriateness, even though few people were able to give a good definition of these terms, much less break them down into their component parts. However, these terms turned out to be good rubrics under which to try to organise the issues.

This section presents a compendium of considerations or practices followed by a variety of different agencies and different individual members of staff as they make decisions about programmatic response in food security crises. In other words, this is about the range of topics that are taken into consideration, and how influential these factors are on programme choice.

The operating environment
Situational analysis: early warning, needs assessments and causal analysis
Most agencies report that they base programme choices on some kind of assessment, but these are highly variable, ranging from very comprehensive assessments to informal rapid assessments that are largely impressionistic in nature. Typically, an assessment identifies the populations

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Feasibility
- Donor resources and policies
- Market assessment
- Feasibility of market interventions
- Organisational capacity
- Partner agency capacity
- Host government policy
- Access and security
- Timeliness
- Seasonality/phase of crisis
- Record of past programmes
  - M&E records
  - Lessons-learned documentation
- Logistics
- Costs of compliance
- Influence of other agencies
- Conditionality/targeting considerations

Appropriateness
- Internal comparison of response options
- External analysis of gaps in response
- Risk assessment/prevention of unintended consequences
  - Market distortion risks
  - Staff security and safety
  - Recipient community security
  - Risk of theft, diversion or corruption
  - Reputational/legal risks to agency
  - ‘Do no harm’ analysis
- Cost-effectiveness/value for money
- Assessment of recipient preferences
- Post-distribution dynamics
- Gender, age, disability

Source: Analysis of field interviews.
in need and gives some estimate of the extent of the need, but the accuracy of these estimates is highly variable – an observation confirmed by donor staff who review proposals. Linking actual programmatic choices to early warning is even more difficult, though the consequences of not responding to early warning information with programmatic choices and responses was graphically clear in the Horn of Africa in 2011–2012.

Much of the response choice is dictated by the nature of the assessment, which is to say that some element of response choice has often already been determined before the assessment or situational analysis is undertaken, and the assessment is shaped accordingly. Hence, agencies that already know that they will undertake nutritional programmes focus on nutritional assessments; food assistance agencies focus on current food security status, etc. Both assessment choices and the choice of objectives and modalities are often made on the basis of the agency’s organisational capacity and strongly held views about what kind of intervention is appropriate. This is not to suggest that agencies should choose response options outside of their area of core capacity, but it does suggest that capacity is only fixed in the short term. In some cases, capacity can rapidly be built in a new area if the situation demands it (see Box 2). And in some cases, other actors have addressed other elements of needs assessments. There is also a time element involved: asset protection and other livelihood assistance may be part of an early response that affects the extent to which other programme options are subsequently needed or not.

Good analysis, including current needs but also the examination of livelihood systems, underlying causes, political economy considerations and early warning trends, is the foundation on which the analysis of response options can take place. Comprehensive livelihoods analysis or research would seek not only to quantify current status, but also to understand the background and causes of the situation, and ideally would be in comparison to a baseline assessment conducted in relatively ‘normal’ times. Good analysis also includes some projection about the immediate future, not just a snap-shot of current vulnerability. These analyses are less frequent. Most staff interviewed suggested that this would be the ‘right’ way to conduct assessments, but in fact it is actually fairly rare. Other sources of evidence that influence programme choice include monitoring data from ongoing programmes in the same context, which sometimes provide the platform for agencies to simply scale up in response to the demands of emergency situations.

Often a significant gap exists between analysts and implementers within an agency, and data collected by analysts can be interpreted in very different ways by implementers. Different people are involved at different points in the process of data collection, analysis, response choice and programme design. Personal preferences, past experience and biases often lead to a filtering of information, and ‘analysis’ can be applied in a very non-evidence-based manner. Nevertheless, without good information on the situation, response analysis is a fairly hollow exercise.

The agency environment
Organisational mandate and mission
Clearly, organisations are created to serve some purpose, and staff continually ask themselves if what they are doing is in line with the mandate and mission of the organisation for which they work. Humanitarian agencies have invested in specific capacities in order to carry out their mandate and country-specific strategy, which inevitably limits them to certain kinds of responses. Organisational mandates often fix the first-order response options regardless of what an assessment might suggest. An organisation with a child-protection mandate may ask itself ‘what is good for children in this situation?’, whereas an organisation charged with protecting the food security of the general population may ask itself a different set of questions. Many agencies have a broader mandate or multiple mandates, which makes this task more daunting because the multiple mandates may operate at cross-purposes in large-scale or protracted crises. Multiple mandates might feature multiple sectors, but it is important that all sector activities are complementary. Different members of staff can also represent different interests within broad organisational mandates. This highlights the need for good response analysis to justify choices made across different sectors.

In brief, it is not clear whether organisational mandates – and their various interpretations – are a helpful or detrimental factor in determining the best programme response choices, but they are certainly influential in what is chosen. Agencies large or flexible enough to have the ability to choose from a range of response options often opt to limit their response to the most familiar territory. In the words of one donor, ‘certain agencies are going to propose certain activities’ almost regardless of the circumstances.

Feasibility
All agencies agreed that feasibility is a key criterion for response choice, but few had a ready definition of what it meant. Broadly speaking, ‘feasibility’ covers everything from the availability of goods in markets to cost considerations, organisational capacity, the capacity of partner agencies, government policy, humanitarian and physical access, time considerations, considerations of past programming successes and failures and the influence of large agencies. Donor resources are clearly a major consideration. Rather than trying to define feasibility here, we discuss all these constituent factors.

Donor resources and policies
In some cases, donor resources are perceived to be the single most influential factor driving response choice. In fact, donor resources have become more flexible in recent years. Nevertheless, it is important to ensure that proposed interventions have the support or can garner the support of a donor. Much of this is about negotiation as the process moves along: it is rare that the ‘correct’ response is chosen by some analytical process, and then is presented
to a donor. Usually, a discussion with donors is going on simultaneously to the analysis process.

Market assessments and the feasibility of market-based interventions
As market-based approaches, such as cash transfers and vouchers, have become widespread, so agencies have increasingly recognised that a key element of determining the appropriate response is conducting some kind of market analysis. Most agency staff mentioned this as one part of what they do in making an informed response choice. However, there is a wide range of actual practices, and capacity in market assessment and analysis is in the nascent stage for most agencies. Some agencies use sophisticated tools like the MiFIRA (Market Information for Food Insecurity Response Analysis), while others do little more than check the availability or prices of commodities in the local market. The EMMA (Emergency Marketing Mapping and Analysis) has probably become the most widely used market analysis tool, though it is intended to do many things, of which response analysis is only one. EMMA also tends to focus on a single value chain, rather than providing a general market assessment. As such the results of an EMMA can be informative, but do not necessarily guide the ultimate decision as to the most appropriate response. These tools are described in greater detail in the section on response analysis tools and in the Annex.

Almost all agencies, and particularly donors, note that they require market analyses for market-based interventions. This includes cash and voucher programmes, but also things like the monetisation of food to control price spikes and working with traders to improve their access to credit and markets. While cash transfers have increasingly become a preferred mode of response among some agencies and donors, if they are to be implemented at scale they require considerable infrastructure. It is necessary for markets to have an adequate supply of commodities and the ability to respond to increased demand; to operate at scale, there must also be some kind of banking structure, cell phone network or other money transfer system. The notion of simply giving cash in an envelope to recipients works in small-scale interventions, but even then it creates administrative and security problems. Similarly, if a voucher programme is launched commodities and traders have to be identified. While many aid staff acknowledge that in-kind transfers can also have market impacts, the practice of conducting a market analysis to assess the potential impact of in-kind transfers is much less frequent, and less frequently required by donors.

