Humanitarian Exchange

In this issue

The Haiti earthquake response

The special feature of this issue of Humanitarian Exchange focuses on the response to the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti. The earthquake killed more than 220,000 people and directly or indirectly affected almost one-third of the Haitian population. Although much of the early media coverage emphasised the tardiness and inefficiency of the humanitarian response, subsequent reviews have recognised the complex operating environment and the extensive challenges involved. That does not, however, mean that mistakes were not made. As Sir John Holmes reminds us in his overview article, we must not only note our mistakes but ‘act on the lessons we have learned with speed and determination, striving constantly to improve our response’.

Many of the lessons focus on the need for the international community to engage more effectively with other key stakeholders. Articles in this issue illustrate the benefits of sustained dialogue and interaction between military actors and the need to enable poor individuals and communities to ‘build back better’. A trio of articles examine the ways in which information is collected, analysed, managed, used and shared, and address issues around stakeholder engagement. Two look at the importance of using standardised methods, enabling positive collaboration between multiple actors and building local research capacity. Another focuses on how web portals, platforms and social networking media were used to facilitate communication and access to information.

Other articles highlight innovative approaches to addressing water, sanitation and hygiene needs; lessons learned from the rapid deployment of a specially designed mobile field hospital; the work of the education cluster in Haiti; efforts by aid agencies to promote flexible, incremental approaches to secure land and housing tenure; and how close cooperation with local actors and UN and Canadian security forces facilitated rapid and efficient food distribution.

The Practice and Policy section of this issue contains articles analysing engagement between humanitarian protection actors and peacekeeping missions; the role of religion in disaster risk reduction; whether NGO engagement with the CAP process in Zimbabwe is worth the effort; continuing problems with the practical application of international codes and standards; lessons learned from a cash-for-work drainage clearance project in Niger; and guidelines highlighting the main issues facing NGOs when working with community volunteers and committees during humanitarian emergencies.

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Learning the lessons of Haiti

Sir John Holmes, former Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator

Many humanitarian organisations have been working intensively over the last six months to help the Haitian authorities reach those affected by the devastating earthquake of 12 January 2010 as quickly and effectively as possible. This edition of Humanitarian Exchange dedicated to the Haiti earthquake is an opportunity to step back and take stock of what has been achieved, to look at where we could have done better and to set out some of the lessons we need to learn. This exercise is not theoretical – it has real and lasting value, so long as the lessons we have identified are actually applied on the ground. The aim is both to ensure that we help to save more lives in Haiti in the months to come, and to improve our response when the next major disaster happens – as it will, even if we cannot know where or when.

Successes ...

A huge amount was achieved by the authorities and the international community in the weeks and months which followed the tragedy. Many lives were saved, and are being saved today, because of the relief effort. One of the most successful search and rescue efforts ever pulled many from the rubble even when all hope seemed to be gone. Approximately four million people received food assistance, 1.2m regular clean water and 1.5m temporary shelter. A million Haitians have benefited from cash for work programmes. No major epidemics have struck. No second disaster has followed the first. Most schools have been helped to restart, even without school buildings. Agriculture has been assisted. Protection has been provided to some of the most vulnerable in difficult camp contexts. And all of this has been done against the background of an extremely difficult and complex starting-point.

Overall, therefore, I believe we got a lot more right than wrong. This was the most significant disaster requiring a large-scale international response since the Pakistan earthquake of 2005. Haiti was unusual – almost unprecedented – because of the devastating effect on local capacity of all kinds and the difficulties of the urban, capital city context. It was a major test of the capacity, resources and response readiness of the global humanitarian community. That we passed that test for the most part is also the view of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), the primary forum for humanitarian dialogue and decision-making among humanitarian partners – the United Nations, NGOs and the Red Cross and Red Crescent movement. In its six-month review of the Haiti response, published in July, the IASC noted that ‘despite the challenging operating environment, the humanitarian operation to a large extent achieved its immediate objectives, and responded effectively to the critical needs identified’.

... and failures

Nonetheless mistakes were made, and lessons need to be learned if we are to do better in future. Coordination and leadership were challenges from the beginning, in chaotic circumstances where so much local capacity had been destroyed or disrupted. The cluster mechanism kicked in straight away and helped improve the coherence of the effort within the first days of the earthquake. It may not have solved all the problems – and we were all frustrated by how long it took to get some parts of the relief effort moving with the scale and speed necessary. But by common consent, without it we would have struggled to get anything moving at all in crucial areas like health, shelter and water. Nonetheless more resources were needed, particularly from lead agencies, but also from OCHA on the inter-cluster coordination side, to make these mechanisms work even better. Moreover, the influx of many hundreds of humanitarian organisations, many of whom, while well-meaning, were not necessarily professional and well-informed in their approach, posed a huge challenge to coherence. A new system of certification of capacity and experience needs to be looked at.

coordination and leadership were challenges from the beginning

The presence and assets of powerful military entities, particularly MINUSTAH but also from the US and Canada, presented both opportunities and challenges. Humanitarians required the support of the military in facilitating the transport and distribution of assistance, and dealing with basic problems like running the airport and repairing the port. The establishment of coordination structures engaging both military and humanitarian actors was critical to the success of the operation. But keeping all these actors, including the major bilateral donors, pulling in the same direction was a huge challenge. We need to learn how to work together more effectively and naturally in such circumstances. The current architecture is too focused on the humanitarian organisations themselves.

The international humanitarian community meanwhile did not show itself to be sufficiently sensitive to the concerns and capacities of local civil society, and did not listen closely enough to what the people whose lives had been destroyed by the earthquake were saying. This mistake has been made before, for example in the
wake of the Indian Ocean tsunami five years ago. It leads to misjudgements about what is needed and errors in strategy which then have to be corrected. In this case it was compounded by too much use of English in the coordination mechanisms and difficult access for local NGOs to the UN base where most meetings were being conducted. This is an area where we really must do better. The humanitarian community simply cannot afford not to work with national and local structures, to the fullest extent possible, however daunting and complex an operation may be.

The operation in Haiti also showed gaps in the humanitarian community's range of experience and knowledge. We need to look in more detail at methods for identifying the most vulnerable in a disaster operation and in distinguishing between those affected by the disaster and those – the majority of the population in Haiti – suffering from more systemic forms of deprivation. The related and perennial challenge of strengthening linkages between relief and longer-term recovery and development still requires further work. We also urgently need to learn how to better adapt our response to urban contexts, and to identify the necessary expertise, tools, knowledge and partnerships to be able to operate effectively in such environments.

Challenges ahead

There is no question that the hardest part still lies ahead. Even if Haiti is spared a direct hit by a hurricane, massive humanitarian needs remain. On my last visit to Port-au-Prince, in July, I visited the Ancien Aéroport Militaire, a camp sheltering 48,000 people, and Fort National, a hilly area of the capital very heavily damaged by the earthquake, where rubble removal is under way to allow building of transitional shelters and the beginning of return for the displaced from areas like Champ de Mars. I saw people coping with extraordinary patience in the midst of what is still terrible devastation and very harsh living conditions, despite the availability of basic services. But the challenge just to take care of humanitarian needs on a daily basis remains enormous, and will continue well into next year. More resources are needed from donors to keep this relief operation running.

People also need to see hope and the beginning of change for the better. They ask how long they will have to stay in the camps. More employment, more schools and safer housing are major priorities. Shelter is at the forefront of people’s minds. The almost 1.5m people still living in tents or under tarpaulins are in a very precarious situation. Security in some of the camps is a huge problem, given gang presence and intimidation, and sexual violence is increasing. Meanwhile, contingency planning for hurricanes needs to be intensified. Arrangements and incentives for people to return to their houses, and for more transitional shelters to be built, urgently need to be resolved. Rubble removal needs to be accelerated dramatically – as of July only 250,000 cubic metres, out of more than 20m, had been moved. Humanitarians are working closely in all these areas with the government, as we need to. But we have to maintain and indeed increase the momentum. More children must be encouraged back to school, disease prevention efforts must be sustained and stepped up, agricultural renaissance must be nurtured and investment for sustainable jobs found.

We owe it to the devastated population of Haiti – and to all communities affected by disasters – to act on the lessons we have learned with speed and determination, and to strive constantly to improve our response. Meanwhile, the biggest lesson of all remains the need to reduce the risks of disasters before they happen, through measures like enforced building codes and ensuring that people do not live in flood-prone areas, and to prepare for them more systematically, not just to respond effectively to them afterwards. If building Haiti back better means anything, it means making sure that its people are never again as vulnerable to disaster as so many were on 12 January 2010.

Sir John Holmes is the former Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and now the Director of The Ditchley Foundation

THE HAITI EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE
In the aftermath of a disaster, relief workers, community leaders and government authorities must urgently respond to a bewildering constellation of needs, assess disaster-related damage and undertake comprehensive recovery planning, including future risk mitigation. To do this properly it is essential that they acquire a basic understanding of the pre-disaster context, and how things may have changed. In unstable, low-income contexts such as Haiti, administering randomised post-disaster survey research is especially challenging. Census data and public records may be out of date, damaged or inaccessible. Disaster-affected areas may themselves be out of reach.

In situations like these, foreign aid agencies and national governments often resort to ‘quick and dirty’ needs assessments. Because large-scale randomised surveys are considered time-consuming and costly, practitioners often resort to ‘convenience samples’ (readily available groups such as recipients of an existing aid programme) that cannot be generalised to the entire population. Alternatively, they may deploy other methods, such as focus groups, expert surveys or interviews with key informants. As a result, assessments tend to be uneven in quality, narrowly focused and disconnected. A meta-analysis of such studies is often assembled in order to generate an overall picture of a post-disaster situation, despite considerable differences in assessment methodologies. Although such an analysis may provide a valuable historical perspective and in-depth information about particular demographic groups or thematic priorities, it seldom has enough detail to allow for the disaggregation of relationships between variables.

A rigorous quantitative assessment immediately following a natural disaster can generate the requisite data to inform responsive interventions that address the real needs of affected population groups. Moreover, where there is coordination between service providers, government officials and international agencies, such data can be made readily available to relief organisations and policymakers. A systematic and representative survey of the population not only allows individuals to inform the policy-making process, but it can also highlight risks and resiliencies not previously identified. Moreover, it can establish a baseline by which the efficacy of post-disaster interventions can be measured, eventually contributing to the growing body of empirical knowledge regarding disaster response. Although such practices are still in their infancy, many NGOs are moving towards results-based and evidence-based approaches to service provision following man-made and natural disasters.

Facing up to challenges
A number of basic obstacles hinder relief agencies and researchers intent on conducting empirical assessments in post-disaster situations. In Haiti, in addition to the sheer physical devastation and wreckage brought about by the recent earthquake, most maps of the capital, Port-au-Prince, were missing streets and even entire neighbourhoods; translators were unavailable or of poor quality; internet access was limited and expensive, and government and international agencies were releasing incomplete and sometimes conflicting reports of damage, mortality and needs.

Although dubbed the ‘Republic of NGOs’, Haiti is home to comparatively few experienced and qualified social science researchers. Many of those living in the country at the time of the earthquake were also personally affected. Homes and offices were lost, along with research data and telephone access, making it difficult to respond to requests to participate in post-disaster assessments. To complicate matters further, the only census data available immediately after the earthquake was collected more than eight years before.

With the world watching on, Haitian government officials and humanitarian agencies faced mounting calls to implement programmes rapidly. They were also expected to deliver results without setting goals or benchmarks of success. Speaking to members of the press in mid-January, one NGO representative complained: ‘We’re not magicians. I can’t conjure up figures out of nowhere. We don’t know how many are dead, buried, or missing ... Who knows how many houses have collapsed? What electrical wires are down, what water pipes have burst, or how many...”
Preventing a post-quake survey

Reliable, valid information was a key priority for policymakers and relief workers in Haiti. In order to support this effort, the Small Arms Survey, local Haitian researchers, the University of Michigan, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) collaborated on the design and implementation of a peer-reviewed post-disaster assessment. Administered less than two months after the earthquake, the survey was expected to generate baseline data for the World Bank/UN-managed Post Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA).

A number of foreign agencies including UNDP and IDRC reviewed the proposal, ensuring that specific variables relevant to the wider recovery effort were included. In order to generate awareness of the impending survey, a summary of findings from earlier household surveys conducted in Port-au-Prince in 2009 was posted to internet-based document-sharing platforms used by agencies involved in the PDNA process. Consequently, additional agencies such as the World Bank contacted the research team to ask that their areas of interest be explored.

A protocol document and questionnaire were finalised, translated into Haitian Creole and submitted to the University of Michigan for ethical approval. The research team then assembled in Haiti to train the enumerators on the new survey instrument. Fieldwork was initiated and results were entered each evening into a simple spreadsheet, so that supervisors could review results and address any data collection errors. From project conception to the release of preliminary findings, the process took a total of 51 days – quite likely the most rapid and inexpensive household survey ever completed in Haiti.

Capacity

Using expatriates in post-disaster situations costs ten to 40 times more than using locals to do the same job. In this case, an experienced team of Haitian enumerators who had previously received specialised data collection and research theory training in 2009. New Haitian researchers were mentored and often 'job-shadowed' by more experienced team members. Likewise, two Haitian team members attended classes on data analysis software in the latter part of 2009.

The availability of known, enthusiastic and experienced enumerators made it possible to quickly mobilise a post-earthquake survey. Nevertheless, it is important to stress that enumerators need to be well-trained (and possibly retrained) before beginning a large-scale baseline assessment. In 2010, researchers were provided with three training days to enhance data collection and the use of scantrons (paper ‘bubble-entry’ forms that can be read electronically) to record interview responses.

Methods

The 2010 post-quake household survey focused primarily on Port-au-Prince residents, including displaced people residing in settled and ‘spontaneous’ camps. In addition to developing information on the demographic profiles and mortality rate of the population, key themes included victimisation and sexual violence, attitudes towards security providers and perceptions of service delivery, as well as food security, water and sanitation and property issues.

The survey was designed explicitly to compare the experiences and perceptions of security, justice and access to basic services among households, compared with the findings of the 2009 survey. In order to generate a pre- and post-profile, the research team re-interviewed some 1,800 households previously interviewed in 2009, along with an additional 1,147 households residing in 30 camps.

number of dead ranging from 90,000 to 300,000

even six months on the situation remained confused, with the estimated number of dead ranging from 90,000 to 300,000
A multi-stage approach was employed to identify households throughout Port-au-Prince and in three over-sampled highly populated zones in both 2009 and 2010. First, a list of random GPS locations was produced, with interviewers identifying all households within a 20m radius at each location before randomly choosing one to interview. Likewise, five large camps were identified using Google Maps, and an estimated population figure for each camp was obtained from the agencies servicing the camp. Camp leaders also provided an estimated population figure and granted permission for enumerators to enter the camp.

Preliminary findings

The survey findings were distributed to PDNA drafters and local authorities in three separate reports in March 2010. A final report was published by UNDP in July 2010 and released in New York and Port-au-Prince. Owing to the varied needs of users, findings were prepared in a variety of formats, ranging from opinion pieces and short executive summaries to longer data-rich reports with tabular annexes. Outputs were circulated through social networking sites, and via UN and NGO networks. While it is not possible to list all of the findings here, a few are featured below.

First, confirming conventional wisdom, children were especially at risk of dying from earthquake-related injuries. They were considerably more likely to have been killed during the earthquake than adults, and were 11 times more likely to have died of injuries after the quake.

Second, while the physical damage was extensive and the requirements of removing rubble and rebuilding are immense, the picture is not necessarily as bad as commonly assumed. Around a third of households suffered no visible damage to their dwellings.

Third, crime rates were dramatically lower than expected. Just 4.1% of all Port-au-Prince households experienced some form of property violation, including theft, vandalism or the intentional destruction of property, in the first two to three months after the earthquake. Unsurprisingly, given the high levels of food insecurity, theft of water and food was most common. Theft was geographically concentrated in certain neighborhoods and usually involved relatively modest amounts.

Fourth, the survey revealed a surprising shift in attitudes towards the Haitian security sector. While reviled by the local population in previous years owing to accusations of systematic human rights violations, the preferred security provider for both the general and camp populations in early 2010 was the Haitian National Police. Likewise, the vast majority of respondents believed that strengthening police capacity would make their communities safer.

Fifth, the survey underlined the importance of social networks – including diaspora links – in influencing how people coped and adapted. For example, the survey observed that almost a quarter (23.4%) of camp households claimed to have received gifts (including remittances) from friends, family, non-governmental organisations and charities in the months following the quake. Remittances are a major source of income for all population groups in Haiti, with some $1.3 billion reportedly flowing into the country in 2009.

Finally, the earthquake response highlighted the critical role played by communications. Well over half of camp respondents said that they received national news from radio. Almost half of the general population also reported receiving information from radio and a little over 20% from strangers, family and friends via text messages, phone calls, face-to-face conversations and new social media such as facebook and twitter.

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Coordination and the tenure puzzle in Haiti

Kate Crawford, Emily Noden and Lizzie Babister, CARE International UK

Security of tenure has a direct influence on people’s vulnerability to disasters and their capacity to recover. Tenure type directly affects the likelihood of displacement and the chances of a rapid return. Tenure security does not necessarily mean having formally registered, legally recognised and inheritable ownership. It can also mean formal and informal, short- and long-term ways to secure shelter by individuals, households, communities and enterprises, including renting, ownership and leasing of land. Contemporary studies suggest a move away from ‘solve’ land rights issues by documenting and enforcing long-term, inheritable ownership models in favour of flexible, incremental approaches which protect people from eviction and provide a basis for building livelihoods.

Housing, land and property in Haiti

Haiti is the poorest country in the Western hemisphere, with over half of its population living on less than a dollar a day. It is also one of the most densely populated countries in the Americas, particularly in urban areas, with metropolitan Port-au-Prince growing by 115,000 people a year for the last two decades. Before the earthquake, population densities in the shanty towns of the capital stood at up to 25,000 people per square kilometre. According to UN-HABITAT, living space in Port-au-Prince’s permanent housing was 1.98m² per person, whereas Sphere recommends 3.5m².

The 12 January earthquake destroyed or damaged an estimated 200,000 homes, displacing 1.2 million people, the majority of them from what was already sub-standard, vulnerable and precarious housing. Responding to housing, land and property (HLP) issues after the earthquake has been challenging. Haitian housing evolves incrementally: households often start with a ground floor unit, gradually adding upper floors to let out and generate income. The majority of the capital’s 2.7 million inhabitants live in informal settlements, where tenure is based upon informal contracts or permits. Many Haitians do not have personal identification documents, few land information systems exist and land claims are duplicated and out of date. Different land-related information is kept within different government authorities, and it is difficult, from the perspective of emergency teams, to find reference documents on housing, land and property, the history of urbanisation and urban social and political movements in Haiti.

Housing, land and property rights impact on households in the following ways:

- Vulnerability. According to UN-HABITAT, before the earthquake householders perceived the risk of eviction to be low and even the poorest slowly invested in heavyweight but very poor quality structures that were highly vulnerable to collapse. In addition, overcrowding can lead to the occupation of high-risk zones by the most vulnerable.
- Displacement, repair and reconstruction. Assessments by CARE have shown that owner-occupiers and land tenants were more likely to have access to their original plots and housing materials. Building tenants tended to be in less resilient self-built shelters because they were less likely to salvage building materials and more likely to be displaced from the site of their original home.
- Access to services. Land tenure also affects other infrastructure. World Vision notes that: ‘Efforts to provide basic services like sanitation and drainage

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<tr>
<th>Land ownership</th>
<th>Type of tenancy</th>
<th>Percent of occupied area</th>
<th>Type of informality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Direct recognition (contract or authorisation)</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>State housing projects with incomplete titling</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indirect recognition (de facto)</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>Invasions with a fermage contract</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Invasions which are applying for a fermage contract at DGI</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Invasions tacitly accepted by authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Direct recognition (contract or authorisation)</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>Land and/or houses with incomplete titling or limited transferability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indirect recognition (de facto)</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>De facto Invasions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Land in litigation</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>Ownership, tenure or right to occupy land under legal dispute</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Informal housing in Port-au-Prince

Source: UN-HABITAT, Strategic Citywide Spatial Planning: A Situational Analysis of Port-au-Prince, Haiti, 2009. Fermage is a type of land lease combined with full title for a house, sometimes with an option to buy land in future. It is not strictly formal, but not considered illegal in most cases. According to some estimates around 80% of residents in Port-au-Prince have a fermage contract with the option to buy.

are frequently held up by disputes over land. Planning for longer-term transitional shelter cannot take place in the absence of land on which the displaced can be accommodated.  

### Shelter strategy and tenure: the case of transitional shelter

In the wake of the earthquake, the main focus of assistance has been on the decongestion of several high-profile camps and the procurement of transitional shelter kits. Some of these kits are destined for new settlement sites, while others are intended for affected communities with larger plots outside of Port-au-Prince. Since beneficiaries need access to land in order to construct a transitional shelter, NGOs favour those with access to land and buildings over tenants and squatters. So far, people without access to space for shelter appear to make up about 5% of those assessed close to their original dwellings in some zones of south-west Carrefour and central Leogane.

A longer-term housing strategy will need to take into account that ‘a strict asset-replacement approach to housing provision and a rush to confirm property rights through rapid adjudication and systematic titling programmes will not be appropriate to meet the housing needs of the majority of the affected population who are tenants and squatters rather than owners’.  

This is contrary to parallel discussions led by the French, Canadian and US governments, which favour a top-down cadastre of legal tenure partly in the belief that legally owned land or property assets can facilitate access to credit where they can be used as collateral. However, there is a risk that this approach will be costly, slow and inappropriate, and may reinforce biases towards the most established and powerful formal owners able to produce documentation.

The approach so far has been to develop beneficiary agreements and Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) with municipalities to establish security of tenure for transitional shelter. Many NGOs have documents which attempt to define the roles and responsibilities of each party and the validity period, described in Table 2. However, the three years stipulated in the MoUs is a much longer period of tenure than existed prior to the earthquake: typical rental periods were up to six or 12 months. From a legal perspective, MoUs and informal agreements have no official status as public notaries are not often used. The risks of eviction for beneficiaries are therefore unclear. Although mayors have signed MoUs, they have no authority under Haitian law to sign off in relation to land issues, and may have strong personal or political interests which can bias decisions over land use. Mechanisms for addressing grievances are not in place and it is unclear whether municipalities can be engaged as mediators in land disputes.

### The need for coordination and the role of the clusters

At the global level, tenure issues fall under the Protection Cluster’s Sub-Working Group on Housing, Land and Property. Historically this cluster has emphasised legal reform over addressing the barriers to implementation faced by governments. However, the working group is moving towards a more nuanced approach to tenure security under the stewardship of UN-HABITAT. In Haiti, tenure issues impact on the activities of several clusters and working groups, as described in Table 3. However, with no single agency responsible for ensuring coordination there is a risk of duplication and gaps. Oxfam’s proposal for an HLP Coordinator position has been backed by DFID, CARE and the Emergency Shelter Cluster.

CARE has hosted an informal Working Group on land issues, with a specific focus on individual plots and small private/
The group's remit was to document the problems and questions that individual agencies could not answer; map what agencies were doing in terms of agreements; identify organisations with HLP specialists; and get feedback from Haitian experts on the legal implications and potential longer-term risks with NGO activities.

The diagram shows an idealised coordination scenario from the perspective of the international community, with those elements that are currently missing greyed out.
Conclusions
Addressing the complex issue of tenure in Haiti through informal and incremental tenure security will enable quicker recovery. It is essential that NGOs, donors and the Haitian government adopt a more sophisticated approach that caters to the wide variety of vulnerable groups in urban situations. The traditional model of building transitional shelters solely for those with access to land must adapt to meet the needs of the ‘land vulnerable’. In addition, although large cadastral projects address the longer term, a solution is needed to meet immediate livelihoods needs, as presented by the operational model in Table 2.

Coordination around this operational model and sharing information is key. Agencies in the field still need practical, best-practice guidance on securing tenure for the most vulnerable in the Haitian context. Dialogue between different working groups and the government of Haiti around land use issues needs to be more transparent and inclusive. The failure to do this so far has been partly caused by the Cluster System’s failure to provide early leadership on HLP issues. This may improve with the arrival of the Emergency Shelter Cluster’s HLP Coordinator on 24 August, who comes with a mandate to map and consolidate current work on HLP. Government engagement should include briefings on policy options. These could consist of short papers summarising the best available data and analysis of the context, followed by a selection of response options with the pros and cons of each clearly outlined, together with evidence-based recommendations. These briefings could also be used to improve feedback to local partners and beneficiaries. Dissemination, translation and presentation of reports to partners in the field through cluster meetings and working groups is the responsibility of all cluster partners and government authorities.

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Mobile field hospitals in the Haiti earthquake response: a Red Cross model
Hossam Elsharkawi, Tørris Jæger, Lene Christensen, Eleanor Rose, Karine Giroux and Brynjulf Ystgaard

In the wake of the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) mobilised the biggest single-country emergency response operation it had ever mounted. Deployments included field hospitals, one of which was a specially designed rapid response mobile and light hospital with 30 expatriate staff. This was initially set up in Port-au-Prince at the main university hospital, and later relocated to Petit Goave in the south-west of Haiti. This article describes the lessons learned during the hospital deployment.

The RDEH ERU
The Rapid Deployment Emergency Hospital is a health Emergency Response Unit (RDEH ERU) and one of the IFRC’s global emergency standby tools. The unit is positioned in Oslo and owned and managed by the Norwegian Red Cross. The standard configuration is a tented 20-bed medical/surgical facility, with medical supplies and its own facilities for power generation, lighting, water purification, sanitation and telecommunications, along with vehicles and a base camp for staff. The standard set-up requires 12–14 specially trained personnel. In the case of Haiti, additional medical supplies, tents, beds, relief items and two ambulances were provided to support local hospitals.

The RDEH is designed to be loaded into one Ilyushin 76 cargo plane, but due to lack of availability the unit was divided between two smaller Antonov cargo planes and a Boeing 747. The Antonovs landed in Port-au-Prince and the Boeing in Santa Domingo, from where items were trucked into Haiti. Self-offloading aircraft like Ilyushins and Antonovs are preferred as off-loading equipment is often not available in emergency contexts. The expanded multinational team of 30 (from Norway, Canada, Israel and Denmark) included two surgical teams, one outpatient team, a midwife, nurses, technicians, administrators, community health specialists, psychosocial support specialists and paramedics. They arrived between 15 and 19 January.

IFRC’s emergency response in Haiti was its biggest ever single-country operation

The ERU was set up in the grounds of the University Hospital in Port-au-Prince. An advance team of two arrived from Norway 24 hours ahead of the unit, and identified the site along with the IFRC Field Assessment and Coordination Team (FACT). The first patients were treated in the outpatient department on 16 January, and surgery commenced on 18 January. The outpatient department treated an average of 70–80 people per day, dealing with major dressing changes and wound care and management. A total of 300 surgical procedures were performed.

The ERU team set up its base camp in the hospital compound and remained there for the duration of the four-week mission, providing surgery, an outpatient clinic,
psychosocial support to patients and local staff, epidemic prevention measures and material help and technical advice to the hospital management. The hospital was provided with over 800m$^2$ of tenting, 100 quick-set-up beds, blankets, plastic sheeting, a portable X-ray machine, a generator, a laboratory module and medical supplies.

The hospital compound comprised over 25 buildings, with 700 beds and approximately 2,000 staff. Some structures, such as the nursing school, had totally collapsed, while others were partially damaged and not usable (including paediatrics, maternity and some operating rooms). Post-quake, the compound contained over 1,400 people, including patients, their families and staff. Repeated after-shocks forced patients and staff out of the remaining buildings and further complicated patient care and hospital management. Many patients and their families were exposed to the elements for many days as tents and shelters were being set up. Many international aid agencies had teams in place working during daylight hours, using salvageable hospital spaces and tented facilities. Daily coordination meetings were held involving aid agencies and the hospital management team.

The RDEH ERU Operating Theatre was the best and most equipped facility on the hospital campus. It enabled the team to handle a large proportion of procedures requiring a proper clean (semi-sterile) environment, such as caesarean sections and emergency laparotomies. The surgical team operated in close collaboration with other agencies working at the hospital, selecting patients from a common pool and returning them to wards on the hospital grounds after surgery. The RDEH had to run its own recovery services. A full complement of ward nursing staff was neither locally available nor provided for in the RDEH set-up. An experienced nurse originally designated to work with children had to take charge of this facility, which functioned efficiently, and expatriate paramedics provided post-operative care. Future deployments require better staffing for post-operative nursing care.

Psychosocial support
The ERU’s psychosocial support component comprised two trained delegates and a supporting kit. The first task upon arrival was to provide psychological first aid (PFA) and emotional support for patients and relatives. Applying a community-based approach, delegates recruited and trained a team of 20 Haiti Red Cross volunteers to provide PFA and other basic psychosocial services to patients and others in need. The volunteers learned to listen to patients and observe their behaviour so as to identify people showing signs of mental health distress or symptoms of disorder. When identified, patients were evaluated by the psychosocial delegate, to decide whether follow-up was needed. Additional activities included visiting and interacting with patients on wards, following up on specific requests by hospital colleagues and awareness-raising on normal reactions to abnormal events.

The psychosocial delegates and their volunteer teams established a protocol to ensure the protection and care of unaccompanied minors and isolated children. A child-friendly space was set up, with structured playing and activities that allowed the children to regain a sense of normality. A social space was also set up in the hospital grounds, with games and recreational equipment to enable socialising and an opportunity to talk. This was used by hospital staff, patients, visitors and relatives.

In the paediatric unit, particular attention was given to parents and children, to reinforce parenting skills and re-establish daily routines through games that stimulated psychomotor development. Creative activities such as the establishment of a children’s choir and an exhibition of drawings helped raise spirits in the hospital and bolstered mechanisms of social support. Ensuring the wellbeing of volunteers and local hospital staff was another psychosocial activity. Delegates ensured supervision and support for volunteers as they were as affected by the earthquake as those they were assisting.

After three weeks, the situation within and outside the hospital had stabilised, and the psychosocial team established contact with communities surrounding the facility. Delegates trained three groups of community
workers from the NGO Médecins du Monde and hospital staff, to enable them to continue providing services in the longer term.

**Epidemic prevention and community health**

The Community Health Module (CHM) comprised two trained delegates and a supporting kit with Information, Education and Communications (IEC) material for epidemic hazard mapping and priority activities focused on disease prevention. The urgency of medical needs following the earthquake dictated that, for the first few days, all medical staff (CHM delegates included) provided care for injured patients. CHM delegates also worked with the sanitation committee at the University Hospital to address poor hygiene and sanitation conditions.

CHM delegates focused on three basic health messages: hand washing, safe disposal of waste (including use of latrines) and drinking safe (potable) water. Haitian Red Cross Volunteers were trained in hygiene promotion, targeting the population living in informal IDP camps. Activities were initially carried out with the 1,400 patients and family members within the hospital compound. In early February, the Haitian government asked the IFRC to vaccinate a population of 150,000 IDPs, as part of a mass vaccination campaign. CHM delegates trained 110 Haitian Red Cross vaccinators, and assisted in the planning and implementation of the campaign.

After approximately four weeks, the RDEH was moved to a rural hospital in Petit Goave. This area had also been severely affected by the earthquake, but had not received as much attention as the capital. CHM delegates carried out assessments of health and hygiene conditions in IDP camps. Training of new Haitian Red Cross Volunteers in hygiene promotion activities continued, and hygiene promotion activities were carried out with over 2,000 families in 13 IDP camps. Training was coordinated with Oxfam.

The success of epidemic prevention activities was due largely to very close cooperation with the Haitian Red Cross, whose Volunteers proved to be a tremendous asset. Many were already trained and their local knowledge and acceptance by the population greatly facilitated their work. The Volunteers were able to communicate effectively with the target population, particularly since they were enduring the same losses and hardships. Training both Red Cross and community members (community mobilisers, health committees) improves the prospects for sustainability.

Most of the IDP camps assessed in Petit Goave had neither potable water nor sufficient, if any, latrines. This made it difficult to convey hygiene messages when hygiene promoters could offer only good advice and soap. Ideally, there should be closer coordination with actors providing water, sanitation and shelter. The provision of hygiene kits would also improve matters.

**Conclusion**

The hardware of the RDEH ERU was ideally suited for this type of disaster response, as it was configured for rapid deployment and quick set-up, with lighter, smaller medical and non-medical components than traditional mobile hospitals. The ability to rapidly set up and perform safe surgery within hours was critical to saving many lives at the University Hospital. The ability to move once the situation had stabilised was likewise critical to providing continued care at another location.

Working 16 to 18 hours a day in very difficult circumstances meant that the flexibility and hardiness of the specially trained medical and non-medical ERU members, drawn from four nations and with a mix of skills and backgrounds, were crucial to the mission’s success. Most had undergone specialised ERU and Field School training. At the beginning, all delegates were required to participate in all set-up tasks, including off-loading and erecting tents in addition to providing safe and good-quality medical care. Explicitly pairing experienced delegates with less experienced ones in mentoring roles has proved to be successful as a training methodology. The need for post-operative care

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Haitian Red Cross Volunteers proved to be a tremendous asset

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and ward nursing was critical, and future deployments need to ensure sufficient personnel providing such care utilising both nurses and paramedics. The many surgical teams working at the University Hospital overloaded the post-operative end, with minimal or no care due to the lack of nurses. Additionally, and perhaps most critically, the ability of the team to work in close collaboration and coordination with local hospital management, the Haitian Red Cross leadership and volunteers and other international providers increased the efficiency and effectiveness of the entire relief effort. Such interventions need to operate in support of local medical teams, no matter how basic, as an explicit objective.

After-shocks limited the extent to which existing structures could be used, both due to potential collapse and the psychological trauma and fear experienced by staff and patients, and hospital managers were not able to order patients or staff into these structures for several weeks. First-phase responders need to bring sufficient supplies and shelter for themselves and their patients, as well for the services they wish to provide, or they risk becoming a burden and further depleting local resources. The RDEH was the only unit deployed to the University Hospital that was entirely self-sufficient and thus did not put further strain on already weakened infrastructure and staff. Surgery and outpatient care provide a platform for epidemic control measures and psychosocial support activities. Thus, the RDEH ERU maximised its impact by going beyond clinical care. Providing expert advice in running field hospitals, and supporting but not substituting for hospital managers, proved vital and enabled the RDEH to move to another location.

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The United Nations Humanitarian Civil–Military Coordination (UN–CMCoord) response to the Haiti earthquake

Alan Butterfield, Ronaldo Reario and Robert Dolan, Civil–Military Coordination Section, OCHA

Large-scale foreign military forces were deployed in response to the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti, with contingents from the United States, Canada and a number of Latin American and European countries, in addition to existing military and police forces operating as part of the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). This is part of a growing trend: from the Indian Ocean tsunami to the South Asia earthquake, military forces are increasingly being tasked by their governments to respond to disasters.

Humanitarian actors have an opportunity to utilise military capacities in the immediate aftermath of a disaster, when civilian capacities are typically not readily available. The resumption of operations at the airport in Port-au-Prince – a vital aid artery – is a clear example of what the military can achieve in the early phase of an emergency response. According to US government figures, the airport’s throughput increased from 13 commercial flights a day before the earthquake to 200 a day by 21 January.¹ US forces also dedicated considerable resources to the repair of the seaport. Other ‘niche’ military capabilities, such as airlift, emergency medical support and logistics, were deployed on a large scale, and foreign troops played a key role in ensuring a secure environment for aid delivery and the protection of IDP camps.


At the same time, however, the presence of substantial military forces, in the midst of an equally massive humanitarian response, means that all parties need to coordinate their efforts, to ensure that resources are put to best effect and that action is coherent and cohesive. The United Nations Humanitarian Civil–Military Coordination (UN–CMCoord) function has a key role to play in facilitating this interaction.

The UN–CMCoord deployment

In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, a UN–CMCoord officer was dispatched to the headquarters of the United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) in Miami, the operational HQ for the US military’s deployment. A four-strong team was also dispatched to the field, comprising two officers from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)’s Emergency Response Roster (ERR), one from the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) Team and a fourth through OCHA’s Stand-by Partnership Programme.² In addition to the liaison officer at SOUTHCOM, a second, very experienced UN–CMCoord officer was stationed in Washington, working with the US military, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). A month after the earthquake

² The Stand-by Partnership Programme (SBPP) is operated by the Surge Capacity Section (SCS) of OCHA. It involves a partnership with ten external organisations, which maintain rosters of humanitarian professionals who are rapidly deployable to humanitarian emergency situations to provide external support of OCHA.
a longer-term follow-on team was established, with four officers in Port-au-Prince and one in Leogane.