Capacity and capacity assessments
Several issues arise with respect to organisational capacity. Many agencies specialise in certain responses and simply do not have the technical expertise to expand into other response options. Even when individuals in smaller agencies recognise that a different approach may be more appropriate, their hands are tied due to the lack of specialised personnel with the ability to design and implement such a response. Attempts to hire temporary emergency experts are often explored, but are frequently limited by resources and lack of knowledge of the specific context.

Assessing capacity is tricky. By their very nature, humanitarian emergencies call for more capacity than currently exists in a given situation, so an assessment of current capacity often under-estimates the ability of an agency (or collective of agencies) to respond. But capacity is malleable; it takes courage – and sometimes a major crisis – to ramp up capacity to the level required. This

**Box 2**
**Rapid scaling up in an unfamiliar response**

The UN declared a famine in Somalia in July 2011. Because the underlying cause of the famine at least partially involved a major production shock (a drought), the most likely response would have been food aid. However, most agencies with the capacity to mount a major food aid operation had been forced to withdraw from the area affected by the famine, and were prohibited from returning by the controlling authority, Al Shabaab. A major debate ensued about the appropriate way to respond. There were existing nutrition programmes that scaled up to meet the increased requirement for the prevention and treatment of severe acute malnutrition, but these programmes could not deal with the malnutrition problem in the absence of a robust food assistance operation.

Many observers thought that the only real option was to explore cash transfer programmes – and indeed some of the necessary infrastructure to support cash programming already existed (an informal banking system, a cell phone network and functioning markets). There was experience with cash transfer programmes, but mostly only on a relatively small scale – not the scale required to address a major famine. But there were concerns about cash as well – would it be diverted or taxed, or in some other way prolong the conflict? Would it be sufficient to stimulate a market response? Would it cause inflation? Several response analyses were conducted to estimate the market response, and in the end cash programmes were implemented. Response analysis therefore played a role, but options were vigorously debated and the analysis was interpreted in very different ways by different agencies. The willingness of a handful of donors and agencies to step into unfamiliar territory also helped to nudge programming in this direction.

can be difficult when there is limited time to respond in emergencies, but it is possible and can be successful. In extraordinary circumstances, such as were seen in Somalia in 2011, agencies have proved that they can scale up quickly, even in programme areas outside of their core mandate, if they have courageous leaders and the support of their headquarters and donors (see Box 2).

Host government policy, access and security

National government policy can sometimes restrict options for response, or at least shape them in important ways. The effect depends on the individual government and is highly variable. It can range from preventing agencies from working altogether to limiting physical access, controlling information, influencing the movement of commodities and the functioning of markets, determining the type and amount of resources and dictating what programmes are permissible. In some cases, governments play a critical coordination and enabling role. Most of the field interviews conducted for this study were in East Africa, where countries run the gamut from almost no national government oversight of humanitarian operations in Somalia to a situation in Ethiopia in which the government directs nearly all humanitarian assistance. In Kenya there is government-led coordination, but a relatively permissive environment for experimentation and innovation; indeed, some of the more interesting programme innovations to come out of the response to the 2011 regional drought crisis emerged in Kenya.

Humanitarian access to affected populations in a crisis can also be restricted because of insecurity, or by obstruction by non-state actors or state authorities. This was particularly clear in Somalia in 2011, when few humanitarian agencies had access at the time the famine was declared, and many of those were subsequently barred from areas controlled by Al Shabaab. In such cases, the range of response options may be severely restricted.

Timeliness

Clearly, timeliness is an important consideration in the feasibility of any response, and can have a strong influence on programme choice. Some donors even require an analysis of timeliness as part of the rationale for programme proposals. Yet few organisations provided strong examples of how these factors are measured and weighed among different programme options. The problem is that there are few good ways to assess how timely an intervention will be in a given situation. One suggested method is the ‘crisis calendar’, but no actual examples of such methods were noted during the field research. Food aid can take up to five months to be delivered, although donors have taken steps to preposition food aid in locations closer to expected emergencies, and recent research has confirmed that locally purchased food arrives more quickly than imported food. Predictable seasonal food insecurity is increasingly addressed through mechanisms other than emergency response, such as safety net programmes, where resources are allocated in advance. Cash interventions are presumably the quickest, but experience from 2011 indicates that it takes time to scale these up as well. Part of the problem is that much programming is informed by current needs assessments rather than early warning per se, and thus is almost by definition late by the time it arrives.

Seasonality/phase of crisis

Often assessments give a snapshot of needs or current conditions, but in most contemporary food security crises those current conditions change with the seasons, which is to say that programmes have to adapt as they go. This adaptability – and the link between programme change and any kind of analysis – is frequently not built into programmes. Additionally, emergency programmes might be added on in particularly bad seasons, but they may be operating alongside other longer-term programmes, particularly safety net programmes designed to take seasonality into account. While often linked to seasonality in drought-related crises, the phase of the emergency is also important to the choice of response. Sometimes this is not just a consideration of seasonality, but also of ‘stages’ of the crisis, particularly in temporal terms, and ‘managing’ this by concatenating different response options at different stages.

Record of past programmes

The results of monitoring and evaluation from previous programmes can be a very important piece of evidence in choosing a response. Both general project monitoring and evaluation and more specific lessons-learned documents and best practice documents can provide extremely useful information, but this can be a double-edged sword. Sometimes a strong track record in one particular intervention modality makes that into a sort of agency default option. This can be positive: it means that agencies really embody the capacity to deliver well on that option. But it can also preclude other options, even if evidence suggests that another option may be preferable. Many respondents referred in one way or another to an ‘agency default’ response option.

Records of past monitoring and evaluation are important, but they often do not actually offer a comparison. Standard project monitoring and evaluation focuses more on inputs and outputs, rather than evaluating whether the entire approach was more or less appropriate in comparison to some other alternative. There are rarely more in-depth records of past programming performance in terms of documented lessons learned or research findings. When done well, this kind of research has led to radical changes in response choices, for example with regard to community-managed approaches to acute malnutrition or responses to pastoral crises.

Logistics

Logistics was mentioned several times as an influencing factor in determining programme choice. This includes the availability of certain commodities, the ability to transport personnel and commodities, the timeliness of different responses and environmental and social factors that may or may not support different types of programmes. Given the increase in market approaches to providing assistance,
there is a tendency on the part of some agencies to discount logistics (or perhaps, more accurately, to simply ‘outsource’ logistics). But some of the innovative responses to the 2011–2012 crisis worked with local traders to increase their logistical capacity to respond to increased demand via cash or voucher programming (see Box 3).

Cost of compliance
Some responses have higher costs to the agency, either because more in-depth assessments are required (often the case with market-based interventions) or because they involve stricter reporting requirements. A number of respondents noted that these higher standards for accountability often subtly influence choices towards other response options.

The influence of other agencies
In some cases, the choices of a few donors or large agencies can be influential in determining the overall response. This may in part result from the fact that large agencies with large programme budgets may be looking for local implementing partners, but the contents of the programme may already be more or less fixed, meaning that the prospective partners have little or no choice about their own response options. However, the size of an agency does not always determine its ability to dictate a programme choice. Sometimes, smaller agencies with more modest budgets have championed new approaches and may have greater freedom to experiment.

The conditionality of assistance
Respondents expressed very different views about whether assistance should be conditional or unconditional. Few specific methodologies exist to help make this determination, so the decision more frequently reflects agency perspectives than any particular analysis. A more ‘developmental’ (for lack of a better word) school of thought almost always requires conditionality on assistance, ensuring that community assets accrue through public works that are the condition for assistance. A perspective oriented more towards vulnerability is concerned first and foremost about the protection of life, and tends to prioritise assistance for the most vulnerable. In some cases (but not always), cash- or food-for-work programmes allow for unconditional transfers for particularly vulnerable groups. In no case did anyone report a method for assessing whether and how much members of a prospective recipient community could work during an emergency, or what kind of mix between conditional and unconditional assistance would be appropriate to the context. And of course, the context varies with the emergency.