The initial days of the response in Haiti were extremely challenging, largely due to the swift deployment of large numbers of military personnel – in short, the officers were overstretched. As the greatest amount of damage occurred in Port-au-Prince, and much of the humanitarian and military activity was centred there, UN-CMCoord officers were likewise concentrated in the capital. Although there was a UN-CMCoord officer in Leogane, and a civil–military assessment was carried out in Petit Goave, areas north of Port-au-Prince where there was a significant military presence were assessed by the team but could not receive constant attention.¹

Liaison also took place at the strategic level, in New York with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and in Washington and Miami. This proved very beneficial to the overall humanitarian effort. Information exchange and facilitation of access to decision-makers on the ground were two areas that benefited directly from this interaction and liaison. At the field level, however, the UN-CMCoord team in Port-au-Prince – which evolved into a Civil–Military Coordination Cell (CMCC) within the overall OCHA structure – struggled to keep pace with the various military units and humanitarian agencies on the ground. Mobility in particular was a huge challenge, and regular visits to key offices were not possible. As is standard practice in UN-CMCoord deployments, the team organised a weekly Civil–Military Coordination Network Meeting to create a forum and dedicated location for discussing humanitarian civil–military issues and for resolving operational and coordination problems.

The team also worked with other civil–military platforms, including the Joint Operations and Tasking Centre (JOTC), established by MINUSTAH, OCHA and other key partners. Through the JOTC, humanitarian organisations in Haiti could place requests for military or police assistance in support of their relief activities. In effect, the JOTC acted as MINUSTAH’s ‘clearing house’ for requests for military assistance.² OCHA and the UN-CMCoord team also issued guidance to ensure that military actors participated constructively in cluster meetings. This guidance served a dual purpose: for the humanitarian community, it outlined why and how military actors should be involved in cluster meetings, to allay suspicions about the military’s role among some humanitarian organisations; for military personnel, it outlined how they could contribute to cluster arrangements, whilst not overwhelming the meetings.

From an early stage, the UN-CMCoord team also recognised the need for a sustainable structure in place that could dovetail with the broader humanitarian coordination framework. One of the primary reasons why the UN-CMCoord structure worked well, when it reached full capacity, was that key liaison staff from many military and humanitarian organisations were graduates of UN-CMCoord courses run by OCHA’s Civil–Military Coordination Section (CMCS), based in Geneva.³ Throughout the various stages of the response, some 20–30 graduates were present in the country at any one time. These graduates represented their respective organisations in the coordination of their activities with other actors within the relevant clusters, as well as bilaterally with other organisations. Their presence highlighted the benefits that the UN-CMCoord training programme can have at an operational level in times of emergency. Numerous graduates also provided staff support to headquarters functions in DPKO and OCHA in New York, USAID and OFDA in Washington and at HQ SOUTHCOM in Miami.

Lessons learned

Although the wider humanitarian community may still have reservations about military involvement in humanitarian work, the reality is that national or foreign militaries – or

¹ A civil–military assessment is essentially a survey of the civilian actors and military forces operating in a particular area. A UN-CMCoord officer carrying out such an assessment will log all groups that are present, the work that they are doing and their exact location.

² For more on the JOTC, see: http://www.logcluster.org/ops/ht10a/jotc-info-sheet.

³ Further information can be found at http://ochaonline.un.org/cmcs/training.
in some cases both – are increasingly likely to be asked by their governments to respond to emergencies. In the interest of making the humanitarian emergency response more effective and predictable, the involvement of military forces needs to be taken into account and appropriately planned for by all parties in such situations. One of the most obvious conclusions that can be drawn from the operation in Haiti – and one which reinforces current practice – is the need to engage with the military before a disaster strikes, so that humanitarian agencies have the opportunity to shape military planning, rather than simply react to it.

one of the most obvious conclusions is the need to engage with the military before a disaster strikes

The following observations can be made based on civil–military interaction in the Haiti earthquake response:

1) A general awareness and understanding of UN-CMCoord as a function will help considerably in initiating dialogue and facilitating interaction between humanitarian and military actors.

2) Interaction between humanitarians and the military should take place in a structured way, in two stages. The first stage, as in Haiti, involves setting up a CMCC within the OCHA office; the second stage involves longer-term work at the cluster level, the principal operational coordination platform in response operations.

3) UN-CMCoord officers need to enhance their knowledge of the cluster approach, and the wider humanitarian community needs to determine, for the future, how the military should best plug in to this system. Likewise, UN-CMCoord should be recognised as a common service available to both cluster leads and UN and non-UN agency heads within the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT).

4) UN-CMCoord capacity should include the ability to cover other potentially affected areas without jeopardising capacity in the national capital which, in the case of Haiti, was the centre of gravity for the coordination of response operations.

5) The timeliness of the deployment of UN-CMCoord capacity to undertake specific liaison functions in emergencies is crucial; if it occurs promptly, the UN-CMCoord officer involved is afforded the opportunity to prioritise, target and facilitate the right levels of interface (be they strategic and/or operational).

6) UN-CMCoord should be able to plug into the broader response and preparedness effort by contributing to contingency planning exercises, scenario planning, transition planning and other activities that support the efforts of the international humanitarian community and the governments of affected states, ultimately benefiting populations in need.

Conclusions

In today’s emergencies interaction among responders extends beyond the humanitarian community to include a range of other actors, including the military. Indeed, focused, humanitarian-led direction needs to be provided to the military to ensure that they are appropriately informed as to what is required, when it is needed and how it should be utilised.

By their very nature, all emergencies are different and there will never be a perfect, fully resourced, fully coordinated response involving all the required capacities. These realities demand decisiveness in implementing the ‘best possible’ solution rather than procrastinating and waiting for a ‘perfect’ one. Key to this is the ability to adapt and improve the response as it occurs. To this end, the UN-CMCoord function needs to constantly seek out ways to improve, in order to remain responsive to the challenging and dynamic needs of emergency situations.

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Smart and just: involving children and young people in post-disaster needs assessment

Daniel Walden and Kelly Hawrylyshyn, Plan International UK

Post Disaster Needs Assessments (PDNAs) are meant to ensure that both the needs and the opinions of everyone affected by and responding to a disaster are taken into account. It is widely accepted that those directly affected should be heard, and many agencies have developed strategies and tools to allow this. But it is rare that children and young people – who often comprise more than half of an affected population – are consulted. Guidelines for conducting PDNAs do not recognise the value of young people’s views. This article shows that children and young people can offer very valuable perspectives, and should be formally included in PDNAs.

Getting the views of children and young people

Over two weeks in February and early March Plan International, in partnership with UNICEF, organised 54 focus group discussions (FGDs) with children and young people across Haiti. Preparations included designing a child-friendly PDNA methodology and training 18 Haitian
facilitators (nine females and nine males, representing each of the nine departments covered) to lead the FGDs in the local Creole language. The 18 facilitators, whom Plan and its local partners had worked with in the past, learned about the PDNA process, and received refresher training on child rights, particularly the rights to protection and participation. Separate focus groups were held with different age groups (5–10, 11–16, 17–24), further divided by gender.

**Child-friendly methodologies for PDNAs**

A number of child-friendly participatory methodologies can be used to help children affected by a disaster communicate their feelings, concerns and ideas. Recognising that children’s perspectives are different from those of adults, and that many children lack the skills and means to express themselves, these tools make use of visualisation and drawing. Through the body map tool, for example, children focus attention on an anonymous child (whose body’s outline they have drawn on a large flipchart) and are guided through a series of questions to share information on the impact of the disaster on this imaginary child. The body map uses different body parts to address potentially sensitive issues, such as abuse, violence, loneliness and fear. Starting with the head, children are asked what they are thinking about, worrying about or feeling happy about, and whether the way adults think about children has changed. Focusing on the eyes, are there changes in the way children see their world, communities, families and themselves? Are there any changes in the way adults see children? For the ears, children are asked if there have been any changes in what they hear, and how adults listen to them. With the mouth, are there any changes in the way children speak, or adults speak to them? For the heart, are there any changes in the way children feel, and adults feel about them? For the hands and arms, are there changes in what activities children do, and the way adults treat them? For the feet and legs: any changes in where they go and cannot go?

The consultations considered the four key areas of the Haiti PDNA, namely the social sector (including education and health services), infrastructure, production/the economy and governance and security. This was more than an extractive Q&A exercise. The focus groups allowed most children their first formal opportunity to share with their peers how the earthquake had affected them. It also gave them the space to debate the priorities for the reconstruction process. The children were encouraged to express their hopes and dreams for the future of their country, and identify specific contributions they could offer.

**The reality of life for Haiti’s children**

Prior to the earthquake, Haiti’s children faced many problems, including high rates of infectious disease and HIV/AIDS, poor education, low nutrition levels and economic insecurity. One in seven did not reach the age of seven, and 22% of under-fives were malnourished. Disaster risks posed ever-present threats of flooding, especially during the annual hurricane season. Most of Haiti’s children were trapped in poverty.

In the focus groups, it quickly became clear that education was a very high priority. Children explained how access to

1 These tools are adapted from Action for the Rights of Children (ARC) resource pack 2009, http://www.arc-online.org.
good-quality education was a major problem before the earthquake, with schools in poor condition, inadequately resourced and staffed, and with fees too high for most people. Prior to the earthquake, only half of Haitian children attended primary school, less than a quarter attended preschool and 83% of all schools were non-public, many of them poorly regulated and supervised. The national literacy rate was under 53%. Over half of 20-year-olds had not completed secondary school, and near half of young people in the labour market were unemployed.

Children emphasised the importance of schools for restoring routine and normality

Children emphasised the importance of schools for restoring routine and normality following the trauma of the earthquake. One nine-year-old from Western department said: ‘I dream of a new Haiti, where children go to school... I have dreamed another Haiti where I go to school and meet my friends and teachers. I miss them so much’. Children also stressed the need for safe schools. One girl from the Western department described her experience: ‘When the earthquake occurred, I was in the schoolroom. I thought the building was collapsing. I fell down the stairs and I was rescued down there. Thank God, I was not seriously injured. Since then I stay at home doing nothing. I would really like schools to be rebuilt’.

‘We are Haiti’s present; we will be Haiti’s future’

The consultation groups also helped young people to understand how the government and the international humanitarian community were planning the reconstruction process. Young people expressed their interest in actively participating in the reconstruction of their country. An 18-year-old girl from Western department said: ‘Children and young people must find the necessary psychosocial support and must participate in rebuilding the country to avoid stress. We want to work. We want jobs’. According to a 13-year-old girl from South-East: ‘As a personal contribution to the reconstruction process, I could participate in cleaning activities in my village – there is so much garbage everywhere’. With a clear vision of a resilient future, these girls challenged the stereotype that sees children simply as victims; they wanted to be heard and involved.

Protection was another priority area identified in the FGDs. Children spoke of an upsurge in insecurity following the earthquake and were determined that this should be addressed, particularly in temporary camps where the risk of violence, abuse and trafficking is high. One 17-year-old girl from Beudet in the West said: ‘After the earthquake, I slept outside the house, but because of bandits and thieves, we had to go back inside the house’. The children’s view of protection also included the need for better protection from future disasters. One girl from the 17–24 age group told us:

When the earthquake came, I thought it was the collapse of the earth. I have seen people with broken arms and legs without any chance of being assisted. I think there were so many victims because we were not prepared to face that kind of disaster. I think it is important to provide psychosocial support to young people and to help the people be better prepared.

Children complained that they did not really know how to prepare for an emergency. The education curriculum does not include disaster risk reduction – a very regrettable omission in a country so vulnerable to so many hazards. Nonetheless, the children knew that the degraded environment, inadequate natural resource management and deforestation were making them even more vulnerable to disasters such as floods and landslides. Many of the children and young people stressed that preparedness and disaster prevention were essential components of the rebuilding process, and they offered several suggestions on how this could be done, including making roads more robust, controlling construction and enforcing building standards. Children also called for steps to revitalise agriculture, improve access to information and communication technologies, renewable energy supplies, better transport, better governance and decentralisation.

As one teenage boy put it:

Reconstruction should not only apply to Port-au-Prince, because if only Port-au-Prince is rebuilt, people in the rest of the towns will be soon leaving to Port-au-Prince and shanty towns will grow and grow. We need schools, universities, industries in towns so that people can stay in their original towns.

Conclusion: smart and just

Vulnerability to disaster risks arises from a number of different sources, including social exclusion and lack of consultation. This is especially the case for children. Participation in disaster response, recovery and rehabilitation grants those affected by disasters, a large number of whom are inevitably children and young people, the opportunity to have their voices heard. Including children in PDNAs ensures that a major part of the population is engaged in building back better and building resilience. This in turn contributes significantly to their own recovery from trauma and loss.

The official PDNA report set the price for reconstruction at $11.5 billion. The findings from our consultations with a small sample of Haiti’s children and young people illustrate how they can contribute to decisions about how this money is used, monitored and accounted for. The reconstruction process must address children’s priorities if it is to have long-term benefits. Children and young people in Haiti are ready to learn and take part in making theirs a better future.

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The work of the Education Cluster in Haiti

Charlotte Lattimer and Andrea Berther

The massive earthquake that hit Haiti on 12 January 2010 had a devastating impact on the education sector. Eighty percent of schools – almost 4,000 – were damaged, and an estimated 1.26 million children and youth were affected; large numbers of teachers and other education personnel were killed and injured.\(^1\) In relation to more obvious lifesaving sectors such as food, shelter and health, education typically struggles to achieve visibility and funding within an emergency response operation. In the aftermath of the earthquake in Haiti, however, education was accorded a surprisingly high priority. Given the scale of the disaster and the size and complexity of the humanitarian response that followed, the Global Education Cluster conducted a lessons learned exercise to reflect on and learn from the experience in Haiti during the first three months after the earthquake. This article summarises the main points, with a particular emphasis on coordination.

Background

The Education Cluster was set up at global level in December 2006 as part of the wider humanitarian reform process to improve the effectiveness of humanitarian response. The Global Education Cluster is co-led by UNICEF and Save the Children. Its vision is to enable all children and young people to have immediate access or ensured continuity to a good-quality education in a safe environment, in order to protect, develop and facilitate a return to normality and stability. To date, Education Clusters have been set up in 38 countries in response to natural disasters and conflict situations.

Within days of the earthquake in Haiti, clusters were established to support national authorities to coordinate the humanitarian effort. An Education Cluster was established alongside other clusters and is co-led by UNICEF and Save the Children.

Education as a priority in Haiti

The education sector in Haiti was weak even prior to the earthquake. Over 90% of schools were privately run, and families had to pay up to 25% of their income to send their children to school. Estimates vary, but some reports put the proportion of children out of school prior to the earthquake at 50%.\(^2\) Teachers are vastly under-qualified, with 80% failing to meet selection criteria for professional training. Recurrent natural disasters compound the problem by disrupting normal education patterns and exacerbating the political, socio-economic and environmental problems that have greatly constrained Haitians’ access to education.

The Education Cluster in Haiti

The initial meetings of the Education Cluster in Haiti were convened by UNESCO in the first week after the earthquake. By week two the Cluster was fully established and functioning under the leadership of UNICEF and Save the Children. In the initial weeks and months after the earthquake, the Education Cluster was responsible for coordinating the work of approximately 175 members from more than 100 organisations. Some 40–50 individuals were regularly present at weekly coordination meetings in Port-au-Prince. Sub-national Education Clusters were set up in Leogane, Petit and Grand Goave and Jacmel, where regular meetings also took place. Working groups were created to focus on specific thematic areas: capacity development/teacher training, psychosocial support (linked to the inter-cluster Psychosocial Task Force), the curriculum, early childhood development (linked to a Task Force bringing together other relevant clusters) and infrastructure/reconstruction. Disaster risk reduction was initially integrated into the work of different groups and later established as a sub-group in its own right. The Education Cluster in Haiti works alongside the pre-existing Education Sector Working Group, led by UNESCO, which focuses on longer-term education support in the development context.

Initial activities included a rapid joint needs assessment carried out by 40 data collectors visiting nearly 240 sites and meeting over 2,000 community members. The Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies were adapted for use in Haiti, and a detailed strategy for all education actors involved in response and recovery was drawn up for an initial six-month period, in alignment with the strategic priorities of the Ministry of Education. Information management and sharing were facilitated via a common website and tools and services such as a ‘who does what, where and when’ matrix.

Achievements of the Education Cluster

Education was included within the Flash Appeal issued just after the earthquake. Within the revised Humanitarian Appeal, which requests a total of $1.5 billion across all sectors, education requirements amount to just over $87.5m. At the time of writing, $82m had been received, 94% of total requirements.

\(^1\) Education Cluster, March 2010.

\(^2\) Advocacy brief, Education Cluster, March 2010.

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200,000 children have benefited from temporary learning spaces, over 88,000 children under the age of six have enrolled in early childhood development classes and over 500,000 children have received basic learning materials.\textsuperscript{3} The Education Cluster is working closely with the relevant humanitarian and civil–military coordination bodies, and has succeeded in clearing debris from approximately 70\% of destroyed and heavily damaged schools on the priority list for 2010. Work is under way with the government to provide grants to non-public schools, giving essential support to ensure that they reopen. An adapted curriculum is being developed with the government to allow children in directly affected areas to accelerate their learning and complete the rest of the school year in 90 days or less. Training for teachers on psychosocial recovery continues, with the target of reaching every school-going child in affected areas.\textsuperscript{4}

**Lessons learned**

**Capacity and staffing of the Education Cluster**

The magnitude of the disaster and the complexity and scale of the response called for a massive coordination effort, with unprecedented numbers of staff performing a wide variety of functions. The Education Cluster, like many of the other Clusters, struggled to deploy adequate numbers of skilled and experienced personnel for at least the first month after the earthquake. The fact that the Education Cluster functioned exclusively in French meant that sourcing the right staff was even more problematic than it might have been. Only short-term staff were available, resulting in high turnover and a loss of institutional knowledge with each rotation. Because of the pressure on agencies to deliver and the shortage of deployable personnel, staff deployed to support coordination struggled to balance dual programming and coordination responsibilities.

Lessons learned from the experience point to the need for:

- Renewed efforts to improve surge capacity for the Education Cluster by agreeing on triggers for rapid response, making better use of existing rosters and exploring new sources of additional deployable capacity through Cluster partners. Options to explore include rapid response teams, internal temporary re-deployment, rosters and stand-by partners.
- A move away from deploying individual Cluster Coordinators to deploying teams of staff for large-scale emergencies, with a range of different functions and skills.