Deciding on a targeting strategy
Although targeting may be considered mostly a programme design choice, rather than a factor on which response choice is contingent, there is a curious link between choices about targeting strategies and conditionality. Agencies more likely to worry about developmental impacts tend to worry more about reducing inclusion error; agencies that worry more about vulnerability impact are more concerned with reducing exclusion error. Self-targeting, commonly used with conditional transfers such as food for work, often results in significant inclusion error. Targeting was rarely mentioned in interviews about response analysis, yet the feasibility of certain kinds of targeting plays into decisions about response choice. In such cases, it can cause an agency to rethink its modality or even its overall response.

**Appropriateness**

**Comparative analysis**
Although mentioned by only a handful of agencies, the sensible step in response analysis would be to compare the relative merits of all (or at least several) response options. This would certainly be the case for the second-order options in Figure 1. It is rarely done for first-order options. Comparative analysis tools often consist mostly of market analysis methods, particularly for the choice between in-kind food aid, cash transfers and voucher programmes.

**External analysis of gaps in response**
Along with comparing alternative response options against one another, an important component of programme decision-making is to look at the overall response in an area, and think about what is missing. In theory, it is the job of clusters or government coordinating bodies to ensure that there are no major programme gaps. But coordination is not always functional and is rarely prescriptive about the specific response of individual agencies. A handful of agency staff mentioned programme diversity as a good thing (‘not putting all your eggs in one basket’). At a systems level, there is little that one agency, or even a group of agencies such as a cluster, can do that does not depend to some degree on what many other actors are doing. This implies the need for a kind of ‘systems thinking’ that is often absent at the level of a single agency, and clusters and coordination bodies are often consumed with more mundane coordination tasks. Ideally, response analysis would have at least one component that is coordinated with other agencies, so that individual and collective choices are aligned with an overall response strategy. The record on this so far is limited, although there have been attempts, for example the Response Analysis Framework (RAF) pilot trials in Somalia and Indonesia. Currently, to the extent that response analysis is a recognised activity at all, it is mostly focused at the agency level.

**Risk analysis, unintended consequences and ‘do no harm’**
The notion of risk analysis or risk assessment was raised by nearly all agencies and is highly influential in programme choice. This covers a wide range of topics. Some risk analyses are narrowly focused on the risk of undermining markets. Other risks include staff security and safety; recipient community risk (does receiving assistance make people more vulnerable or put them at some other risk?); the risk of aid being diverted, stolen or subject to corruption; agency reputational risk; the risk of fuelling conflict; and legal risks (such as in the case of counter-terrorism laws). All of these risks add up to reasons to be either overly cautious in the response, or not to intervene at all.
Response analysis and response choice in food security crises: a roadmap

Whether or not decisions around risk are driven by empirical evidence or assumptions depends on the type of risk. Some are based on empirical evidence, such as government policies or security threats that are backed by reliable information. However, other types of risk are often based on estimates and assumptions regarding which programmes are riskier than others. For example, some agency staff suggested that cash transfer programmes are much riskier than in-kind food aid interventions, while others within the same context emphatically stated the opposite. Even beyond the risk attached to different types of responses, the risk to an agency’s reputation – both in the sense of acting out of a need to be ‘seen’ and not acting for fear of ‘failure’ – was commonly discussed as a driving factor for programme choice. The risks of responding solely on the basis of early warning, rather than waiting for confirmed assessment results, were one of the reasons for the delayed response in 2011.7

Cost-effectiveness
One major component of appropriateness is the relative cost-efficiency/effectiveness of different response options. Different agencies have different ways of measuring this. But while many agencies mention cost-effectiveness as an important criterion, few had good examples of how to factor this in, particularly in a context of fluctuating global and local prices. For example, a simple measure that is applicable to response option decision-making is the ‘alpha value’ used by WFP to compare the cost-efficiency of in-kind food and cash or voucher programmes.8 This type of comparative information was not commonly found across agencies. Even on a larger scale, few cost–benefit analyses have been conducted comparing early response to an emergency (protecting assets) with late response (saving lives). Yet donors are putting greater emphasis on value for money and other considerations of cost-effectiveness.

Recipient preferences
Frequently overlooked in the process of determining response options are the preferences of the intended recipients of aid. In only about one in four of our staff interviews did the notion of recipient preference come up at all. When it did, recipient preference was often noted to justify the agency’s preferred mode of response, rather than as previously collected evidence that originally drove decision-making. Food aid agencies invariably noted that feedback from their recipient consultation exercises showed that food aid was the preferred response; agencies that had pioneered approaches to vouchers reported that their recipient communities revealed a preference for vouchers; and agencies that have been working with cash transfers reported that community consultations in their areas noted a strong preference for cash.

There are few specific tools for assessing recipient preference, and while at face value it might not appear that a sophisticated tool is required to have a discussion about preferences, it does require sensitivity to the context. Firstly, as would seem evident from the foregoing, there may be a strong inclination for prospective recipients to simply affirm what the agency has typically had on offer – which should not be conflated with consulting recipients about their preferences. Secondly, recent research has noted that, irrespective of the preferences of the agency, people may give different answers about preferences depending on the circumstances in which they are asked (in a group or privately).9

Post-distribution dynamics
Perceptions about what happens to assistance after it has been transferred to the recipient often shape the modality of assistance. For instance, many respondents stated that food aid is widely subject to inter-household sharing after distribution, whereas cash is less susceptible to this and therefore tends to remain in the targeted household. While some evidence supports this, it is hardly enough to make it a hard and fast rule that cash is easier to target than food aid, which is to say that most of this choice is driven by perception, not data. This ability to make assistance ‘stick’ can also be responsible for changes in targeting criteria. One notable example was a shift from general food distribution to distribution targeted only at households with a malnourished child.

Post-distribution dynamics came up as the major reason for considering gender and household factors as part of response analysis: some of the generalisations about household control over cash and other assets do not always prove true. For example, there is a long-standing view that women control food and men control money, suggesting that in-kind food assistance should target women. This is increasingly challenged by evidence, but this data is not always used in programme decision-making. Age and disability were very infrequently mentioned as response analysis considerations.

Additional considerations specific to nutrition and livelihoods
The integration of food security with other humanitarian sectors, specifically nutrition and livelihoods, has been strongly advocated for some time. While most agree that integration across sectors is best for addressing the causes of crises and responding in a more comprehensive and holistic manner, this study found that the majority of programmes are still ‘silod’ and particularly so for nutrition and food security responses. Some agencies do not attempt to tackle both nutrition and food security responses in an emergency on the grounds that organisational mandate and/or capacity exclude one of the two sectors. However, when organisations do engage in both sectors programmes still remain distinct, with separate objectives, modalities and aims. The main documented ‘integration’ across nutrition and food security sectors involved targeting food assistance to families also receiving nutritional supplements intended for malnourished children. But beyond this very specific and intentional overlap at the individual or household level, more strategic coordination between nutrition interventions and food assistance or livelihoods interventions is relatively rare. Simon Levine...
and Claire Chastre propose that the explanation is poor response analysis. They point to a failure to use a common conceptual framework, lack of causal analysis of malnutrition and an absence of common objectives, despite obviously overlapping goals.11

In fact, our research found that response analysis for food security and nutrition programmes is quite different. Most nutritionists interviewed commented that choosing nutrition programmes is the more straightforward process: nutrition responses are more narrowly focused, are targeted at individuals and there is a stronger evidence base to show which interventions are effective and appropriate. However, both nutrition and food security sectors are similar in that options for responding are much fewer when the response occurs late in an emergency, often coming after the peak of a crisis, when mortality and malnutrition rates are already high.

While nutrition and food security programmes are viewed quite separately, this research indicated that livelihoods programmes are more likely to be integrated with emergency food security programmes. However, the integration may be temporal – either labelled preventive (livelihoods protection) or restorative (livelihoods recovery). In many cases, food assistance – particularly food for work or food for assets (and to some degree cash for work) – incorporate livelihoods objectives, including both protection and recovery. But a complete analysis of livelihoods response options goes well beyond this limited overlap. It requires an in-depth analysis of livelihood assets and strategies, and particularly of the institutional constraints on access to assets and engagements in certain strategies. Livelihoods responses – unlike either emergency food assistance or nutritional responses – have to take into consideration causal factors; they cannot simply be targeted at symptoms. Hence, a livelihoods approach often focuses greater attention on causal analysis.
Response analysis and response choice in food security crises: a roadmap
Chapter 4
Constraints to response analysis and evidence-based choices

Many experienced programme staff we spoke to during this study noted that they tended to operate on the basis of accumulated experience and instinct, rather than always waiting for an analysis to be completed. In one sense this is good: sometimes analysis takes a long time to conduct and then does not necessarily come up with clear answers (many respondents referred to a ‘paralysis by analysis’ problem). However, in another sense this can simply be a way of justifying whatever is most convenient to the agency under the circumstances. This can lead to a kind of ‘programme inertia’, whereby organisations are unable to change their preferred ways of addressing a crisis, irrespective of new analysis. As one key informant stated, decisions are often made based on ‘what we are known for’ and ‘what we did last time’. Whether due to a lack of available information or despite available information, programmes may be planned based on a conditioned memory, rather than analysis.

While ideally all programme choices would be made on an analysis of the best response suited to the specific needs and context in a given emergency, the fact is that many other factors enter into the process. The practical issue therefore is how to move programming decisions away from assumptions and biases and towards evidence. But first we must understand what all the factors are and why they are so influential. Figure 2 depicts the factors present when considering a programme choice, with the size of the ‘balloons’ (both the large, categorical representations and the small, individual factors) roughly proportional to the influence that factor has on decision-making. The main categories that shape programme choice include diagnostics, other external factors, programme experience and organisational ethos.

The use of diagnostics in decision-making is obviously the most evidence-based area that influences programme choice. Unfortunately, it is not as important an influence as organisational ethos (the largest of the four balloons). Although it is likely to be the category that influences programme choice the most, organisational ethos is...
the least likely to be evidence-based. The factors that make up an organisation’s ethos include organisational capacity and mandate, risk management considerations, assumptions about donor resources, assumptions about recipient preferences and interpretation of analyses. Secondly, programme experience, including monitoring and evaluation, cost-effectiveness and timeliness, as well as what worked last time, is a combination of evidence and assumption. Thirdly, external factors, including donor resources, government policy, the cost of compliance, political considerations and the media, all significantly influence programme choice.

Managing the constraints

While the constraints to evidence-based decision-making are many, respondents had many suggestions for how some of them can be managed. Below are some of the most salient examples.

**Joint assessments, planning and programming.** Although frequently not done, many respondents noted that several of the problems outlined above could be mitigated by better coordination, joint analysis and joint programming. The question is almost always how. Relying on joint assessment among agencies (not just for assessing needs but also for assessing response options) can both reduce costs and compensate for an individual agency’s lack of technical staff (to do market assessments, for example). This would also help individual agencies consider the aggregate impact of interventions (on markets, for example). On the other hand, they might take a long time to organise, slowing the process. Most of the best examples of programmatic innovation growing out of the response to the 2011–2012 crisis in the Horn involved collaborative work between agencies, or among agencies, donors and host governments – and the collaboration involved both analysis and implementation. But in practice, such approaches remain the exception rather than the rule. They should be pre-planned, and seen as part of good preparedness and contingency planning.

**Using good ideas from different tools.** While tools are often designed for a specific question or use, the general ideas behind them can be more broadly applicable. Good ideas can be borrowed from different tools; for example, FEWSNET combined a rapid, MIFIRA-style market assessment with several other risk analysis considerations to make a recommendation about cash programming in Somalia after the famine was declared in 2011.

**Phasing of different interventions.** Different responses are more or less appropriate depending on the stage of the emergency (pre-crisis, post-crisis, protracted crisis, etc.), but even seasonal changes may call for different responses or variations of the same kind of response. Decision-makers who take this into account can choose and design more appropriate interventions.

**‘No regrets’ programming.** Interventions such as risk reduction and livelihoods protection/resilience-building seek to address an emerging crisis and prevent it from worsening, yet still remain useful even if the crisis does not develop as severely as predicted. They can rapidly transition either into fully-fledged emergency responses if the situation worsens, or into recovery-style programmes if they successfully prevent the slide into a full-blown humanitarian emergency.

**Organisational change.** Addressing all the constraints described above, rather than simply managing them in the short term, calls for substantial change at the agency level, to both programming processes and programming support, such as financial and logistics systems. This requires a major organisational effort. Thus, broadening the range of response options – and putting in place the analytical capacity to deliver them appropriately – requires much more than a one-off response to a set of empirical imperatives. For example, WFP-Kenya put in place a process several years ago to enable it to respond differently to different kinds of needs. The result has been greater flexibility in cash, voucher and in-kind responses, but the process involved rebuilding the country office from the ground up (i.e. not just programming, but also finance, logistics, information technology and monitoring and evaluation).

**Training and awareness-raising.** The nature of a response, and the degree to which evidence is incorporated into it, depends to a great extent on individuals, particularly at the level of country directors or regional managers. Their willingness to listen to evidence, take risks and make hard decisions is critical to the process of making good response choices. Training and discussion of response analysis should therefore include not only field teams and programme managers, but also senior decision-makers.

**Challenging assumptions.** Often a member of staff who is willing to challenge long-held assumptions can significantly change the way business is done. Assumptions very frequently fly in the face of evidence, but evidence is distorted or interpreted through an organisational lens that tends to reinforce pre-existing assumptions. (One respondent noted that two types of assumption were needed: one to support the response choice and one to discredit the alternative.) Someone has to challenge these cherished assumptions.

**Systemic thinking.** The research confirms that agencies (donor, government, UN and non-governmental) need to take a larger view. Nothing is stand-alone, either in time or relative to what others are doing. Good programmers and managers are always thinking about where the gaps are, and how what their agency is doing fits in with the larger community of practice.

**Using informal networks.** When information is restricted or unavailable due to host government policies or lack of access, participation in informal discussion platforms and working groups as well as the use of personal connections within other agencies can serve as a strong basis for access to and insight into raw data, to develop more evidence-based responses. Cross-checking data and response ideas with
other agencies prior to proposal development can provide other external information, evidence and consultations.

**Establishing long-term relationships with local governments.** Long-term relationships are key to building trust, moving things forward and working in areas that may not be possible otherwise. Having a strong network on the ground has also proved extremely helpful in providing reliable data.

**Understanding the broader politics.** This can be difficult as staff turnover in emergency situations is high and new personnel lack contextual knowledge. However, priority must be given to understanding the broader politics at play.

**Using private funds.** A secure flow of private funds facilitates timely responses and the ability to implement the response of choice.

**Stronger baselines (including information for response analysis).** Some agencies have invested in baseline assessments in disaster-prone areas so that post-shock assessments can be done more quickly and systematically. This includes understanding livelihood systems and vulnerable groups, as well as market assessments and other information that feeds directly into response analysis. This is linked to improved preparedness and contingency planning. Many shocks are predictable, which means that much of the response analysis could be done as part of preparedness planning.