**Role of the Education Cluster**

Different actors approached the Education Cluster with different needs and expectations. Those who were new to Haiti and/or education in emergency response looked to the Cluster for orientation and training. More experienced players expected the Cluster to drive decision-making and improve the quality of the education response. However, in the early weeks of the response the large numbers participating in Cluster meetings made it difficult to go beyond basic information-sharing. The main focus of the response was at sub-national level, yet staffing and resourcing of the sub-national Education Clusters was not prioritised early enough. Similarly, the thematic groups within the Cluster, focusing on areas such as teacher training or psychosocial support, were not adequately resourced. Much of the time of Cluster coordination staff was dominated by reacting to operational issues, leaving little space for strategic or proactive and creative thinking, or for ensuring stronger links between the Cluster's immediate plans and government/Sector Working Group mid- to longer-term planning.

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**the Education Cluster has been able to extract several useful lessons from its response in Haiti**

The Haiti experience resulted in several key recommendations in this area:

- Take a more decentralised approach to Cluster coordination, focusing on and adequately resourcing sub-national coordination.
- Develop benchmarks for Cluster progress, with milestones for what should be done by when.
- Prioritise capacity development within Education Clusters, using the INEE Minimum Standards, and adapting existing training packages for Frontline Responders, Ministry of Education officials and Education Cluster Coordinators.

**Operational issues**

There were high expectations within the Education Cluster when it came to areas such as information management, needs assessment, planning and monitoring, advocacy and resource mobilisation. Education Cluster members appreciated the high level of information-sharing that the Cluster facilitated. However, information management within the education sector had been weak prior to the earthquake, with very little reliable data available on schools, students and teachers. The assessments conducted by the Ministry of Education and the Education Cluster provided a snapshot of the situation after the earthquake, but failed to fill this larger information gap. Large amounts of money were mobilised for the humanitarian response in Haiti, but some Cluster members thought that the Education Cluster could have done more to mobilise additional resources earlier, capitalising on donor generosity in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake.

Lessons learned from Haiti point to the need for:

- Stronger information management stand-by capacity within the Education Cluster, including deployable experts, agreed tools and templates and databases/systems for adaptation and use in ‘information poor’ environments.

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\textsuperscript{3} Mid-Year Review of the 2010 Haiti Humanitarian Appeal, June 2010.
\textsuperscript{4} Mid-Year Review of the 2010 Haiti Humanitarian Appeal, June 2010.
• More resources for comprehensive education-related needs assessment to accompany the forthcoming rollout of the Joint Education Needs Assessment Toolkit by the Education Cluster.
• Continued efforts to review the inclusion of education in inter-agency appeal processes and guidance for Cluster Coordinators on how to participate in the development of appeals.

**Partnerships**

Government capacity to lead and coordinate education was weak even before the earthquake, and what little capacity existed was devastated by the disaster. There was confusion, including within the government, about the role of the Education Cluster in relation to the pre-existing Education Sector Working Group and other groups. There were good links between the Education Cluster and other clusters relevant to education, such as the Child Protection Sub-Cluster, though duplication of effort was still reported in some areas.

Following experiences in Haiti, the Global Education Cluster recommends:

• Emphasising the importance of early Education Cluster support to boost government capacity for coordination and leadership, including possible secondments into Ministry of Education offices.

**Conclusion**

The widespread destruction of schools and vast numbers of children and youth affected, combined with an extremely weak, non-state education system prior to the disaster, put extreme pressure on the humanitarian community to respond in a coordinated manner. There needs to be some caution in terms of learning lessons from the Haiti experience, given many of its characteristics are not necessarily transferable to other situations. Having said that, the Education Cluster has been able to extract several useful lessons from its response in Haiti. These lessons will be turned into concrete recommendations and actions that the Education Cluster can implement in the months and years to come, to improve its response to future disasters.

Charlotte Lattimer works with Save the Children as Knowledge Management Advisor for the Global Education Cluster Unit in Geneva. Andrea Berther was Education Cluster Coordinator in Haiti between January and April 2010. She is currently Regional Education Specialist, Emergencies, UNICEF West and Central Africa Regional Office.

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**Water, sanitation and public health in post-earthquake Haiti: reflections on Oxfam’s experience**

Jane Cocking and Andy Bastable, Oxfam GB

On 10 January 2010 Oxfam GB’s global humanitarian team spent the day reviewing our current approaches to humanitarian response in urban areas. We concluded that the most significant challenge we could possibly face would be a major earthquake in a densely populated urban area. We felt we needed to boost our capacity and understanding of what sort of assistance might be needed in preparation for such an event. Less than 48 hours later the earthquake struck Port-au-Prince, eventually leaving up to 220,000 dead and 1.5 million homeless. Within hours Oxfam’s team in Haiti was responding despite massive personal loss, and the global team was on its way to provide support. This article focuses on lessons learned from responding to water and sanitation (WASH) needs after the earthquake.

**The immediate response**

Despite the collapse of half of the Oxfam office and the death of two members of staff, in the first few days following the earthquake Oxfam’s Haiti team began installing bladder tanks at a few sites where people were gathering, and supplying the tanks by water trucking. Some basic equipment was salvaged from Oxfam’s collapsed stores, and more was borrowed from other agencies.

Throughout those early days the team in Port-au-Prince worked without any formal structures, running on adrenaline, pre-existing personal contacts and relationships and a commitment to act. Contact with the outside world was limited to occasional satellite phone calls with the Regional Centre in Mexico and Headquarters in Oxford. While the organisational infrastructure (equipment schedules, staffing lists, funding streams) was being set up, Oxfam staff outside Haiti could do little more than offer moral support to the team on the ground. These early days demonstrated the importance of having the right staff and equipment in place in vulnerable areas before disaster strikes.

Oxfam GB’s team of senior specialist staff in WASH, shelter and logistics left the UK for Haiti the day after the earthquake. It took three and a half days to reach Port-au-Prince. All flights had to go through Santa Domingo in the Dominican Republic, from where the team hitched a ride with a Dominican Defensa Civil bus. Meanwhile, equipment was in very short supply. With the low operational capacity of the airport at Port-au-Prince, Santa Domingo airport soon became inundated with cargo, and getting equipment into Port-au-Prince was extremely difficult.
In the weeks immediately following the earthquake Oxfam’s immediate priority was to provide clean water, safe excreta disposal and shelter material to those who had lost their homes, and to clear the accumulated solid waste from camp sites. Prior to the earthquake only 15% of Port-au-Prince’s population was served by the existing water supply network areas. Oxfam initially assumed that the pipeline infrastructure would need huge amounts of repairs. However, it soon became apparent that, as in many other earthquakes, the underground pipe system was surprisingly undamaged relative to the enormity of the destruction above ground. Even so, there was enough damage for us to engage a French engineering company which had worked in Port-au-Prince before to assist us in supporting DINEPA, the Haitian government’s water and sanitation authority. Together we focused on re-establishing the water kiosks which were an important part of the water distribution system.

Water
Oxfam and other agencies installed a large number of bladder tanks at IDP sites in those first few weeks, and by the second month of the response 70% of water at the various camps was being supplied by tanker, at a cost of half a million dollars a month. However, a recent water survey conducted by Oxfam established that communities are hesitant about drinking trucked water, largely because people had become used to purchasing water following a successful pre-earthquake government campaign to create safe water awareness. The survey revealed that people were continuing to buy water in small plastic bags or from water kiosks, as they had done prior to the earthquake. While agencies initially hoped that providing treated tanker water would have a significant health impact, the majority of people used it only for washing and cooking, and did not drink it.

Sanitation
During the first few weeks after the earthquake it quickly became clear that the key sanitation challenge was providing safe excreta disposal. Oxfam began by digging pit latrines wherever possible and constructing raised latrines sited over 1,000 litre plastic containers. In order to continue de-sludging the pit latrines, a large fleet of de-sludging trucks was required. The pits also needed to be lined to prevent collapse after repeated de-sludging. Our emergency trench latrines also needed to be lined. De-sludging the relatively small plastic containers was problematic: despite attempts to disseminate information to the contrary, people threw so much other waste into the pit latrines that the de-sludging trucks could not suck the slurry out.

As no piped water was available on the sites, sanitation had to be waterless. Oxfam used two new approaches. First, we brought in a partner called SOIL, with whom we had previously worked in Cap-Haïtien, to build compost toilets. Composting latrines are now working in five camps. Urine can either go to a soakaway or be stored for agricultural use. After each excreta deposit, users add a small amount of bagass (chopped sugarcane, a free waste product from the processing plants in Port-au-Prince). The mix goes into a plastic drum, which is removed weekly and taken to a composting site. The aim is to reduce the volume of solids that need to be taken off site. The secondary aim is to produce a demand for the urine and compost, which will make these systems sustainable for the future. So far, the feedback from users is extremely positive: people prefer the composting toilets to pit or raised latrines as they are considerably less smelly. More work needs to be done to stimulate demand for by-products.

The second new approach we tried was to systematise a pre-earthquake, largely slum practice of ‘flying latrines’, whereby people defecate in plastic bags which they then throw away. We set up cubicles and gave out small containers for home use. People can either use a peepoo bag (a double bag system containing powdered urea

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1 This work was originally funded by UNICEF and then subsequently through Oxfam International’s public appeal funds.
which prevents bad smells and speeds up the biodigestion process) or simple biodegradable bags. Innovative male and female urinals were also part of this approach, whereby people use the urinals then defecate into a bag, tie a knot in the bag and deposit it in a covered plastic drum, which is emptied daily. The contents are then taken to a local composting site. This approach has also received very good beneficiary feedback, even from people who had flush toilets before the earthquake. It is good for sites that de-sludging trucks cannot access, or where it is impossible to dig pits.

Management issues
Oxfam, like many INGOs, struggled to ensure the smooth management of a vast programme which grew in the space of a few weeks from $2m a year and 100 staff to $50m a year and 450 staff. We were also working with a wide range of approaches and partners – national partners, newly formed and often highly politicised camp committees, local government and international private sector partners – and were also operational ourselves.

Because the geographic area was so small, Oxfam initially centralised programme, management and business support in one office. It was assumed that this would also help to achieve economies of scale, better team coherence and more efficient and cost-effective programme implementation. Within a few weeks it was clear that this was not working and that Oxfam’s traditional way of structuring programmes into small geographically defined units, each with its own manager and technical and support teams, was much more effective. Staff built up much better relationships with each other and were able to establish relationships with individuals in the communities with which they were working. This approach was also much more reassuring for communities themselves, as they could get to know individual staff and express their opinions much more freely, leading to a more accountable and appropriate response. In some cases, such as Corailles, the team opened a dedicated office in the area where they were working, to give people a focal point where they could discuss issues, needs and complaints with Oxfam.

Looking to the future
The experience of the first months following the earthquake has given Oxfam the impetus to move on early from our crisis response ways of working. We have started a programme working with DINEPA, private companies and individual water vendors to increase the number of vendors across Port-au-Prince. The aim is to replace tankered water at each site by supporting private and public sector water vendors. The question now is how the poorest members of the camps can afford this water. Currently, we are carrying out Emergency Market Analysis (EMMA) surveys in many of the 47 camps where Oxfam is working, to determine how best to address this issue.

Variations in water pricing are another issue highlighted by the survey, which shows that the more affluent areas of Port-au-Prince pay on average 3–4 times less than poorer areas not on the piped system. Without new legislation, it is difficult to see how this disparity can be addressed. Lobbying work is underway to highlight the problem, but this will take time to have an impact.

Conclusions
Two lessons come out of Oxfam’s experience in Haiti. The first is that delivering water and sanitation services in urban areas poses very different technical challenges than those that arise in rural environments. As the urban population grows, so agencies will increasingly need to respond to urban disasters. Second, technical solutions need to be innovative and responsive to the specific physical, social and cultural circumstances of the disaster-affected population. Programmes are most effectively managed when they are implemented by dedicated groups of staff working with small communities with whom they develop clear reciprocal relationships and understanding. A balanced combination of these technical and management approaches can help to deliver an effective humanitarian response.

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The Haiti earthquake: breaking new ground in the humanitarian information landscape

Dennis King, US Department of State, Humanitarian Information Unit

The Haiti earthquake ushered in a new humanitarian information environment: one with unprecedented availability of raw data, the growing usage of new information communication technology (ICT), and the emergence of three loosely-connected communities of interest centred around the US government, the United Nations and the international community and a new group (ICT Volunteers) comprised of virtually-connected academics, humanitarians, corporate foundations and ICT professionals. All three communities collected, shared and acted upon enormous amounts of digital information made available on a variety of web portals, platforms and new social networking media, such as Short Message Service (SMS) feeds, Twitter and Facebook.

Each community has slightly different missions, needs, preferences, cultures and personal networks. There is therefore never going to be one single, universally accepted website or database that contains all knowledge, serves all functions and meets the needs of all users. Some users need information for operational purposes: planning, coordinating and implementing a humanitarian response or programme. Other users want information to provide them with synthesised situational awareness or strategic analysis. Because of the variety of users and applications, critical data and information should be structured in such a way that it can be shared across communities, networks and platforms. These broadly available datasets can then be more systematically evaluated, synthesised and analysed for the purposes of coordination, gap analysis, prioritisation, strategic decision-making and the creation of a common situational awareness.

The US government

The Haiti earthquake marked the largest US humanitarian response to a natural disaster. President Barack Obama designated USAID as the lead agency for the US humanitarian response. As of 13 August 2010, USAID had committed over $655 million in supplies, grants and support. At the height of the disaster response, US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) dedicated approximately 22,000 personnel to Operation Unified Response Haiti, and deployed 33 ships and 130 aircraft for humanitarian transport. The US Department of State obligated $11.2 million to assist displaced people and host families and to support repatriation and resettlement programmes. Other US government agencies provided technical assistance.

During the first hours after a major natural disaster such as the Haiti earthquake, the situation is changing rapidly, communications are disrupted, access is limited and few on-the-ground assessments have been conducted. Because of its proximity to Haiti, the US was quickly able to dispatch a USAID Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) and SOUTHCOM personnel set up US Joint Task Force Haiti to manage and coordinate logistics and to support other US government humanitarian response activities. Coordination centres were established at SOUTHCOM headquarters in Miami and at USAID and the State Department in Washington. Defense, State and USAID personnel were assigned to each other’s coordination centres to serve as liaisons and advisors in an effort to develop and implement a ‘whole of government’ approach to the response. Representatives from UN agencies and NGOs also served as liaisons in some of these coordination centres, as well as with some US government teams in Haiti. This helped to establish personal relationships, facilitate information-sharing and provide greater mutual understanding.

Another key decision was to use unclassified information whenever possible, and to use public platforms for...
sharing information. Much of the Defense Department's humanitarian-relevant data and information, which in previous instances resided on classified systems inaccessible to the public, was kept unclassified and shared widely within the Haiti earthquake response. SOUTHCOM launched the All Partners Access Network (APAN), a platform originally developed by US Pacific Command, to share unclassified information and enhance collaboration and operational coordination. SOUTHCOM made password registration available to anyone on request, and within three weeks APAN had over 1,600 registered users. Imagery products, maps, photos, assessments, situation reports, common operational pictures and requests for information were all made available on APAN.

The United Nations and the international community

UN humanitarian agencies first began tracking the post-earthquake situation using three OCHA-managed webportals/platforms: GDACS, VOSOCC and ReliefWeb. UN Disaster Assessment Coordination (UNDAC) teams and international search and rescue teams were dispatched to Port-au-Prince, using VOSOCC to mobilise and coordinate deployment. The UNDAC team included information management and GIS personnel to provide situation reports and maps for the international humanitarian response community.

a new OCHA portal, OneResponse, was launched and used to store and share data, information and analysis

The UN also activated the Cluster System, and a new OCHA portal, OneResponse, was launched and used to store and share data, information and analysis related to each of the cluster activities. Several clusters set up GoogleGroups to facilitate information-sharing, collaboration and coordination. Information management tools such as the Joint Operations Tasking Center (JOTC) logistics form, a Who is Doing What Where (3W) database, the Multi-Cluster Rapid Assessment methodology, the Displacement Tracking Matrix, the Post Disaster Needs Assessment and Recovery Framework and the Cluster meeting calendar and directories were established to facilitate coordination and information management. The creation of new information systems and tools, however, does not necessarily ensure effective inter-organisational coordination and decision-making. In order to be effective, these systems and knowledge management tools must become integrated into the work and decision-making processes of the international humanitarian response, including donors.

ICT Volunteers

Within hours of the earthquake, a new community of virtually connected volunteers affiliated with ICT consulting companies, private corporations, open source software proponents, academic/research institutions, NGOs and the Haitian diaspora began applying new ICT applications to the earthquake response. ‘Web 2.0’ social network media were used as a new means of data collection, information-sharing and collaboration. Within days, individuals from this community, with support from the US State Department, worked with ICT companies to establish an SMS 4636 code for the free transmission of text messages to and from Haiti. Google adapted its suite of tools to support the Haiti earthquake response and helped develop a Person Finder application to help find and connect people in Haiti who could not be contacted. Microsoft and Infusion provided technical assistance to the Inter-American Development Bank in creating a Haitian Integrated Government Platform to aggregate data on humanitarian and reconstruction activities in order to track and gauge progress.

A nascent, virtual CrisisMappers network utilised an open source interactive mapping platform known as Ushahidi (Swahili for ‘witness’), to gather, extract and plot georeferenced data on a public website. Over the course of the disaster, Ushahidi and volunteer diaspora translators received over 80,000 text messages; approximately 3,000 were used in some way during the response. Other georeferenced data was gleaned from Twitter, blogs, the news media and humanitarian situation reports to provide situational awareness products, including maps. The US Coast Guard, the 22nd US Marine Expeditionary Unit and other first responders used these social media platforms to support their emergency assistance operations. Individuals from the US government, the UN and some NGOs were also connected to this network.

This new community needs to be recognised as a new player in the humanitarian information environment. To be most effective, it needs to work with established international humanitarian actors and follow their codes of conduct and information management best practices and principles. One potential problem is that SMS ‘crowdsourcing’ could become a tidal wave of unverified reports and requests for assistance from individuals with smartphones. Requests and pleas for assistance might be exaggerated or might include misinformation, and could overwhelm the system and divert responses from identified emergency needs that have been objectively assessed by national and international teams. This nascent ICT community is also dependent on volunteerism and pro-bono resourcing, which does not ensure its sustainability or its integration with the host country and the international humanitarian system. Members of this community recognise these issues and are working to address them.

Other information management lessons learned from Haiti

There is one lesson learned that is constantly repeated: we don’t learn from previous experience, nor do we institutionalise best practices. Here are some information lessons learned/best practices that bear reiterating:

• Store and back up essential baseline geospatial datasets so that they can be used immediately once a disaster occurs. Likewise, store and maintain geo-referenced datasets that are collected during the...
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Emergency food assistance in Haiti: lessons learned from a post-earthquake GTZ operation in Leogane

Manfred Metz, independent consultant

In its immediate response to the Haiti earthquake, the German Ministry of Economic Cooperation (BMZ) provided €1 million for emergency food aid. GTZ organised procurement and transport through its country office in the neighbouring Dominican Republic, using an ongoing development-oriented Emergency and Transitional Aid (DETA) project to deploy staff and facilities to organise on-site distribution. Leogane, a badly hit town 35km west of Port-au-Prince, was chosen for the intervention, and food distribution began on 22 January. In selecting distribution points and carrying out the distribution, GTZ cooperated closely with the local administration, local emergency committees and UN and Canadian security forces based in Leogane. By the time the operation ended, on 23 February, 135,860 boxes had been distributed containing ten-day rations of wheat flour, rice, beans, oil and sugar (a total of roughly 1,000 tonnes of food in all). The operation was rapidly and efficiently implemented, and helped mitigate acute food shortages in Leogane and surrounding areas. Implementing partners included Deutsche Weltungerhilfe, Arbeiter-Samariter-Bund, Kindernothilfe, CARE Haiti and Help.

Lessons learned

Rapid response
Because a DETA project was already running in another region of the country, GTZ was able to react promptly and effectively in the wake of the earthquake. Indeed, GTZ was operational just two days after the earthquake hit. The support of the GTZ office in the Dominican Republic also allowed for very fast procurement, packing and transport of the food assistance.

Coordination
Aid agencies were unable to reach areas outside of Port Leogane immediately after the earthquake. According to the OCHA SitRep of 21 January 2010 ‘The Government has asked humanitarian partners for the rapid provision of humanitarian assistance to affected regions outside of Port-au-Prince, such as Leogane, Petit Goave and Grand Goave. Humanitarian assistance including food, water, shelter and medical assistance is reaching these areas but a more detailed overview of the presence of humanitarian partners and their activities is required’. Identifying and allocating the intervention area to GTZ was efficiently handled by the WFP-led Food Aid Cluster. Coordination between GTZ and WFP was efficient, the operation began the day after the decision was taken to allocate the Leogane area to GTZ. Coordination with local food committees was also successful.

Food rations: composition and packaging
The food rations GTZ distributed provided 2,890kcal of nutritional value per day, exceeding by a third the minimum requirement of 2,100kcal a day. The rations were packaged in cardboard boxes. Although this type of packaging was slightly more expensive, the decision to use cardboard boxes was crucial to the success of the operation. The boxes were easier to handle, distribute and transport, and they were also effectively reused, rather than discarded, by the affected population.
Logistics
GTZ worked in close cooperation with the UN and Canadian security forces to ensure the secure transport, storage and distribution of the food. Cooperation with the military proved very successful in terms of preventing looting and identifying secure and appropriate distribution points. In addition, the military was able to reach and provide assistance to affected populations in otherwise inaccessible areas.

Organising the distribution
Emergency committees were established to facilitate the organisation of distributions. In cooperation with the committees it was decided that food distributions would be targeted exclusively to women and children. Military forces were present during distributions, preventing any clashes. In addition, targeting effectively ensured that the needs of all household members (including men) were met, and that the distributed goods were consumed rather than sold.

Phasing out and handing over
From its conception, it was decided that the GTZ emergency response project would be time-limited, and should ensure the provision of foodstuffs to those in need until other humanitarian organisations could take over in the area. Coordination with the regional Food Aid Cluster proved positive right from the start, and the handover was planned and worked out in cooperation with WFP throughout the month-long intervention. As a result, WFP was fully prepared to take over once GTZ’s four-week intervention came to an end, and the handover was smooth and effective.

Factors contributing to a successful operation
The GTZ operation was widely appreciated by local and international partners, who particularly emphasised the well-organised and structured approach to planning and organising the distributions. The success of the operation was the result of specific conditions (external factors), combined with GTZ’s own capacities (internal factors). Important conditions facilitating an efficient and effective execution of the operation were:

- The fact that the neighbouring country, the Dominican Republic, was not affected by the earthquake, was economically relatively well developed and could be used to procure food items.
- The fact that GTZ had a country office in the Dominican Republic, which could immediately initiate and organise procurement, packing and transport.
- The presence of a GTZ-DETA project in Haiti provided an organisational basis for the emergency operation and facilitated the immediate mobilisation of staff and transport capacities. Staff were familiar with local conditions and had established contacts for organising and implementing the operation in coordination and cooperation with other organisations.
- There was a relatively fast and clear assignment of the geographical area of intervention.
- The presence of UN and Canadian forces ensured security during the operation.
- Reliable and well-established civil society organisations were present, with which GTZ could cooperate.

These external factors combined well with GTZ’s particular capacities:

- Staff had experience of emergency operations, were familiar with local conditions and had good management skills and a talent for improvisation.
- There was good communication, coordination and cooperation among the team and with partners.
- Processes (logistics, distribution) were structured well.
- There was awareness of and responsiveness to priorities, and staff were flexible and adjusted well to adverse and unforeseen conditions.
- All staff involved were prepared to go beyond their daily work routines.

The above conditions, and capacities, were responsible for the overall good performance achieved and can be considered as critical comparative advantages of GTZ in launching the emergency food aid operation in Haiti.

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Building back a better Haiti
Theo Schilderman and Michal Lyons

The relationship between natural disasters, recovery and poverty reduction is becoming a key scientific, economic and political issue. It is now widely accepted that some 'natural' disasters actually arise from socio-economic and political structures and processes of development. In turn, disasters bring socioeconomic inequalities into stark relief, creating pressure for change. Yet reconstruction usually reproduces vulnerabilities. Thus, development processes contribute to the number and scale of disasters; disasters set back development, increasing vulnerability and undermining future recovery and development. This article explores the mechanisms by which post-disaster reconstruction following the earthquake in Haiti may succeed in achieving developmental objectives, in particular the empowerment of poor individuals and communities.

Key challenges in Haiti
The ultimate and over-riding goal of reconstruction is not simply to reconstruct damaged buildings but to reduce the poverty and vulnerability which caused low-grade development and poor maintenance in the first place. Despite international involvement in the reconstruction process, neither social nor political change seems likely to offer the key to poverty reduction in Haiti. Haiti has long been an example of abdication of all interest by economic and political élites in the fate of the poor. Meanwhile, the country's governing élite has come under severe criticism for its refusal to open up the political process to opposition parties and free up political debate. In addition to these political and social problems, the death of up to a quarter of Haiti's civil servants is another barrier to reconstruction. Computers and files have also been lost, along with the buildings that housed them. Yet the effective administration of a major reconstruction programme requires a functioning civil administration.

the ultimate goal of reconstruction is not simply to reconstruct damaged buildings but to reduce poverty and vulnerability

In this context, reconstruction approaches which build self-sufficiency at the grass roots are more likely to reduce poverty and vulnerability in the long term. However, with 70% of displaced survivors likely to have been tenants and a land tenure system that is both complex and contested locally, standard 'owner-driven' approaches to reconstruction, which depend on pre-existing titles to land, or approaches that depend on awarding titles to land, are unlikely to be practicable on any scale. Approaches which involve rental by end-users, at least in the short term, are far more likely to be implementable.

In this, as in other strategic decisions, development politics matter. Fundamental differences in approach to reconstruction among donors and clusters risk undermining an already weak government’s authority and its power to act, as well as undermining local trust in any given policy. It is important for clusters in the humanitarian sector to share knowledge and experience, in particular between those engaged in post-disaster relief and those engaged in reconstruction, harmonise strategies and maximise development gains.

Participatory approaches to reconstruction, building on local technologies and using local materials, are essential; reconstruction must set out to restore livelihoods as well as building stock. Without this, it is doomed to eventual failure.

What can make a difference to Haiti’s poor?
The earthquake that struck Haiti caused massive damage and in excess of 200,000 casualties. About a month later, another earthquake hit Concepción in Chile; it was nearly 100 times stronger than the one that struck Haiti, and did substantial damage too, yet the number of casualties was a tiny fraction of those in Haiti. What caused that huge difference in impact? Chile had adequate building standards, including seismic-resistant design, and these standards were properly implemented. In Haiti, this was clearly not the case. The truth is that Haitians have been left extremely vulnerable to hazards such as earthquakes and hurricanes by years of poor governance, environmental mismanagement and increasingly unequal income distribution. The majority of Haiti’s people were unable to build according to disaster-resistant standards, with the results we saw in January.

As in many post-disaster situations, both the government and external agencies appear to be mainly focused on building houses, despite earlier comments by President René Préval that the first objective of reconstruction should be the development of livelihoods. Writing in the British newspaper The Independent in June, Jay Merrick draws attention to the need to rebuild affordable, safer houses. There is certainly a case for this, and the availability of external aid offers an opportunity to do so. However, it is a fallacy to think that building safer houses alone is enough. Whilst safer homes will certainly help to reduce risk for a while, they may do little to tackle underlying vulnerabilities, and therefore the same problems may recur when another hazard strikes in the future. What is actually needed is not just to make houses more resilient, but to make Haitians more resilient too. Therefore, building back a better Haiti involves rebuilding livelihoods and local markets as well as social networks, alongside housing.

Merrick suggests that a design competition and exhibition, involving foreign companies and consultants, alongside some from Haiti, will help define the types of housing that Haiti should rebuild. It is certainly useful to expose

people to additional options and have a frank debate about them, as clearly many local housing solutions failed in the earthquake. There is clearly a need to rethink approaches to construction in Haiti before any large-scale reconstruction proceeds, given that disaster preparedness in the past has focused on resistance to hurricanes, rather than earthquakes. There has been success with exhibitions in the past, for example in Colombia following the earthquake there in 1991. However, the approach raises a number of questions:

1. How are lessons going to be learned from the disaster, with respect to the particular failures in construction that contributed to it, and which local solutions perhaps did better. Do external agencies have adequate information of this type?

2. We have known since the 1970s that the process of producing housing, including taking design decisions, is more important than its end product, as it builds people's capacities and empowers them; empowerment is key to building resilience. The competition and exhibition does not involve Haiti's people at all, until the prototypes are built, so how empowering can it be?

3. There is a risk that, as a result of this process, we will end up with a number of standard housing types. Will they be able to accommodate the large variety of needs of Haitian families of different sizes and occupations? Will they allow for income-generating activities in the house? Can they be made flexible enough to adjust to individual needs?

4. Reconstruction and the influx of foreign capital do offer opportunities to boost livelihoods and local markets. That housing will be low-tech and use mainly local building materials and builders is a positive sign. But how does prefabricated mass housing fit into that picture?

5. In terms of livelihoods, the location of any future housing is also crucial. The Haitian government seems to want to relocate many of the original slum dwellers to new settlements in less earthquake-prone locations, away from the capital. Has anyone thought of the livelihoods consequences? If not, people may be forced to quickly return to the city, or decide not to relocate at all, as experience elsewhere shows.

6. People's social networks are an important asset, providing support to households in times of need. Following a disaster, such networks are often weakened because members have died or have scattered. What is being done to rebuild those networks?

Finally, while housing reconstruction can contribute to the development of livelihoods, there is no question that the development of livelihoods is also crucial in its own right. It follows from this that what is needed is not just foreign architects, but multi-sector teams, including Haitian professionals, working with the people of Haiti, to develop much more integrated rebuilding programmes.

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References and further reading


Productivity and cash-for-work in Niger: GOAL’s experience

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Niger is a land-locked, semi-arid country in West Africa. The 2009 UN Human Development report ranked it last out of 182 countries in terms of human development. Much of the population resides along an east–west strip of relatively fertile land along Niger’s southern borders with Nigeria and Benin. This area has been unaffected by the low-level insurgency afflicting northern regions. Planting in the region begins with the first rains, typically in June. The period between planting and harvest in September is a hunger gap, even in good years – and 2010 was not a good year. Projections by humanitarian agencies indicated that up to 20% of the population was severely vulnerable to food insecurity, with a further 20% at moderate risk.

Zinder, in the south-east, is the second-largest city in the country, with a population of more than 150,000. In response to the developing food security crisis, GOAL began an emergency cash-for-work project in the town in early June 2010 as part of a broader emergency intervention. Specific objectives included the clearance of culverts and drains before the onset of heavy rains. The overall goal of the project was to provide cash-for-work activities with public health benefits to vulnerable people in Zinder.

Initial project assessment

Initial ad hoc surveys of Zinder by GOAL personnel in early June indicated that a significant proportion of the city’s drainage system was clogged with compacted dirt and general refuse. The Zinder city department of hygiene and sanitation (ZDHS) had started drain-cleaning activities in May 2010, but had halted them in early June because of difficulties in paying workers. Meanwhile, reports from OCHA and other humanitarian agencies indicated that vulnerable urban populations (including recent migrants and vulnerable social groups) were facing food security problems over the coming months. GOAL’s quick-impact cash-for-work scheme thus had the two-fold aim of providing employment to vulnerable urban populations and addressing a pressing public health concern.

Making use of a natural experiment

Because of time constraints associated with the imminent start of heavy rains, it was agreed that speed of implementation was vital. GOAL, in cooperation with the local authorities (particularly the ZDHS), decided to calculate a per metre rate to be paid for drains cleaned, in preference to existing practice which was to pay a daily rate per employee. However, national legislation dictates a standard minimum daily rate; it was therefore agreed that the per metre rate calculation should be based on workers’ average productivity when paid the national daily rate. Previous drain-cleaning activities, undertaken by the local government in cooperation with the Zinder branch of the Nigerien Association of the Deaf, had to be stopped after only 14 days because of a funding shortage. The project team, comprised of GOAL and ZDHS personnel, visited the previous work site and conducted a measurement exercise to determine the average rate of progress over the 14-day period; ZDHS had paid labourers on a daily basis using a fixed rate of CFA 1,500 per day (approximately $3), in accordance with the national pay scale. Measurements taken, along with estimates of average work group size and daily amounts paid, were used to calculate a rate per metre of drain cleared of CFA 1,100.

† Note that this rate was considered appropriate for drain cleaning in 2010 as the majority of drains had not been cleared for four years and as a consequence contained deep and heavily compacted debris and refuse. Should these activities be repeated in the near future, a lower rate might be appropriate because drain clearance should be considerably easier.
Drain-clearance activities
Drain-clearance activities using this per metre rate began on 8 June 2010, drawing workers from the same pool of labourers (identified by the Zinder branch of the National Association of the Deaf) used in the previous cleaning exercise. GOAL supervisors marked beginning and end points of work for each team using GPS systems, measuring the total distance cleared at the end of each day. In the first eight days of operations, a total of 1,847m of drains were cleared, using three teams of around 20 workers each. When calculated on a metre per worker per day basis, the average clearance rate was three times greater than that of workers using the daily rate. Daily clearance rates varied depending on the conditions of individual drains. While this increase in productivity cannot be attributed solely to the payment of a per metre rate, as GOAL also provided workers with new tools that made digging easier, discussions with workers and direct observation of clearance activities strongly suggested that it was an important contributory factor. Because of increased productivity rates, drain clearers consistently earned above the base national daily rate. As a consequence it was also possible to attract a greater number of workers to the scheme, further speeding up clearance operations.

To give one indicator of progress, the teams supported by GOAL cleaned 215m of drains on the first day of operations using 45 men, equating to an average clearance rate of 4.8m per person per day; this compares to a total distance of 256m cleared by a team of 13 men over 14 days using the daily rate system, a rate of only 1.4m per person per day. The project completed all drain-clearance activities before the end of June, despite occasional stoppages towards the end of the month because of heavy rain.

Lessons learned
The main lesson of the project was that, for this type of activity, a piece rate payment system is preferable to paying a daily rate. However, while the increase in daily performance that results from this alternative incentive system is a major plus, there are also disadvantages. The first point relates to the sustainability of activities. The longer-term problem remains the lack of a functioning refuse collection system in Zinder and the consequent dumping of garbage in the city’s open drains. Annual drain clearance activities, in the absence of the establishment of such a system, risk perpetuating the problem rather than resolving it. In this respect it is notable that GOAL was responsible for initiating the last drain clearance programme, in 2006.

Second, piece rate systems tend to reward the strongest more than the weakest. This problem was in part overcome by paying teams collectively for work done on a daily basis. Teams typically comprised 20 members each. The earnings of each team were split evenly between team members, encouraging more efficient teamwork. For example, some team members would break up hard-packed earth with picks while others lifted and cleared the loosened earth. However, there is a need to guard against the risk of teams selecting stronger members and leaving out weaker members to maximise productivity.

The combination of work teams and payment method can also reduce workforce flexibility. In one instance, a team was reluctant to accept additional workers mid-morning because they had already cleared a significant area. This problem was resolved by forming an additional temporary team of new workers for that day alone.

Another lesson relates to timing – it was initially hoped that the project could target both socially vulnerable groups and migrant labourers from rural areas looking for work in Zinder. However, the light rains that fell in the first week of the project encouraged temporary migrant labourers to return to their home areas to begin planting. As a consequence the project worked only with the Deaf Association. An earlier start to project activities, perhaps in mid-May, would have addressed this issue – although too early a start might have resulted in cleared drains being refilled with waste, particularly in market areas.

Finally, both the ZDHS and the Deaf Association were reluctant to include women in drain-cleaning activities, claiming that the work was too dirty and physically demanding. As a consequence all project beneficiaries were male members of the Deaf Association. Unfortunately, time and capacity constraints prevented the project team from initiating further discussions with town and association representatives, which might have moderated their views on this issue or allowed for alternative activities to be integrated into the project. However, if future drain-cleaning activities are implemented, complementary cash-for-work street cleaning or other activities considered culturally appropriate for women should be included.

Conclusion
This project was only one part of a larger series of emergency cash-for-work interventions being implemented by NGOs and the Niger government in the run-up to the hunger gap. Cash-for-work proved to be a convenient and efficient way of implementing quick-impact projects and providing paid employment in Zinder, where markets function effectively and can respond to increased demand. Applying a piece rate approach and making team payments proved to be more efficient than paying individuals a daily wage rate, both in terms of completing the work as well as for income transfer. However, this approach and the type of work involved may also have had potentially negative consequences, including the exclusion of the less physically able and women.