**Levelling the playing field.** Donors exert significant influence over response choice, and in some cases have been instrumental in changing response. Donor actions may also freeze programmes and prevent change. The most obvious example of this is setting a higher bar for market analysis or reporting in the case of cash or voucher interventions than in the case of in-kind interventions, even though in-kind interventions have market impacts as well. ‘Levelling the playing field’ in terms of analytical and reporting requirements would make it easier to select response options based on analysis.
Chapter 5
Response analysis tools

In recent years, a number of tools have been developed to assist programmers with response analysis. Much of the content of these tools is overlapping and no one tool is comprehensive. It is important to remember that these tools are intended to help guide decision-makers in thinking through all aspects of various response options. They are not intended to provide clear-cut, yes/no answers to all decision-making situations. The range of tools is wide, but can be classified into six main categories:

- Market analysis tools, which focus on gathering and assessing information on markets in order to determine the potential impacts of different response options on market outcomes.
- Livelihood-related response analysis tools, linked to specific sectors within livelihoods responses.
- Nutrition-related response analysis tools, which help in deciding when to implement therapeutic and supplementary feeding programmes, and the use of different nutrition products.
- Modality analysis tools, which guide the choice between cash, vouchers or in-kind food aid responses.
- Harm-mitigation tools, which gather and assess information on the risks and potential harms that interventions may present.
- Process-oriented tools, which focus on the process of response analysis and are mainly oriented at consensus-building decision-making.

Examples of these tools are listed in Table 2 and further explained in the Annex.

While programme teams are often aware of at least some tools, these tools are not frequently used. Several reasons were reported to explain why this is the case. Firstly, there are too many to choose from, and it is not always clear what tool is used for what task or decision. Secondly, and probably most importantly, existing tools are seen by many practitioners as being too complex, too time-consuming and requiring too much technical expertise. Thirdly, none of the tools really map out the overall process of response analysis; rather, they tend to be specific to one particular kind of decision.

Sometimes, the results of an analysis provide useful background information but do not necessarily provide the ‘answer’ to the response choice question. There is also a lack of clarity about the various ways in which tools can be used. For example, a MIFIRA analysis conducted in Kenya in 2010 provided a very useful baseline for market-based approaches to the drought response in 2011. Yet some respondents said that tools were simply being used to ‘tick the box’, noting

Table 2: Response analysis tools

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Market analysis tools</th>
<th>Good Practice Review (GPR) Cash Transfer Programming in Emergencies</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EMMA (Emergency Market Mapping and Assessment)</td>
<td>ECHO Decision Tree for Response Options</td>
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<td>WFP MAF (Market Analysis Framework)</td>
<td>Save the Children Risk Assessment Tool</td>
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<tr>
<td>FEWSNET Structure-Conduct-Performance Tool</td>
<td>ACF Food Security and Livelihoods Assessment Guidelines</td>
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<tr>
<td>Livelihoods sector-specific tools</td>
<td>ICRC Global FSA Guidelines, ICRC Guidelines for Cash Transfer Programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRIM (Participatory Response Identification Matrix) within LEGS</td>
<td>ACF Implementing Cash-based Interventions</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSSA (Seed Security System Assessment)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nutrition sector-specific tools</td>
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<tr>
<td>WHO Decision Chart for Implementing Selective Feeding Programs</td>
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<tr>
<td>WFP Decision Tree for Response Options – Nutrition Intervention Food Products</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAQR Decision Trees (In Improving the Nutritional Quality of US Food Aid)</td>
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<td>Modality-specific tools</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIFIRA (Market Information for Food Insecurity Response Analysis)</td>
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<td>Harm-mitigation tools</td>
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<td>CARE Benefits/Harms Analysis tool</td>
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<td>Do No Harm</td>
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<td>Preventing Corruption in Humanitarian Operations</td>
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<td>Process/consensus-oriented tools</td>
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<td>RAF (Response Analysis Framework-FAO)</td>
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<td>RAP (Response Analysis Project-WFP)</td>
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<td>Oxfam Response Analysis Guide</td>
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Source: Adapted from Maxwell, Parker and Stobaugh, ‘What Drives Program Choice in Food Security Crises?’. 
for example that, if a market analysis had been conducted, it was therefore okay to submit proposals for cash and voucher programmes, even though they could not say what the results of the market analysis had shown. Some even suggested that existing tools discourage people from thinking. Lastly, some respondents noted that analysis costs money that donors would rather see spent on response. In the main, respondents wanted, not another tool for response analysis, but rather guidance on how to use existing tools and to choose which tool to use in which situation.

Figure 3 maps out what response analysis tools exist and which decisions they address in the response analysis process. While many needs assessment tools provide some information required to choose an appropriate response, these tools precede the actual response analysis process. Note that other assessment tools – most notably market assessment tools – do provide specific response analysis information. Furthermore, many guidelines, best practices and standards exist regarding assessments as well as programme design that are not captured in Figure 3, because they do not necessarily guide practitioners on how to choose the most appropriate programme.

Tools for first-order options
With the exception of a couple of agency decision trees, there are no specific response analysis tools to guide practitioners in choosing which objective or approach is most appropriate for addressing a food security crisis. With no specific tool that guides practitioners through these first-order options (and indeed such a tool would need to be quite comprehensive across sectors), decision-makers typically choose the first-order option according to their organisational mandate. In the instances where an apparent need for a certain sectoral approach does not align with an organisation’s specific mandate, agencies often choose not to respond but rather to inform other organisations that have a mandate (and capacity) that more closely aligns with the identified need. However, typically in large-scale food security crises, there is expressed need in all sectors. Joint assessments and better causal analysis will help provide a more holistic analysis and improve agency collaboration to ensure that choices are appropriate to the situation and complement each other’s interventions.

Tools for second-order options
The vast majority of response analysis tools deal with analysis of second-order options, mainly to guide decisions regarding direct food assistance versus cash responses. Various decision trees have been developed to help practitioners address the appropriateness of different modalities. In order to thoroughly answer the questions in these decision trees, knowledge of the functionality
of markets is important, which means that some kind of formal or informal market assessment is necessary.

Nutrition-specific response analysis tools, such as the WHO Decision Chart for Implementing Selective Feeding Programs and the Decision Trees in the *Improving the Nutritional Quality of US Food Aid* report, contain nutrition-specific decision trees that provide very basic guidance on which types of nutritional feeding programmes are appropriate given certain malnutrition prevalence. It is important to note that these tools take direct, in-kind nutrition support as the assumed starting point (rather than preventative approaches or responses that deal with care-giving, disease or water-related causes of malnutrition). In fact, there is emerging evidence on the impact of cash programming directly on nutritional outcomes. Livelihood-specific tools that address second-order options mostly deal with decision-making within different types of livelihoods. For example, the Participatory Response Identification Matrix (PRIM) tool within the Livestock Emergency Guidelines and Standards (LEGS) deals specifically with different response options relating to pastoralist livelihoods, and the Seed Security System Assessment (SSSA) pertains to farmers.

**Tools for third-order options**

Decisions regarding the provision of conditional versus unconditional assistance are often discussed within operational guidelines for response programmes, including the HPN Good Practice Review on *Cash Transfer Programming in Emergencies*, the ECHO Cash Voucher Decision Tree and the ICRC *Guidelines for Cash Transfer Programming*. This is by no means an exhaustive list. In reality, this decision is mainly based on assumptions or preferences within organisations. Tools regarding the targeting of beneficiaries tend to give instructions on the different types of targeting, rather than providing guidance on which targeting strategies are most appropriate when. This may be due to the absence of a strong body of evidence to support certain targeting strategies over others. In terms of nutritional products and food baskets, Decision Trees in the *Improving the Nutritional Quality of US Food Aid* report, as well as the WFP Decision Tree for Response Options–Nutrition Intervention Food Products, provide guidance on the use of several new food and nutrition products.

**Cross-cutting considerations**

Several issues must be considered at the onset of response options and all the way through to the programme design stage, as laid out in Figure 1. There are few set tools that address many of these issues, which are often quite agency- and context-specific. One of the first tools for conducting a risk assessment in humanitarian emergencies, the original *Do No Harm* book, was mostly concerned with the risk of humanitarian aid fuelling conflict, and what could be done to prevent this. This analysis gave rise to thinking about other unintended and potentially negative impacts of assistance, through tools like CARE’s Benefits/Harms Analysis and the TI Corruption tool. Many agencies and some inter-agency procedures, such as FAO’s Response Analysis Framework (RAF), include a do no harm or benefits/harms analysis.
Chapter 6
Incorporating response analysis into ongoing assessments

In order to have timely information for response analysis, data collection increasingly needs to be incorporated into ongoing assessments, since separate processes are time-consuming and often impossible. Conducting specific baseline assessments and collecting response analysis data within ongoing assessments in crisis-prone areas can ensure that the right information is available at the right time, which in turn results in more rapid and appropriate programmes.

Several determinants of response choice can be informed by evidence and assessment. These mostly fall into the following categories: the operating environment; markets; capacity; security and risk; household dynamics, habits and preferences; and logistics/delivery mechanisms. Incorporating the collection of data for each of these categories is discussed in turn below.

**Determinants of response choice**

**The operating environment**

Most information agencies need about the operating environment comes from livelihoods assessments. This includes information about what livelihood groups are vulnerable and how; what the likely hazards are and what their impact is likely to be; and how markets and other mechanisms for coping are likely to be affected. Knowing this information in advance shortens emergency livelihoods assessments to more of a verification exercise, rather than a primary data collection exercise. Other information about the operating environment includes government, taxes, access and security, but these are often assessed separately.

**Markets**

Ongoing and baseline assessments should include basic market information to help assess the impact of shocks on markets and the potential for markets to respond in an emergency. Types of information that should be collected pre-crisis include the number and types of traders; levels of competition; storage and stocking capacity; access to credit, capital and transport; source markets; supply chains and lead times; market integration; historical commodity prices; production trends; consumer demand and access to markets; food quality; government policies; and weaknesses or bottlenecks in supply chains. Understanding trader perceptions and intentions will provide insight into the private sector response to food security crises. This kind of market information (not just prices) should be incorporated into assessments and contingency planning prior to the onset of a crisis or the impact of a shock, and would make response analysis a much smoother and more timely process. Information collected in baseline market assessments can be updated relatively quickly in an emergency. Table 2 lists several market assessment tools that can be adapted for both pre- and post-crisis use.

**Capacity**

The onset of an emergency is not the time to register the fact that capacity – of a humanitarian agency and its partners – can be a constraint on programme choice. Capacity assessment and, of course, capacity-building, are important ‘regular’ (i.e. non-emergency) activities. Capacity-building should be directly informed by programme history as well as capacity assessments.

**Security and risk**

Depending on the situation, there may be restrictions on access and movement; risks to communities and staff; corruption or diversion; and a host of other risks. Knowing in advance what these are – and how they might change in the event of a shock or crisis – is critical to response choice. But response choice can also affect these things: the introduction of resources, whether cash or in kind, almost always has some impact on security and risks to both agency staff and recipients. Some of this is difficult to predict, but information and monitoring results from previous programming are critical information.

**Household and community dynamics, habits and preferences**

Response choice should consider several factors at the household level. Livelihoods assessments should collect empirical data on who in the household earns incomes from different activities; who makes decisions on how money is spent and how each of them chooses to spend money; the risks involved in targeting certain members of the household or community; and traditional coping strategies and the impact of different responses on them. Needs assessments should inquire about the form of assistance preferred; post-distribution practices for different forms of assistance; consumer demand; the marginal propensity to consume given different forms of assistance; and demand elasticities.

**Logistics and delivery mechanisms**

Different response options can be constrained by a lack of infrastructure and delivery mechanisms. In some cases delivery mechanisms exist, but there is not sufficient time to investigate them or develop the necessary relationships in a crisis. Necessary information includes a mapping of formal and informal financial institutions and their capacity to increase their services to meet demand in an emergency; the capacity and willingness of private traders to distribute assistance; and network coverage for mobile phones. These could easily be incorporated into market assessments.
Response analysis and response choice in food security crises: a roadmap
Chapter 7

Conclusion

Structured response analysis is a relatively newly recognised activity. This study has documented the need for response analysis, and attempted to elucidate the best practices that individuals and agencies have developed for response analysis. Some of these practices involve factors to take into consideration, pitfalls to be avoided, suggestions for managing constraints and using or adapting existing tools. This paper has been an attempt to lay out all the factors that agency staff consider when making response choices – in the form of good analytical and programmatic practice – to enable analysts and practitioners to improve evidence-based decisions on response choices. Several final observations should be noted.

1. Response analysis is actually part of emergency preparedness and contingency planning. Labelling response analysis as an activity that fits neatly between needs assessments and programme planning is misleading. Agencies clearly should not wait until there is an emergency needs assessment before starting the process of response analysis. Data necessary to conduct a reasonable response analysis has to be collected as part of – or concurrent with – needs assessment data and established baseline information.

2. Response analysis is an ongoing process, not a single step. Response analysis has typically been depicted as a 'step' in the programme management cycle. There are some major decisions that get made at a certain point in the programme cycle, but good programmes are constantly undergoing small design adjustments. So, one challenge is how to ensure that response analysis is also an ongoing process, rather than a one-off activity. This obviously calls for improved monitoring and evaluation, beyond just inputs, outputs and outcomes. The emphasis should also be on how the operating environment is changing, and how other factors highlighted throughout this paper are changing. Incorporating response analysis in ongoing assessments allows agencies to reassess whether choices are still appropriate and effective.

3. A critical part of response analysis is the question of how the work of one agency fits into the larger picture of what other agencies, national governments and local communities themselves are doing. Hence the right locus for the overarching response analysis work is some kind of coordination mechanism, either national government or cluster. Simultaneously, agencies are responsible for the work they commit to do, which means that some parts of response analysis must be conducted at the agency level, but ultimately according to a strategy that makes overall sense. So far, there is no formula for exactly how to split this up, but the elements of it that belong in each forum are evident. (This is linked to point 8 below.)

4. Improving the analysis of causal factors is essential for evidence-based response analysis. On balance, the conclusion of this research is that both improved causal analysis and response analysis are needed. One of the challenges noted above is how to include information-gathering in assessment processes that will streamline both good causal analysis and a proper analysis of response options. Much of the documentation on response analysis – and indeed much of the results of this research – tends to focus on contextual and agency factors, but does not necessarily take into account the type of food security crisis in question. That is to say that, for the most part, response analysis tools and approaches do not distinguish between protracted/chronic crises, rapid-onset natural disasters, slow-onset crises and conflict crises. Response analysis tools and approaches will need to be fine-tuned to address the differences in each of these situations.

5. There may be a trade-off – particularly in acute emergencies – between rapid responses that have to be based on assumptions, and more analysis-based responses that may take longer to start. But this should rather be viewed as a process, not an either/or choice. Examples are rife of hurried responses which became fixed over time, and which were based on the assumption of a brief, acute crisis. These in turn became protracted crises with responses not informed by good analysis. As time passed, programme choices created expectations and entitlements that were very difficult to change.

6. Quick responses should be informed by the thinking behind 'no regrets' programmes, mentioned above, and should be based on existing analysis. Analysis-based changes would then be more like minor adjustments. Donors can assist in making this less a trade-off and more of a process by incorporating 'crisis modifier' elements into programmes in at-risk areas.

7. The role of the state and of government policy has to be factored into response choice. The state may range from essentially being absent to being contested and hence perhaps part of the conflict that is leading to the crisis in the first place, being relatively facilitative or being the dominant presence and perhaps not even tolerating independent analysis. Government policy – even if arguably more influenced by politics than analysis per se – has to be treated by agencies as part of the evidence on which programme choices are made.