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UN peacekeeping has expanded enormously over the last decade. There are 15 UN peacekeeping missions around the world today, with 125,000 peacekeepers. As part of this expansion, UN peacekeeping missions are playing an increasing role in the protection of civilians, since first being mandated by the Security Council with such a task in 1999 in Sierra Leone. However, there is a lack of clarity about what this development means for humanitarians. Although a number of policies and guidelines have been published on humanitarian protection, these documents say remarkably little about how humanitarian agencies should engage with peacekeeping missions in this area.¹

This is not to say that peacekeepers and humanitarians do not communicate or work together on protection. In contexts such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), South Sudan, Darfur and Chad, UN peacekeeping missions and the humanitarian community do interact around protection issues, but their relationship can often be best described as one of co-existence rather than a meaningful desire to coordinate better. Despite the growing importance of civilian protection for both, the interaction is often ad hoc and not strategic. Coordination at the field level is not always clear, and at headquarters there is a big gap in policy and guidance to provide direction for what has arguably become a vital relationship. These deficits demand attention.

Principles and pragmatism
Humanitarian organisations have been keen to distinguish their protection action from that of peacekeeping missions in order to safeguard humanitarian principles. UN peacekeeping missions have political mandates and use military personnel; in some contexts, such as with MONUSCO in the DRC, they are perceived as having become a party to the conflict. Many agencies believe that any association with a peacekeeping mission could undermine their neutrality in the eyes of armed groups, compromise the safety and security of their staff and reduce their ability to act independently to access populations in need of aid. For their part, peacekeeping missions have taken a narrow view of their protection role, seeing it primarily in terms of ensuring the physical security of civilians, and have not always seen the need to coordinate with humanitarian organisations. Most peacekeeping missions today, however, are multi-dimensional, with traditional uniformed peacekeepers but also significant police contingents and civilian components including units dealing with child protection, gender and sexual violence, human rights and rule of law – all of which are relevant to the protection of civilians. As a result, the protection mandates of peacekeeping missions have become much more diverse, and the need to coordinate with external actors that much greater.

The protection mandates of peacekeeping missions have become much more diverse

The majority of protection risks civilians face require coordinated approaches by peacekeepers and humanitarians. It is not possible to say that humanitarians work on some protection issues and peacekeepers on others; protection problems require collective action if they are to be addressed properly. Even protection from physical violence, in which peacekeepers obviously have a unique role to play, often relies on the analysis of humanitarian organisations to identify where problems exist. Likewise, although the protection work of humanitarian organisations focuses a great deal on internally displaced people, peacekeeping missions are often expected to protect IDP camps or help provide security to enable IDPs to return home. While there is still the need to maintain a clear distinction between their respective roles and responsibilities, not least to safeguard humanitarian principles, a pragmatic approach is required.

¹ Including ALNAP’s handbook a few years ago and the ICRC standards and the Protection Cluster IDP handbook most recently
to ensure better coordination between peacekeepers and humanitarians on the protection of civilians.

Protecting civilians: an OCHA/DPKO study

This growing interface between peacekeepers and humanitarians on the protection of civilians was one of the reasons why the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) embarked on an independent study entitled Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations – Successes, Setbacks and Remaining Challenges, published in January 2010. The study traces the formulation of protection mandates by the UN Security Council, and their implementation by UN peacekeeping missions on the ground. Case studies on DRC (MONUC), Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) and Sudan (UNMIS and UNAMID) were analysed, highlighting a number of gaps and shortcomings. In particular, the study found that UN peacekeeping missions lacked a clear definition and conceptual understanding of civilian protection, as well as comprehensive protection strategies for implementing their mandates. They are also often poorly resourced and inadequately trained. A number of the study’s findings and recommendations were included in Security Council Resolution 1894 on the protection of civilians, which was adopted last November as the study was being finalised.

should peacekeepers and humanitarians have the same definition for protection?

Following the study, DPKO and the Department of Field Support (DFS) – with input from UN humanitarian agencies – have developed an Operational Concept which sets a framework for the protection of civilians in peacekeeping missions. This was presented to the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping (better known as the C34) in March 2010. The C34 suggested a number of ways in which the protection of civilians should be addressed by the UN Secretariat, including the development of a ‘strategic framework’ for protection strategies, training standards and an assessment of resources and capabilities. Following the publication of the study the issue has also been included in the work plan of the Global Protection Cluster for 2010.

Key priorities

What then are the priorities for humanitarian agencies when engaging with peacekeepers on protection, and what should their contribution be to the policy debate? Five key areas require attention.

The first concerns the definition and conceptual understanding of protection. Following a series of workshops in the late 1990s the ICRC developed a definition encompassing ‘all activities aimed at ensuring full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with international human rights law, international humanitarian law, and refugee law’. This was adopted by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), and most humanitarian actors broadly subscribe to it. DPKO has not yet adopted a definition of the protection of civilians for peacekeeping purposes, and while noting the IASC definition has not decided whether it might be applicable to its operations. Similarly, DPKO has not taken up the ‘egg model’ developed by the humanitarian community, which sets out different layers of protective action from response to remedial assistance and environment-building. Instead, DPKO’s Operational Concept is organised around three tiers of action: support to the political process, protection from physical violence and establishing a protective environment. While there are clearly common elements between these frameworks, there are also differences.

There is debate about whether peacekeepers and humanitarians should have the same definition and conceptual model for the protection of civilians. While there is broad agreement that both are working to the same end, each community goes about things in noticeably different ways. Much has been said about the Joint Protection Teams (JPTs) of MONUSCO in DRC, which bring together the military and civilian components of the mission to devise on-the-ground protection interventions in given locations. However, there has been concern in the humanitarian community that it is not the role of civilian protection actors to advise on what are essentially military tactics. As ostensibly political-military actors, peacekeeping missions tend to see their protection role
in terms of providing physical security. Humanitarian actors view their protection role more in relation to rights and remedial action once violations are committed. It may be more useful to talk of ‘humanitarian protection’ and ‘military protection’ to denote these fundamental differences. Although it is unlikely that peacekeepers and humanitarians will arrive at precisely the same conceptual understanding of civilian protection, it is important nevertheless that they continue to discuss this point.

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it may be more useful to talk of ‘humanitarian protection’ and ‘military protection’

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Second is the issue of protection strategies. Both Security Council Resolution 1894 and the C34 report this year require that all UN peacekeeping missions with protection mandates develop protection strategies, though MONUSCO, UNMIS and UNAMID are the only operations that currently have them. On 31 May–1 June, DPKO, OCHA and the Global Protection Cluster held a workshop in Addis Ababa to develop specific guidance in this area. The fact that the workshop was organised jointly by peacekeepers and humanitarians shows the important collaboration now taking place on this issue. Although the scope of the workshop was limited to protection strategies developed by peacekeeping missions rather than the UN system as a whole, it clarified the consultation that needs to take place in the development of these strategies with other protection actors, notably UN agencies within the Protection Cluster. The Protection Cluster has in fact already developed its own strategies in a number of countries, under the guidance of UNHCR as the Cluster lead. Peacekeeping missions and humanitarian agencies are therefore undertaking strategy development in parallel. There is clearly a need for continued collaboration between the two, as was agreed at the Addis workshop, and greater effort is required to bring these strategies together.

Third is the need to define clearly the protection roles and responsibilities of peacekeepers and humanitarians, a concern repeatedly raised by humanitarians. In many ways this is a civil–military coordination issue. While for some areas of protection responsibilities are quite clear, in others this is not the case. For example, in some contexts peacekeeping missions are responsible for seeking the release of children from armed groups, while in others this is UNICEF’s responsibility. Clarification on this is important not only because of concerns about humanitarian principles, but also to make the overall response more effective. Guidelines on civil–military coordination in crisis situations developed by the IASC are clearly relevant here, but they say little about the specific issue of the protection of civilians. More specific civil–military guidelines on the protection of civilians might be required.

The fourth issue is information sharing and analysis. Having reliable and verified information is the cornerstone of effective protection work, and this is an obvious area where peacekeepers and humanitarians have an interest in collaboration. Peacekeeping missions have enormous potential to collect information on protection risks, and peacekeepers on the ground often see the merit of establishing relations with local populations. While humanitarian organisations may be unable to go where peacekeepers are deployed, the opposite can also be true, and humanitarians regularly possess information useful to peacekeepers. The ability of humanitarian organisations to protect civilians is limited, so lobbying for the deployment of peacekeepers into areas where they believe people are at risk is a key protection activity. In the DRC, the Protection Cluster has developed a matrix in which MONUSCO and the Protection Cluster identify areas with the most pressing protection risks, into which peacekeeping units ‘should’ or ‘could’ deploy. MONUSCO has deployed peacekeepers in 80% of areas in the ‘should’ category, showing that good collaboration is possible. However, passing on information about protection problems is a sensitive issue, and doing so might affect the perceived neutrality of humanitarian organisations and endanger the people providing the information.

Fifth is coordination on the protection of civilians. The Protection Cluster is the primary coordination mechanism for humanitarian actors. In some instances, such as in the DRC, peacekeeping missions have co-chaired the Protection Cluster, but this practice does not seem to have been replicated elsewhere, as a political-military actor coordinating a humanitarian forum is surely anathema to humanitarian principles. For this reason the practice has been discontinued in the DRC. A priority for UN peacekeeping operations is to coordinate the disparate actors within the mission involved in the protection of civilians, including the military, police and civilian components, which in itself is a big task and requires the establishment of working groups and other such mechanisms. Like protection strategies, parallel coordination structures seem to be the established practice. Not only should participation and communication be a two-way process between the different coordination mechanisms, but a priority is surely for there to be a common decision-making forum for peacekeepers and humanitarians on the protection of civilians. MONUSCO has recently established a Senior Management Group on Protection chaired by the SRSG and comprising all relevant sections of the mission, as well as UNHCR – as the head of the Protection Cluster – and OCHA, to represent broader humanitarian interests.

In conclusion, peacekeeping and the protection of civilians is obviously an issue that should, and is, being addressed by humanitarians. There are certainly concerns about safeguarding humanitarian principles, but these should not get in the way of effective engagement between both communities to ensure complementary, and where possible coordinated, approaches to the protection of civilians.

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A role for Civil Affairs in community conflict resolution?
MINURCAT’s Intercommunity Dialogue Strategy in eastern Chad

Diana Felix da Costa and John Karlsrud

Increasingly, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is adopting more comprehensive and integrated mandates that deal not only with traditional security, but also attempt to engage in wider peacebuilding and protection efforts, including at the local community level. While in principle engagement at community-level peacebuilding is a laudable development, in practice it raises questions regarding DPKO’s capacity to fulfil this role. Although Civil Affairs work has been undertaken since the early 1990s, doctrinal development within DPKO has been slow, as it has in all areas of multidimensional peacebuilding within the UN. The Capstone Doctrine, including the Policy Directive for Civil Affairs, was first published by DPKO and the Department of Field Support in 2008. Three core areas of Civil Affairs are emphasised to support UN peacekeeping mandates at the local level: 1) cross-mission representation, monitoring and facilitation; 2) confidence-building, conflict management and support to reconciliation; and 3) support to the restoration and extension of state authority.

MINURCAT’s Intercommunity Dialogue Strategy

In eastern Chad, high levels of banditry, criminality and lawlessness are serious problems. Customary dispute management and conflict resolution mechanisms have long been the only structures able to foster community safety and protection and maintain some degree of law and order. However, displacement, conflict and growing tensions and violence, as well as rivalry with state authorities, have combined to weaken the capacity of traditional leaders to resolve conflicts. The central government has employed a divide-and-rule strategy, encouraging mutual resentment between different ethnic groups and co-opting traditional mediation and conflict management mechanisms. A new elite consisting mostly of members of the Zaghawa tribe and members of government military forces has been dispatched to eastern Chad to take up administrative positions. This new elite is slowly but surely replacing the traditional leadership.

The UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) was deployed at the beginning of 2008, and is scheduled to be withdrawn at the end of 2010. MINURCAT’s broad list of tasks relating to civilian protection includes the provision of security through military patrols and escorts, as well as ‘softer’ protection measures such as Civil Affairs support to local authorities in the resolution of conflicts. In January 2009, MINURCAT was mandated to 'support the initiatives of national and local authorities in Chad to resolve local tensions and promote local reconciliation efforts, in order to enhance the environment for the return of internally displaced persons'. In line with this, a strategy to support Intercommunity Dialogue (ICD) at the local level was developed by MINURCAT’s Political and Civil Affairs Section (POLCA). Three regional field offices were responsible for ICD, with three main pillars for intervention: 1) conflict prevention and the development of early warning systems; 2) conflict resolution by supporting existing mechanisms or assisting in the creation of new structures; and 3) developing follow-up and monitoring systems.

POLCA’s role involved consulting local authorities to identify priorities for action. Once these were determined, POLCA would offer its assistance to the local administrative authorities in bringing concerned actors together. In each case, a Quick Impact Project (QIP) (such as the construction of a common well or market) would be suggested to enhance interdependence between conflicting communities. Once local authorities had accepted POLCA as a facilitator, confidence-building activities would begin, involving regular visits to each conflicting side. If the leaders of both communities expressed their willingness to enter into dialogue, local administrative and customary authorities would be informed, and arrangements made to organise an ‘official’ reconciliation event through existing customary conflict resolution mechanisms, such as the Elders Commission. All administrative and traditional authorities in the region would be invited to witness the event. A Reconciliation Commission comprising members of both communities would then be established, which would function both as an early-warning system and follow-up mechanism.

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In one of the three field offices the POLCA team had a thorough understanding of the region it was operating in and enjoyed an excellent rapport with both the administrative and the customary authorities. Through collaboration with MINURCAT’s human rights section, information was systematically collected and constant communication maintained with other actors, including UNHCR and its national NGO counterpart Eirene, alongside other NGOs involved in protection and economic recovery. The POLCA office used reliable and up-to-date information to inform its community peacebuilding strategy. Staff invested in building relationships and trust with local authorities and developing follow-up mechanisms, including supporting Reconciliation Commissions and encouraging other more long-term actors in eastern Chad to implement economic recovery projects with tangible ‘peace dividends’. In another

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any engagement has to be sustained, long-term and aimed at building the capacity of local governance structures

Quantifying the impact of these initiatives is a challenge. The dialogue processes that were facilitated reportedly resulted in some IDP returns, but these were not properly verified. Overall, POLCA’s intercommunity dialogue did not live up to expectations. In part, this can be explained by the failure to invest sufficiently in follow-up mechanisms. More broadly, the Chadian government’s withdrawal of consent for the MINURCAT mission as a whole, and its subsequent withdrawal by the end of 2010, raises obvious questions about the sustainability of the strategy. The government argues that it is able to provide a secure environment without peacekeepers on the ground. NGOs working in returnee areas seriously question this, and point out that, without security provision, programmes will grind to a halt.

Is there a role for UN peacekeeping operations in community conflict resolution?

Even when good local context analysis is carried out and applied, lack of commitment from local actors will cause local peacebuilding initiatives to fail. The most pressing question when assessing MINURCAT’s role in peacebuilding in eastern Chad is whether local actors actually want external assistance in the first place. MINURCAT’s mandate problematically assumes that national and local authorities in Chad are committed to ‘resolving local tensions and promoting reconciliation efforts’ and actively interested in changing the status quo. This is a perilous assumption in Chad, where the government often appears to support specific ethnic groups and has a long history of co-opting customary authorities and opposition members.

With all-embracing mandates incorporating issues ranging from rule of law and gender to human rights and security sector reform – to name just a few – legitimate questions can be raised as to whether multidimensional UN peacekeeping operations have sufficient expertise and contextual knowledge to carry out effective conflict resolution and peacebuilding work at the local level. A mission can bring added resources and contribute positively to an intercommunity dialogue process, but it is clear that, if peacekeeping operations take on this task, it must be done in close cooperation with other local actors and in a realistic timeframe. However, engaging in local intercommunity dialogue requires specific local knowledge, flexibility and long-term, sustained commitment, a challenge for large, unwieldy and time-limited peacekeeping operations. Together with the short-term, project-based cultures of some donor organisations, this generates considerable pressure for the rapid achievement of concrete and measurable results. Success is thus often measured in terms of tangible outcomes such as the quantity of infrastructure rehabilitated or numbers of returned IDPs and refugees, rather than whether the underlying causes of conflict (and the political dynamics) have been sustainably addressed. Any engagement has to be sustained, long-term and aimed at building the capacity of local governance structures, as well as partnerships with national NGOs and other actors to ensure continuity after the UN has pulled out. UN peacekeeping Civil Affairs may prove to be an asset in facilitating the space required for intercommunity dialogue and in advocating for early recovery activities by fostering structures that meet basic human needs and maximise public participation, but this has to be done alongside national authorities, involving all relevant actors and within a realistic timeframe.

Some requirements for UN engagement in community conflict resolution

Based on MINURCAT’s limited experience of intercommunity dialogue in eastern Chad, some reflections can be put forward for DPKO’s future engagement in interventions in similar contexts.

- Intercommunity dialogue/reconciliation strategies must be part of a wider intervention effort – return areas should be safe, and quick-impact projects should be implemented to support voluntary return, in parallel with support for local administrations and other early recovery activities, together with the UN Country Team and other actors.
- The UN peace operation and the UN Country Team must maximise partnerships, develop activities and exit strategies with other UN agencies, such as UNHCR and UNDP, and international and national NGOs, which have deeper knowledge of local conflicts and are longer-term actors in the country.
- The spotlight should be put on local administrative practices and on ensuring that local administrators treat different ethnic communities equally; the international community should be careful in its support for the development of local administration structures, so as not to further exacerbate conflicts between ethnic groups and unwittingly endorse one particular clan over another.

• More emphasis is required on communication both internally within the peacekeeping mission offices and with other national and international NGOs supporting intercommunity reconciliation.

• Quantifying the impact of intercommunity reconciliation initiatives remains a challenge and should not be based solely on the number of returns.

• When facing a lack of commitment by local actors, all must continue to build confidence and promote communication between them, and encourage through all possible means a national, inclusive dialogue.

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Addressing the challenge of compliance: Tearfund’s Quality Standards

David Bainbridge, Tearfund

Over the last decade the aid community has recognised that there is a quality and accountability deficit in emergency projects. The widespread criticism of the relief response to the Rwanda genocide in 1994 and to later emergencies in the Balkans and elsewhere highlighted the need for standards of good practice in programme quality and accountability. Joint initiatives were launched, including the Sphere Project, the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance (ALNAP), the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP) and People In Aid.