8. There is a clear danger of a ‘fallacy of aggregation’ with regard to response analysis if it is carried out on an individual agency basis. It is reasonable for a single agency to conclude from a market assessment that its cash transfer programme (or for that matter its food aid programme) will have no adverse impacts on local markets. But if a number of individual agencies all have the same kinds of programmes, the cumulative effects could be quite different from what any individual agency calculated, even though their calculation was based on
good analysis. This reinforces the observation that response analysis requires strategic coordination, and would ideally be led by a cluster or other coordinating body. This would also make for a better overall strategy for addressing multiple causes or multiple needs, and ensuring a balanced approach. And – it should go without saying – this could enhance coordination between nutrition and food security programming, which is still sometimes a major gap.

9. Response analysis can be bolstered by collaboration between implementing agencies and research institutions. An excellent example of this is the Local and Regional Purchase Learning Alliance between a group of NGOs involved in local and regional purchase (funded by the US Department of Agriculture and USAID) and Cornell University.\(^\text{21}\) Sometimes agencies collaborate on their own without research institutes being involved (for example the Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP)).

While the response analysis tools and processes outlined here can help agencies make choices, there remains little in the way of an evidence base about what works best under what circumstances. Response analysis is really all about answering the question ‘what works best under what circumstances to achieve the best outcome?’ Cleariy, the evidence base still needs to be expanded to be able to address this question in a comprehensive way. Needs assessments have improved, and a wider range of response options now exists to address needs. Response analysis fills a critical part of the evidence chain, but better monitoring and evaluation are also required, and building a culture of analysis in humanitarian agencies is critical.
Annex 1
Table of response analysis tools and decision trees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tool</th>
<th>Decision focus</th>
<th>Location(s) on response analysis roadmap</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>URL</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Market analysis tools</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>EMMA (Emergency Market Mapping and Assessment)</td>
<td>Market interventions Impact of disaster on markets</td>
<td>Second-order options; GFD/market-based</td>
<td>A multi-faceted tool that consists of gap analysis, market analysis and response analysis. EMMA evaluates feasibility, outcomes, benefits and risks. Step nine of EMMA is response analysis, which considers the options and identifies the most appropriate/feasible responses</td>
<td><a href="http://emma-toolkit.org/">http://emma-toolkit.org/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP Market Analysis Framework</td>
<td>Cash interventions Impact of food aid on markets</td>
<td>Second-order options; GFD/market-based</td>
<td>Information on a range of market indicators: terms of trade, price and income elasticity; shock scenarios; import parity prices; and market integration</td>
<td><a href="http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/manual_guide_proced/wfp243856.pdf">http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/manual_guide_proced/wfp243856.pdf</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCP Tool (Structure-Conduct-Performance)</td>
<td>Not specific</td>
<td>Second-order options; GFD/market-based</td>
<td>Provides information on a range of market indicators used for early warning and assessment</td>
<td><a href="http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADL965.pdf">http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADL965.pdf</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiFIRA (see below under modality-specific tools)</td>
<td>In-kind or cash response/ LRP</td>
<td>Second-order options; GFD/market-based</td>
<td>Breaks down and addresses the two core questions of the ‘food aid decision tree’: • Are markets functioning? • Is there adequate food in nearby markets?</td>
<td><a href="http://www.basis.wisc.edu/epi/barrett%20background%20food%20security.pdf">http://www.basis.wisc.edu/epi/barrett%20background%20food%20security.pdf</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Livelihoods sector-specific tools</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Participatory Response Identification Matrix (PRIM) within LEGS</td>
<td>Livestock-related livelihood interventions</td>
<td>Second-order options; livelihood assistance</td>
<td>PRIM is a tool designed to facilitate stakeholder discussions to identify appropriate livestock-based responses. It draws on assessment information and participants’ contextual knowledge. PRIM varies for slow- and rapid-onset emergencies</td>
<td><a href="http://www.livestock-emergency.net/">http://www.livestock-emergency.net/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSSA (Seed Security System Assessment)</td>
<td>Assessment of seed systems Seed interventions in crop farming areas</td>
<td>Second-order options; livelihood assistance</td>
<td>Seven-step method to assess whether interventions in seed systems are needed Guide to the choice of relief or development actions</td>
<td><a href="http://www.ciat.cgiar.org/work/Africa/Documents/sssa_manual_ciat.pdf">http://www.ciat.cgiar.org/work/Africa/Documents/sssa_manual_ciat.pdf</a></td>
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</table>
# Nutrition sector-specific tools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tool</th>
<th>Decision focus</th>
<th>Location(s) on response analysis roadmap</th>
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# Modality-specific tools

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<tr>
<th>Tool</th>
<th>Decision focus</th>
<th>Location(s) on response analysis roadmap</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>URL</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MIFIRA (Market Information for Food Insecurity Response Analysis)</td>
<td>In-kind or cash response Local/regional purchase</td>
<td>Second-order options; GFD/market-based</td>
<td>Breaks down and addresses the two core questions of the ‘food aid decision tree’:  • Are markets functioning?  • Is there adequate food in nearby markets?</td>
<td><a href="http://www.basis.wisc.edu/ep/mbafood%20security.pdf">http://www.basis.wisc.edu/ep/mbafood%20security.pdf</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good Practice Review (GPR) on Cash Transfer Programming in Emergencies</td>
<td>In-kind, cash or voucher responses</td>
<td>Second-order options; GFD/market-based</td>
<td>Provides guidance on factors to consider when determining the appropriateness of cash or vouchers compared to in-kind alternatives</td>
<td><a href="http://www.odihpn.org/download/gpr11.pdf">http://www.odihpn.org/download/gpr11.pdf</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECHO Decision Tree For Response Options</td>
<td>In-kind, cash or voucher responses</td>
<td>Second-order options; GFD/market-based Third-order options; • Conditionality</td>
<td>A series of questions (regarding market functions, security, beneficiaries’ ability to work, etc.) to guide choice between in-kind, voucher, cash-for-work and/or unconditional cash</td>
<td><a href="http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/sectoral/ECHO_Cash_Vouchers_Guidelines.pdf">http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/sectoral/ECHO_Cash_Vouchers_Guidelines.pdf</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Save the Children Risk Assessment Tool</td>
<td>Cash transfer responses</td>
<td>Second-order options; GFD/market-based</td>
<td>A combination of open-ended questions and rankings of overall risks when determining the appropriateness of cash-based responses</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>
## Modality-specific tools (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tool</th>
<th>Decision focus</th>
<th>Location(s) on response analysis roadmap</th>
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<th>URL</th>
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</table>
| Action Against Hunger Food Security and Livelihoods Assessment Guidelines<sup>36</sup> | In-kind, cash, voucher, livelihoods, nutrition or other (WASH, health, etc.) | First-order options;  
• food assistance/nutrition/livelihood/other  
Second-order options;  
• GFD/market-based | Chapter 6 provides guidance on identifying appropriate solutions through steps that decision-makers must consider when choosing a programme. Decision tree includes series of questions for decision-makers when choosing a response in an acute food crisis | http://www.actionagainsthunger.org/sites/default/files/publications/acf-fsi-manual-final-10-fr.pdf |
| ICRC Global FSA Guidelines<sup>35</sup> | In-kind, cash-transfer or livelihood intervention | Second-order options;  
• GFD/market-based/livelihood support | Section 7 on ‘How to choose an appropriate food security intervention’ contains factors to consider when choosing in-kind food assistance or other food security responses | www.ifrc.org/Global/global-fsa-guidelines-en.pdf |
| ICRC Guidelines for Cash Transfer Programs<sup>36</sup> | In-kind, cash or voucher responses | Second-order options;  
• GFD/market-based  
Third-order options;  
• targeting | Chapter 4 on ‘Decision-Making and Objective-Setting’ looks at the questions to be asked when deciding if a cash transfer is appropriate and in which form | http://www.ifrc.org/Global/Publications/disasters/guidelines/guidelines-cash-en.pdf |
| ACF Implementing Cash-based Interventions<sup>37</sup> | In-kind, cash or voucher responses | Second-order options;  
• GFD/market-based  
Third-order options;  
• targeting and conditionality | Chapters 2 and 3 discuss the appropriateness of cash and assessment; Chapter 2 also discusses the advantages and disadvantages of unconditional versus conditional transfers | http://www.actionagainsthunger.org/publication/2009/09/implementing-cash-based-interventions |

## Harm mitigation tools

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<tr>
<th>Tool</th>
<th>Decision focus</th>
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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B/HA (Benefits/ Harms Analysis)&lt;sup&gt;38&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Unintended impacts, benefits–harm analysis</td>
<td>Cross-cutting considerations</td>
<td>Methodology and set of tools to help agencies understand context, consider unintended impact and minimise harm and maximise benefits</td>
<td><a href="http://pqdl.care.org/Practice/Benefits-Harms%20Handbook.pdf">http://pqdl.care.org/Practice/Benefits-Harms%20Handbook.pdf</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNH (Do No Harm)&lt;sup&gt;39&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Negative impacts</td>
<td>Cross-cutting considerations</td>
<td>Process aimed at predicting the potential impacts of different responses in conflict situations in order to avoid negative impacts of interventions</td>
<td><a href="http://www.cdainc.com/dnh/docs/DoNoHarmHandbook.pdf">http://www.cdainc.com/dnh/docs/DoNoHarmHandbook.pdf</a></td>
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</table>
## Response analysis and response choice in food security crises: a roadmap

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<tr>
<th>Tool</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Modality-specific tools (continued)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Process/consensus oriented tools</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>RAF (Response Analysis Framework-FAO)41</td>
<td>Overall response analysis process</td>
<td>Overall response analysis process</td>
<td>Process of multi-stakeholder meetings in which various response options are discussed and scored according to different categories in a 'Response Analysis Matrix'</td>
<td><a href="http://www.fao.org/emergencies/what-we-do/emergency-relief-and-rehabilitation/response-analysis">http://www.fao.org/emergencies/what-we-do/emergency-relief-and-rehabilitation/response-analysis</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAP (Response Analysis Project-WFP)42</td>
<td>Overall response analysis process</td>
<td>Overall response analysis process</td>
<td>Process to analyse responses by defining needs, reviewing capacity, identifying a range of responses and evaluating each response</td>
<td><a href="http://home.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ena/wfp194140.pdf">http://home.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ena/wfp194140.pdf</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
References


Prou t J., T. Van Den Briel and I. Isa a (2010) A Case Study of Voucher Based Interventions in the West Bank of the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) To Inform Corporate Decision Making on Selection of Transfer Modality and the Way Forward with PRRO 200037. WFP.


Save the Children UK (2011b) Doing Food Aid Differently in Kenya’s Arid Lands: What We Are Learning and Why It Is Worth Investing in the Pastoralist Economy. Save the Children.


Response analysis and response choice in food security crises: a roadmap

World Food Programme (2010a) Decision Tree for Response Options – Nutrition Interventions; Food Products (DRAFT).


Notes

1 A peer-reviewed article has resulted from the study: Daniel Maxwell, John Parker and Heather Stobaugh, 'What Drives Program Choice in Food Security Crises? Examining the “Response Analysis” Question', *World Development*, forthcoming.


5 Levine, Crosskey and Abdinoor, *System Failure*.


8 J. Prout et al., *A Case Study of Voucher Based Interventions in the West Bank of the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) To Inform Corporate Decision Making on Selection of Transfer Modality and the Way Forward with PRRO 200037*, WFP, May 2010.


28 WFP, *Decision Tree for Response Options – Nutrition Interventions; Food Products (DRAFT)*, 2010.

29 P. Webb et al., *Improving the Nutritional Quality of US Food Aid: Recommendations for Changes to Products and Programs* (Boston, MA: Tufts University, 2011).


39 Anderson, *Do No Harm*.


Network Papers 2001–2012

Network Papers are contributions on specific experiences or issues prepared either by HPN members or contributing specialists.

39 Reconsidering the tools of war: small arms and humanitarian action by R. Muggah with M. Griffiths (2002)
42 The Role of Education in Protecting Children in Conflict by Susan Nicolai and Carl Triplehorn (2003)
43 Housing Reconstruction after Conflict and Disaster by Sultan Barakat (2003)
49 Disaster preparedness programmes in India: a cost benefit analysis by Courtenay Cabotenton and Paulenton (2004)
51 Humanitarian engagement with non-state armed actors: the parameters of negotiated armed access by Max Glaser (2005)
53 Protecting and assisting older people in emergencies by Jo Wells (2005)
55 Understanding and addressing staff turnover in humanitarian agencies by DavidLoquerio, MarkHammersley and Ben Emmens (2006)
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57 Standards put to the test: Implementing the INEE Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies, Chronic Crisis and Early Reconstruction by Alison Anderson, Gerald Martone, Jenny Perlman Robinson, Eli Rognerud and Joan Sullivan-Owomoyela (2006)
58 Concerning the accountability of humanitarian action by Austen Davis (2007)
60 Mobile Health Units in emergency operations: a methodological approach by Stéphane Du Mortier and Rudi Coninx (2007)
62 Full of promise: How the UN’s Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism can better protect children by Kate Barnett and Anna Jefferys (2008)
63 Measuring the effectiveness of Supplementary Feeding Programmes in emergencies by Carlos Navarro-Colorado, Frances Mason and Jeremy Dhooham (2008)
65 Food security and livelihoods programming in conflict: a review by Susanne Jaspars and Dan Maxwell (2009)
66 Solving the risk equation: People-centred disaster risk assessment in Ethiopia by Tanya Boudreau (2009)
67 Evidence-based decision-making in humanitarian assistance by David A. Bradt (2009)
68 Safety with dignity: integrating community-based protection into humanitarian programming by Kate Berry and Sherryl Reddy (2010)
69 Common Needs Assessments and humanitarian action by Richard Garfield, with Courtney Blake, Patrice Chataigner and Sandie Walton-Elly (2011)
70 Applying conflict sensitivity in emergency response: current practice and ways forward by Nona Zicherman, with Almai Khan, Anne Street, Heloise Heyer and Oliver Chevreur (2011)
71 System failure? Revisiting the problems of timely response to crises in the Horn of Africa by Simon Levine, with Alexandra Crosskey and Mohammed Abidinnoor (2011)
72 Local to Global Protection in Myanmar (Burma), Sudan, South Sudan and Zimbabwe by Ashley South and Simon Harragin, with Justin Corbett, Richard Horsey, Susanne Kumpel, Henrik Friismark and Nils Carstensen (2012)

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1 Water and Sanitation in Emergencies by A. Chalinder (1994)
2 Emergency Supplementary Feeding Programmes by J. Shoham (1994)
3 Gender and Food Distribution in Emergencies: from Nutritional Needs to Political Priorities by S. Jaspars and H. Young (1996)
4 Seed Provision During and After Emergencies by the ODI Seeds and Biodiversity Programme (1996)
10 Emergency food security interventions by Daniel Maxwell, Kate Sadler, Amanda Sim, Mercy Mutonyi, Rebecca Egan and Markinnoo Webster (2008)
12 Cash transfer programming in emergencies, by Paul Harvey and Sarah Bailey (2011)

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- Occasional seminars and workshops to bring together practitioners, policymakers and analysts.

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