It has become increasingly clear in recent years that field staff working in emergency situations have become overwhelmed by the range of good practice commitments and standards that they are expected to consider or comply with, alongside all the other policies and procedures of their organisations. As a result, there is often a disconnect between the high-level commitments that an NGO signs up to in its Head Office and the practical realities of projects on the ground. There remains a significant problem with the application of international codes and standards. This article presents a case study of Tearfund’s experience in drawing up a set of Quality Standards, to share learning in adopting one approach to addressing the challenge of compliance.

Common codes and standards

The following are some of the most widely accepted codes and standards referred to by NGOs:

• The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief.

• The HAP 2007 Standard in Humanitarian Accountability and Quality Management.

• The Sphere Project – Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response.

• The People In Aid Code of Good Practice in the management and support of aid personnel.

• The Code of Good Practice for NGOs Responding to HIV.

• The Keeping Children Safe Coalition standards.

• The UN Statement of Commitment on Eliminating Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN and non-UN Personnel.

This daunting array of codes and standards is diverse in style and focus, adding to the confusion for staff seeking to assess whether they are working in compliance. Some standards highlight good practice to maximise the quality of humanitarian assistance, while others focus on eliminating bad practice in addressing fundamental issues of staff conduct and abuse. Some use aspirational language, with verbs such as ‘strive’, ‘endeavour’ and ‘attempt’ used to define the required commitment, thereby leaving room for interpretation and muddying the waters further.

field staff working in emergency situations have been over-whelmed by the range of good practice commitments and standards

Critical to the practical implementation of codes and standards are considerations of field staff capacity and the nature of support that NGO Head Offices provide to their frontline staff to help them understand and implement these commitments. Tearfund’s experience has been that field staff in emergency situations face immense time pressures to deliver high-quality assistance whilst meeting donor and organisational requirements, often in the media spotlight. Effective induction and training on codes and standards is therefore required if national and international field staff are to be properly equipped with an understanding of the relevant codes and standards, and how they work in practice. In the heat of an emergency response the excuse often given by NGOs is that there is
little time for such an investment, when other pressing priorities take precedence. The challenge is further complicated when there are high levels of staff turnover.

Against this backdrop Tearfund took the decision to agree a set of Quality Standards to summarise all of the agency's relevant external and internal commitments. Tearfund's field staff had been asking for a 'one stop shop' of organisational commitments, and through a process of consultation with staff in the head office and in the field, a set of 12 standards was identified, as set out in Box 1.

**The Quality Standards**

The process of consultation was challenging, with staff on one extreme remaining adamant that there should be no cutting back on commitments, and staff on the other extreme arguing that, if we were serious about implementing them, there should be no more than two or three quality standards. The decision to go for 12 sought to provide a balanced approach, with no major commitments being dropped, whilst trying to keep the number manageable. The focus of the Quality Standards was on emergency response, and the standards were limited to commitments which were deemed to be meaningful at the community level, as opposed to standards that reflected organisational systems and policies, such as security management, project management and health and safety. Such a distinction is not necessarily clear-cut and these organisational standards are critical in supporting the implementation of the community-level standards. One weakness in the approach was the lack of formal consultation with project communities on the selection of the standards, mainly due to time constraints. This would be a logical next step as the standards are reviewed and refined.

The first three standards, 'Values', 'Impartiality and Targeting' and 'Accountability', were presented as non-negotiable, to be implemented in all project contexts. The Values standard focuses on the conduct and attitudes of staff, ensuring clarity on the positive values that staff are expected to exhibit and clearly identifying types of behaviour which are incompatible with these values, including sexual exploitation and abuse, fraud and corruption. The intention is that the Values standard incorporates the UN Statement of Commitment on Eliminating Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, to which Tearfund is a signatory.

The 'Impartiality and Targeting' Standard is linked with the Red Cross Code of Conduct principle of impartiality, and emphasises both selection of beneficiaries on need alone and the imperative to target the most vulnerable.

The 'Accountability' is linked with the HAP 2007 benchmarks.

### Box 1: Tearfund’s 12 standards

1. **Values**
   
   We are committed to outworking (living out) our core values through our staff, in relationships with project participants and all those with whom we interact.

2. **Impartiality**
   
   We are committed to impartiality. The assistance provided is intended for the poor and most vulnerable. Project participants are selected on the basis of need alone, regardless of their race, religion or nationality.

3. **Accountability**
   
   We are committed to transparency, participation, feedback and learning with our project participants.

4. **Disaster Risk**
   
   We are committed to reducing the risk of future disaster by strengthening local capacity and reducing future vulnerability to disaster hazards as well as meeting short-term needs.

5. **Technical Quality**
   
   We are committed to the technical quality of our projects and to ensuring that they reflect communities’ own relief and recovery priorities.

6. **Children**
   
   We are committed to ensuring that programmes are child-sensitive by incorporating child development and child protection in their design, planning and implementation.

7. **Gender**
   
   We are committed to transforming communities through restored relationships between men, women, boys and girls and ensuring equitable value, participation and decision-making by all.

8. **HIV**
   
   We are committed to addressing the HIV pandemic and people’s vulnerabilities to HIV.

9. **Conflict**
   
   We are committed to designing activities that are sensitive to situations of conflict and the protection needs of project participants, and that contribute to building their capacities for peace.

10. **Environment**
    
    We are committed to protecting the environment through sustainable resource management.

11. **Sustainability**
    
    We are committed to seeing that projects have a lasting benefit, being built on local ownership and using local skills and resources.

12. **Advocacy**
    
    We are committed to influencing key decision-makers to make and implement policies and practices that work in favour of people who are vulnerable to disaster.
‘Technical Quality’ is linked with the Sphere Handbook technical standards, whilst also making reference to communities’ own relief and recovery priorities as per the recommendations of the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC). The other Quality Standards might traditionally be referred to as mainstreaming priorities, for instance Disaster Risk, Gender, HIV and Children, which are to be prioritised as appropriate to the context but with a non-negotiable commitment in all situations to ensure the safety and dignity of project participants and to avoid unintended harm.

In a number of cases, the quality standard acts as an umbrella statement under which more specific commitments are grouped. For example, ‘Accountability’ reflects the range of HAP benchmarks, with a focus on transparency, participation, feedback and learning with project participants. Arguably each of these could have represented a standard on their own. This highlights one of the challenges when seeking an optimal balance in a statement of commitment such as this: not oversimplifying things, but equally not developing too lengthy or complex a set of standards.

The incorporation of the Quality Standards into Tearfund’s project management systems was an important step if compliance was to be improved. This included introducing a Quality Standards checklist as part of the project proposal development and approval system. At the programme strategy level, an analysis of Quality Standards was included within the strategy template, and an overall Quality Standards action plan was required for each emergency programme, which identified overarching priorities and actions to improve compliance. The Terms of Reference of evaluations were revised to make specific reference to the application of Quality Standards. Finally, a knowledge management system was developed, with key learning from project evaluations, staff debriefing and learning reviews categorised under the various Quality Standards and made publicly available on the website (go to http://tilz.tearfund.org/Topics/Disasters/Disaster+management+and+learning).

One of the benefits of agreeing the Tearfund Quality Standards was that it met two external organisational requirements. The Quality Standards represent Tearfund’s Humanitarian Accountability Framework as required in the HAP Standard, and their adoption was a critical step in preparing for HAP certification, which Tearfund received in 2008 for its emergency responses. The Humanitarian Accountability Framework is a publicly available statement of existing commitments made by the NGO, whether internally generated or drawn from international codes and standards. The Standards also represent a clear statement of the standards to which Tearfund works, as required in the Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) Accountability Framework.

Whilst it is still too early to fully assess the impact of the Quality Standards on the level of Tearfund compliance with its quality commitments, initial indications are positive. Feedback from the HAP certification audit suggests that the framework has been helpful to staff.
in achieving greater understanding and ownership of the organisation’s commitments. The provision of practical guidelines has helped to ensure that staff have support and access to training. Making the Quality Standards publicly available both on the website and in the field has strengthened transparency and enabled staff to feel more accountable for the delivery of high-quality humanitarian assistance. Finally, the incorporation of the Quality Standards within project management systems has brought Tearfund’s quality commitments closer to the everyday vocabulary of staff at the project level.

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Guidelines for working with community volunteers and committees in humanitarian emergencies

Nicholas Brooks, Oxfam GB

Drawing from experiences in Sudan, Zimbabwe, Haiti and elsewhere, this article highlights the main issues for NGOs to consider when working with community volunteers and committees during humanitarian emergencies. Every programme is different, so agencies should not necessarily apply identical structures or ways of working with communities in different contexts. However, certain principles should at minimum be considered regardless of the situation. This article aims to improve awareness of these issues, to encourage consistency and best practice in the planning and implementation of humanitarian activities with volunteers and committees.

Consistency and coordination
An ad hoc or uncoordinated approach to working with the community can lead to damaging inconsistencies between different project sites, or across programme sectors. For example, inconsistencies can emerge if the same activities are carried out by paid casual labourers in one location, and in other areas by volunteers. In the Zimbabwe cholera response in 2009–2010, volunteers in urban and rural areas received differing levels of remuneration, even when they were doing identical work. Levels and types of ‘incentives’ (cash, food or other goods given to volunteers to encourage participation) can also vary considerably between projects. The impact of different policies among NGOs and UN agencies should also be considered. Differences between agencies can seriously damage relations between communities, local authorities and NGOs, and can create security risks for field staff.

NGOs entering a new area have a responsibility to understand local agreements regarding volunteers, and to work within these agreements to the best of their ability. This could include common methods for committee selection and composition and incentives. Benefits can also be gained from sharing training and resources (e.g. community meeting places), and learning lessons on legal issues and traditional community structures from other NGOs.

Existing community structures
It is important to understand local practices of volunteering and community organisation before establishing committees or other structures. NGOs should respect and where possible work with established local structures, suggesting minor adaptations (e.g. to promote gender equality) rather than creating new (rival) groups. Health and WASH agencies relied heavily on existing volunteers in response to the cholera epidemic in Zimbabwe, making good use of the existing community health system. Volunteers who had been engaged in previous health campaigns were also mobilised.
Selecting volunteers
A transparent mechanism for selecting volunteers needs to be agreed with the entire community, not just the leadership. While it is tempting to merely accept a list of names from a leader, a group that has been openly selected is more likely to remain accountable to the wider community. The active involvement of women and vulnerable groups, and fair representation of different ethnic groups, should be promoted where possible. Individual volunteers should always be above the legal age of employment in the country: involvement of younger volunteers is more appropriate through specific youth and children’s clubs and activities.

Clarity of roles and responsibilities
The community should be involved in devising and agreeing the roles and responsibilities of committee members and the NGO in delivering the project. Roles and responsibilities should be recorded and ongoing monitoring can assess compliance with the agreement. A committee constitution can improve transparency and confidence amongst the wider community (e.g. for member selection or spending user fees), and a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the NGO and the committee can help ensure consistency and a clear understanding of roles and responsibilities. This can state the names of those involved, project dates, respective commitments and details of any materials, incentives or remuneration the committee will receive. Note that an MoU is a legal document in some countries, so wording should be agreed with a lawyer before it is signed. Copies should be translated into local languages and read to any illiterate committee members for agreement. Constitutions can include the following aspects:

1. Clearly defined role of the institution (defined by an objective) and of the individual members who comprise it (who qualifies for membership).
2. Clearly defined office-holders and their roles (job descriptions).
3. Frequency of meeting and decision-making (number of people required to pass decisions) and method of decision-making (majority voting or unanimity).
4. Clearly defined term of office (frequency of elections).
5. Clearly defined election procedure where members can decide without duress.

Misunderstandings and discrepancies in roles and responsibilities can usually be tackled before they become major problems if there are clear communication channels and regular project meetings with committees.

Gender
When volunteer roles and responsibilities are devised, it is not uncommon for communities to allocate unpaid duties to women, whilst the men are given paid casual work. A familiar solution to this problem is to try to ensure that

NGOs should respect and where possible work with established local structures
It is good practice to maintain a database of community members involved in programmes – volunteers, casual labourers – recording locations, length of time involved with the NGO, any training undergone and items received, such as bicycles. This documentation should enable the timely mobilisation of skilled personnel in future emergencies, and could be used to minimise employment law issues. Oxfam’s Toolkit for Water User Associations (WUAs) in Kenya lists the following important attributes for committee members:

• Use the water source themselves.
• Have sufficient time to spend on project matters.
• Trusted by the community.
• Plan to remain in the village for some years.
• Representative of different neighbourhoods/water users.
• Hard-working.
• Active.
• Dependable.

Motivation
Community members have different motivations for dedicating their time and effort to NGO activities. These can include altruism; community spirit; the opportunity to improve social standing within the community; the desire to learn; the importance of clan or tribal representation; and the expectation of financial or material incentives. It is well worth discussing motivations with national staff and informally with volunteers: understanding what makes people want to participate will help in the design of appropriate and transparent committees.

The WASH emergency response in Haiti depended heavily on paid casual labour for digging and maintaining latrines. The rationale for this was that relying on volunteers would not have delivered the scale and speed of response required, particularly in what were assumed to be disparate communities with minimal cooperative spirit. However, the ongoing planning of recovery activities is putting much more focus on community motivation and involvement in longer-term programme design.

If payments or incentives are to be given, it is good practice to use a consistent annual budget ‘per volunteer’ – agreed with other NGOs, if possible. The allocation can then be spent on materials or food or given as cash, depending on community preferences, which may differ, for example between urban and rural areas. This allows for different-sized committees to be treated equally and encourages early discussion of incentives (usually a controversial topic) at the time of project planning and budgeting, both internally and with volunteers.
half of the volunteers for a particular project are women. Whilst equal representation is important, it does not guarantee fairness; for example women might be doing unpaid waste clean-ups every week, while the men are digging pits for $10 a day.

It is also important to understand the degree of influence females have in decision-making. Experience indicates that, where women are actively involved in decision-making, the quality of a project is enhanced: in Somalia, one criterion for Oxfam-supported health committees is that women occupy at least 30% of the decision-making positions. The 2002 Water Act in Kenya also requires 30% of decision-making posts in WUAs to be held by women.

**Sustainability**

A common argument against giving incentives to volunteers is that they encourage short-term involvement, but that participation fades away when incentives are stopped, for instance after the NGO leaves, because the volunteers do not understand the full value of their involvement and have not developed their own mechanisms to ensure sustainability. This suggests that efforts should focus on educating users on the long-term importance of their work, and on developing community-based management structures – for example water point committees that collect fees and do not rely on incentives.

However, in rapid-onset emergencies NGOs are not aiming for ‘sustainability’. The immediate priority is to ensure that essential services are delivered. Opportunities to develop sustainable activities should be balanced with the reality of acute emergencies. Sustainability was an important issue for community participation in Darfur, where the challenges of working with volunteers over a prolonged emergency necessitated innovative approaches to maintain interest. For example, committee celebration days were held in the large camps outside El Fasher, involving singing, dancing and communal food for 200–300 health volunteers. These were extremely popular and effective, fostering participation for a further 2–3 months after each event.

**Capacity-building**

Training for volunteers is essential. Training needs and formats should be developed with committees to ensure that materials are appropriate and to encourage participation. For example, ‘centralised workshops’ (bringing communities from different sites to one location) can discourage women’s participation, as women find it more difficult to leave their camp or village.

Capacity-building plans should consider both technical skills and committee management capabilities. In some situations it may be useful (or required) to support committees to register as official bodies, for example under national water legislation. This can also help enhance sustainability and transparency.

**Accountability**

It is important that NGOs do not regard volunteers as cheap labour. NGOs should put in place mechanisms to ensure that volunteers are not exploited through over-ambitious expectations of working hours, and are not exposed to sexual abuse or exploitation through their participation.

**NGOs must not regard volunteers as cheap labour**

Accountability to the community is extremely important, alongside interaction and feedback on how each party is performing. NGOs can go a long way to improving accountability by ensuring a timely response to community concerns and delivering commitments within an agreed timescale. Poor performance on simple matters – such as turning up to committee meetings late – can sour relations. Accountability can also be promoted by making any handover of materials or cash to a committee in a public forum – perhaps during a project launch event – to ensure that the whole community has a common understanding of the programme and is aware of resource donations.

**Involve HR**

National legislation covering employee rights and employer responsibilities can give considerable rights to volunteers and committees. In Sudan, the lack of a category for ‘volunteer’ in the national labour law was a key problem for some NGOs when volunteers who had been working with them claimed full employment rights. Given the
numbers of volunteers working with NGOs, legal liabilities are a high priority. Programme staff should always discuss the formation of new volunteer groups with HR staff and request specific HR help in understanding relevant labour laws, developing documented systems for engaging volunteers and committees and checking current casual labour and volunteer groups to identify programme and legal risks. HR should treat issues with committees and volunteers with the same rigour, accountability and consistency as is accorded to internal staff salaries and conditions.

Community-based monitoring
Community volunteers can play an important role in participatory monitoring and evaluation of programme activities. However, NGOs should not be over-reliant on volunteers. If NGOs only hold focus groups with the volunteers they know (maybe because they are easiest to organise) these groups will give an unrepresentative opinion of activities.

Contingency planning and exit strategies
Committees and volunteers have a key role in ensuring programmes continue during periods of insecurity or remote management. This needs clear forward planning to establish logistics, communication channels and specific implementation plans. In Darfur, strong relations between committees and NGOs developed over a number of years were very useful when security problems limited access to camps and operations continued through remote management.

The length of time that NGOs will be actively engaged with a committee or volunteers needs careful planning at the start of an intervention, and must be discussed and agreed with the community at this stage. This is relevant in all situations – whether short-term humanitarian responses, development work or chronic emergencies where NGOs might work with committees over many years. It is always difficult to avoid the problems of dependency upon NGO support and ensure 100% sustainability; a clear and consistent exit or handover strategy can help address these issues.

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Acts of God(s): the role of religion in Disaster Risk Reduction

Andreana Reale, RMIT University

Most people in the world are religious. Particularly in the non-Western world, religion shapes societies to a degree that its salience goes almost without saying. Whether we acknowledge it or not, religion is a key force behind the way a community or society interacts with notions of development – or disaster. Western academics have not always caught on to this. While identity factors like gender, class and ethnicity are emerging as important considerations in the humanitarian field, religion attracts comparatively little attention. This may have something to do with the inherent secular bias of Western thought. It took female researchers to consider gender and black researchers to consider race: maybe it will require Muslims, Christians and Buddhists to bring to light the impact of religion. Unfortunately, those with a spiritual bent often feel compelled to leave their unique perspective in the temple or the mosque, conforming to a secular perspective in the way that women have often adopted a genderless voice in their writing.

The humanitarian and Disaster Risk Reduction field is, however, beginning to open up to considerations of religion – for example, academics are starting to contemplate the role of Christian churches in African development, and liberation theology is attracting some attention. In December 2009, the Centre for Risk and Community Safety at RMIT University held a forum at the Parliament of World’s Religions entitled ‘Faith, Community and Disaster Risk Reduction’, in which speakers addressed the important connection between religion and disasters. This article draws from the Parliament forum, reviewing the role of religion in disasters – from religious interpretations of disasters to the role religious organisations play in disaster mitigation, preparedness, response and reconstruction.
Religion and the natural world

The Western paradigm often sets people against nature. Natural events like floods and fires are seen as hazards that humans must contend with and conquer. In the ancient spiritualities of many indigenous traditions, however, humanity is inextricably linked to nature. Len Clarke, an indigenous Australian leader and educator, told the Parliament forum that far from being ‘acts of God(s)’, so-called ‘natural’ disasters are the consequences of humans abusing the earth. The earth reacts with droughts, floods and other disasters.

We often find effective disaster mitigation strategies within the traditions of indigenous communities. The Singas village in Papua New Guinea, for example, often faces flooding.1 For generations houses have been built on stilts and emergency crops are grown on the mountainside for use during floods. Heavy rains and river behaviour are communicated and discussed, dispensing with the need for high-tech warning systems. A worldview that sees water primarily as a source of life, rather than danger, affects the way villagers prepare for and mitigate against floods.

Religious and spiritual worldviews do not always have a positive impact on communities affected by disaster. Many religious leaders encourage us to think of disasters not as events that can be avoided through mitigation and preparedness, but as a kind of divine retribution. Another speaker at the Parliament forum, Pakistani academic Hafiz Aziz ur Rehman, explained that, in the aftermath of the 2005 Kashmir earthquake, many Islamic leaders interpreted the disaster as punishment from God. Similarly, both Catholics and Evangelicals in Morolica, Honduras, seemed to regard a devastating flood as a result of Hurricane Mitch as part of God’s design or punishment.2 Despite the fact that the community in question was situated on the flood plains of two rivers, few people conceded that the vulnerable location was a contributing factor, and only a small number saw relocation to a safer site as a priority.

Case study: the Aitape tsunami

The 1998 Aitape tsunami was one of Papua New Guinea’s worst-ever disasters.3 Over 2,000 people died and 10,000 more were forced to permanently relocate. The devastation was predictable, with severe underdevelopment exacerbating the effects of the tsunami and hampering the response. Yet pastors from the Combined Churches Organisation (CCO), made up of local churches, saw the disaster’s origin not in the vulnerability of the people and the society – or even in the scientific causes behind the creation of large waves – but in the sinful hearts of the people, whom God was forced to punish because of their lack of Christian faith. By establishing new churches

in the tsunami’s aftermath, the pastors saw themselves as undertaking a kind of disaster-mitigation programme – ensuring that future disasters did not take place due to sin and faithlessness. CCO pastors also engaged in more direct disaster relief and reconstruction. Pastors were sent to the devastated area for periods stretching from months to years, working alongside locals to build houses, plant gardens and provide pastoral care.

Many locals saw the disaster as intentional – caused by foreigners motivated by rumours of oil or precious jewel deposits in the area. There were mysterious, supernatural elements to the disaster – people noted burns and cuts that did not bleed and sightings of ‘unidentified objects’. Since the disaster was thought to have been intentional, aid was not seen as an altruistic gift (as the donors viewed it) but as compensation. Locals referred to the aid as ‘blood money’. Problems were caused because the process of disaster-relief provision was at odds with local understandings of the disaster. Compensation claims have a detailed process of negotiation and execution; instead, Western donors assumed that people should passively ‘receive’ aid, rather than actively participate in its distribution and allocation.

Thus, there was a clash between the Western, secular assumptions of donors, and local understandings of the disaster. The CCO pastors – who may seem to some secular Westerners to have a backward, unhelpful worldview – engaged more effectively with locals. Their understanding of the disaster as something intentional was more in line with local perspectives than a scientific-rational view. Their long-term efforts, embedded in and working alongside communities, were perhaps more appropriate for people who needed, not to passively receive, but actively participate.

religiously-motivated NGOs often enjoy a degree of cultural alignment with locals

Religion and culture in disaster relief

Religious bodies or religiously-motivated NGOs often enjoy a degree of cultural alignment with locals, which can be invaluable in a disaster or humanitarian situation. This is particularly the case in volatile Muslim areas such as Afghanistan, where there is suspicion of Christian and Western aid bodies.4 Islamic Relief Worldwide, a British Muslim faith-based NGO, is one of the few NGOs with a reasonable presence around Kandahar. Local partner organisations of Christian NGO TEAR Australia, although Christian, use implementing teams made up mainly of Afghan Muslims. In some places, it is simply untenable to have Western, Christian practitioners working in the field. Religious similarities do not always equate to a cultural match. Islamic Relief’s expatriate staff are from many different ethnic


 backgrounds, and as Jonathan Benthall puts it, ‘it would be naïve to assume that because a Bangladeshi and an Acehnese are both Muslim, the cultural differences between them will somehow dissolve’. Similarly, although much of the non-Western world is Christian, cultural differences between locals and rich, Western Christian humanitarian workers are likely to be stark.

Local religious bodies often have a great advantage in disaster situations. Local communities, organisations and governments have the greatest capacity to offer assistance. These bodies are embedded in the local community, speak the local language and understand the local culture. They know who in the community is most vulnerable and what people and infrastructure are available to assist. Religious institutions often have their own facilities, such as a prayer space that can be used for shelter or the distribution of food. Local bodies are already on the ground and can respond immediately. They are also often still involved in helping a community recover long after outside NGOs and UN bodies have gone home.

Rehman made this point at the Parliament forum in relation to the Kashmir earthquake: it was local Islamic NGOs and volunteers from across the faith community that came to the aid of victims, speeding up the response process significantly. After the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, unaffected temples in Phang Nha, Thailand, became places of refuge for survivors, with monks caring for the physical, emotional and spiritual needs of survivors and conducting cremation ceremonies for the dead. Similarly, churches and other religious bodies worked together to provide relief for victims of the 2009 bushfires in Victoria, Australia.

Local religious institutions are often in a better position to respond than governments, particularly where governments are characterised by corruption and incompetence. Following the Aitape tsunami, local, provincial and national governments failed to provide relief, leaving a space that was filled largely by the Catholic Church, which even constructed basic infrastructure such as roads and bridges in order to deliver aid effectively. In Fiji, the Church provides disaster-affected Christians with food and provisions over and above government aid. Religious bodies are able to channel resources from overseas counterparts and provide support on all levels, including reconstruction of housing, relocation and limited financial aid.

Recognising religion in development and DRR
Religious bodies and structures often wield power and authority. Since they are also often at the forefront of development and DRR efforts, it is integral that development practitioners and disaster workers consult with and work beside these groups. Ruth Maetala, a researcher, church leader and development worker in Solomon Islands, told the Parliament forum that Church leaders in her country wielded more influence than any other form of authority, including chiefs and politicians. Religious groups often understand – or are indeed at the heart of – important community dynamics and power structures. This is especially true where local religious institutions are key providers of education, health services, emergency relief and general development.

On a recent trip to Solomon Islands, I found that the Solomon Islands Christian Association – the main ecumenical body in the country – was working closely with the National Disaster Management Office, as well as AusAID and the National Council of Churches in Australia, to implement village-level disaster plans. While the government structure does not reach people in remote communities, every village has at least one church. The church includes women’s groups, youth groups, pastors and chiefs, and the programme utilises this structure to identify disaster risks, solutions and evacuation plans. The programme is an example of a successful religious/secular partnership, bolstering resilience in disaster-vulnerable communities.

religious bodies and structures often wield power and authority

Although religious networks are increasingly recognised in governmental and UN disaster mitigation and response planning, they can also be marginalised from the development and disaster relief professions. In Aceh, Muhammadiyah, a reformist Muslim social organisation with 30 million members in Indonesia, acted as an ad hoc national network of communication in the wake of the 2004 tsunami. They drew up elaborate reconstruction plans, but could not find the funding to implement them. In fact, despite the importance of Islam in Indonesia, no Muslim group was awarded a USAID contract for post-tsunami work.

As humanitarian academics and practitioners, we need to understand that our secularism is unique to us: the majority of the world’s population not only hold to religious beliefs, but their lives and their communities are often centred around religious rites and authority. Religion should therefore form an integral part of any context analysis. Religious bodies and authorities need to be engaged and listened to; religious beliefs and practices that might affect disaster relief and recovery must be identified. Religion, though not always positive, can be a source of resilience for millions of individuals and communities – a resilience that must be acknowledged if we are to help people in the midst of disaster.

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8 Benthall, ‘Have Islamic Aid Agencies a Privileged Relationship in Majority Muslim Areas?’
NGO engagement with the Consolidated Appeal Process in Zimbabwe: is it worth the effort?

Mudasser Hussain Siddiqui, NGOs and Humanitarian Reform Project

A record 66 NGOs, many of them national organisations, participated in the 2010 Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) in Zimbabwe. Yet research undertaken by The NGOs and Humanitarian Reform Project shows that, despite considerable investment in the process, NGOs consistently receive much less funding directly from the CAP than UN agencies and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM). National NGOs receive even less. For these reasons, NGOs are increasingly questioning whether involvement in the CAP is worth the time and effort.

This article analyses recent CAP funding trends for Zimbabwe, with a particular focus on direct funding to NGOs. It examines the CAP development process, analysing the differences between money requested and money received by the appealing agencies, identifying reasons for the lack of support to NGOs and suggesting ways in which the CAP process can be made more effective overall.

The process

The CAP is intended to provide a more strategic and coordinated approach to mobilising resources to meet the humanitarian needs of people affected by complex or major emergencies. The annual CAP is usually developed in September and October and presented to donors in November at launches in New York, Geneva and in participating countries. A mid-year review takes place in May and June.

The CAP involves discussion and work at various levels, including in-country and at cluster level, to agree sector priorities and select projects. Once sector priorities have been identified, participating agencies engage in the time-consuming process of developing and uploading project proposals onto the On-Line Project System (OPS), for review. Once this is complete, the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) distributes the draft document to humanitarian agencies for comments. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) then finalises the draft for the HC’s approval. The OCHA CAP section in Geneva forwards the HC-approved CAP document to IASC members, whose comments are then incorporated into the final version.

The Zimbabwe CAP was launched in 2006. Over the last two years the government has taken an active part in consultations on the CAP, and the CAP is aligned with the government’s assistance priorities. The Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) in Zimbabwe, which includes five NGOs, is responsible for supervising the process in-country, as well as developing a fund-raising strategy. Despite this, the HCT has not been proactive in raising funds for the 2010 CAP, or in developing a strategy for channelling more CAP funds directly to NGOs.

Efforts and results

The figures below show that NGOs have not benefited to the same degree as UN agencies and IOM from the CAP process. Only 26% of the project proposals submitted by NGOs in Zimbabwe received funding in the last CAP, compared with a 47% success rate for projects submitted by UN agencies. IOM had 35% of its projects funded under the CAP in 2009.

![Figure 1: Total number of projects submitted and approved, CAP 2009](http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/fts.nsf/doc105?OpenForm&rc=1&cc=zwe)

![Figure 2: Total number of projects submitted and approved, CAP 2010](http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/fts.nsf/doc105?OpenForm&rc=1&cc=zwe)

1 All figures related to the 2010 CAP are based on information available on the Financial Tracking System (FTS) as of 27 April 2010.
Despite such a poor success rate NGOs once again participated enthusiastically in the CAP for 2010, largely because they were encouraged to do so by OCHA and cluster coordinators. NGOs have a staggering 172 projects in the CAP for 2010, around three times the number submitted by UN agencies (55, five fewer than 2009). Eighteen IOM projects have been included in the 2010 CAP.

An analysis of funding in response to the 2009 CAP is even more revealing. UN agencies requested and received by far the largest share: 84% of the amount requested, while NGOs received only 49% of requested funds. In cash terms, this translates into over $400m for the UN, against a request of $475m, and $45m for NGOs, against requests for just under $93m.

The funding requested in the 2010 CAP ($394m as at April 2010) is substantially lower than the $606m requested in 2009. This decrease can be attributed to improved food security. In terms of money actually received, as at 27 April 2010 UN agencies had $111m, compared to $2.5m each for NGOs and the IOM.

**The way forward**

Because NGOs consistently receive very limited direct support under the CAP, many view engagement with the process as a poor investment of limited resources. As preparations for the CAP 2011 will soon begin, it is important to analyse why NGOs have fared so poorly, and reflect on whether the CAP, in its current form, is really helping humanitarian agencies to meet needs in Zimbabwe. Based on discussions with NGOs, UN agencies and donors, there are several key reasons why NGOs consistently receive less funding than the UN under the CAP.

**Absence of a fund-raising strategy**

Although the terms of reference of the Zimbabwe HCT include activation of fund-raising mechanisms as one of its primary objectives, the HCT has not made a concerted effort to raise funds for the CAP or to address the skewed funding of NGOs participating in it. The HC/HCT’s role has been largely limited to launching the CAP, occasionally receiving updates from OCHA about the CAP’s funding status and appealing for funding at meetings with donors. No serious efforts have been made to systematically review and address reasons for poor funding of the CAP generally, and of NGOs specifically. It is only recently that the HCT identified the need for an advocacy paper to be used for fund-raising with donors.

**Lack of NGO ownership of the CAP**

Given the effort and resources they expend annually on the process, NGOs should be much more proactive in determining the shape of the final document, advocating with donors for funding and lobbying the HC to lead on fund-raising more effectively. Cluster coordinators and NGO representatives should meet bilaterally with donors to advocate for funding under their sectors. The HCT should devise a mechanism to monitor the implementation and effectiveness of the whole process, and should play a lead role in ensuring that a strategy is devised and implemented.

**Absence of robust needs assessment**

The nature and timeline of the CAP exercise leaves very little scope for agencies or clusters to carry out robust needs assessments involving communities in their areas. Although discussions take place at cluster and inter-cluster level to identify priorities for the year, there is...
seldom sufficient time or space for agencies to consult with beneficiary communities. The CAP has become a theoretical exercise rather than a strategic process. The timing of the CAP process (development as well as review) does not always match the timing of needs assessments. Furthermore, agencies spend much more time developing, uploading, reviewing and revising project proposals than they do agreeing sector priorities. The CAP should be developed on the basis of a comprehensive needs assessment. This should be accompanied by a longer-term 2–3-year strategy which would provide scope for robust needs assessment and help to address the challenges of incorporating ‘humanitarian plus’ and early recovery-based interventions in the document. Flash appeals should be used to mobilise funds for any rapid-onset emergencies requiring additional money.

Needs-based CAP
The CAP in its current form is developed after project proposals submitted by appealing agencies are approved by the clusters for inclusion in the document. It largely contains information about participating agencies and their proposed interventions and associated costs. In order to make the CAP exercise less burdensome and more strategic, the current format should become a needs-based document instead of a project-based document. OCHA along with cluster lead agencies should bring agencies together to identify and cost sectoral needs in specific geographical locations (provinces and districts). Agencies involved in the appeal should be given adequate notice to enable them to carry out field assessments and consult with communities, local authorities and other stakeholders, and common needs assessment tools and frameworks and costing mechanisms should be developed and implemented, with consistent leadership from clusters to roll them out. The HCT, with the Humanitarian Coordinator as its chair, should facilitate and supervise the entire process, with support from OCHA. After lobbying from NGOs, OCHA in Zimbabwe is considering revising the CAP format to make it a needs-based document.

Donors’ preference for funding UN agencies
Donors’ preference for funding UN agencies – and NGOs indirectly through UN agencies – may partially account for the disproportionately large amount of funding the UN receives under the CAP. By funding UN agencies, donors seek to minimise their administrative costs and mitigate compliance-related risk. In fact, however, outsourcing fund management responsibility to the UN simply transfers these costs to the UN agency concerned, creating further problems along the funding chain. NGOs find that working through the UN can reduce efficiency and increase operating costs. Accessing funding can be a slow and cumbersome process, and negotiating sufficient overhead costs to support effective implementation can also be a challenge. The application of UN management costs (transferred from donors) means that less money is available for project activities and to cover NGO overheads.

UN agencies are not always best placed to act as fund managers, and donors should continue supporting NGOs directly. INGOs could also be encouraged to act as pooled fund managers. An increasing number have experience of fund management globally, and recent experience in Zimbabwe with the NGO-led Joint Initiative, a consortium set up in 2005, suggests that NGOs can successfully and efficiently manage pooled funding.

Most donors expect their recipients to be certified by their HQs (usually in Europe or North America) to be eligible for funding. This puts local NGOs at a disadvantage. Donors need to consider ways in which they can engage local NGOs more, both within and outside the CAP. The UN and INGOs should demonstrate that they are partnering with local NGOs in their work. A reward system (giving additional points while evaluating the project proposal) could be introduced to encourage the UN and INGOs to include local NGOs in a meaningful way.

Funding cycles and poor reporting
The mismatch between the funding cycles of some donors and the CAP cycle also affects the percentage of the CAP funded overall. Many donor funding decisions have already been made by the time the CAP is launched. OCHA should look into the possibility of rescheduling the appeal development process to bring it more into line with the funding cycles of the majority of donors.

Conclusions
The CAP process in Zimbabwe and elsewhere is in clear need of reform. NGOs, particularly local and national NGOs, do not benefit from the CAP in proportion to the time and resources they invest in the process. Within the Humanitarian Country Team, and under the leadership of the HC, NGOs and UN agencies need to work together to streamline the cumbersome and labour-intensive CAP process, transform the CAP into a strategic, needs-based document and develop a fund-raising strategy which takes into account the comparative advantages of the stakeholders involved. Donors should use this strategy to provide funding directly to agencies best able to implement efficient and effective programmes. This will contribute towards improving the speed and quality of humanitarian response. It would also increase accountability, both to donors and to crisis-affected populations.

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Funding support is provided by CIDA, DANIDA, IrishAID, Norwegian MFA, SIDA and World Vision UK and International.

Humanitarian Exchange is edited by Wendy Fenton and Matthew Foley.

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Typesetting Design To Print Solutions Limited
Printed and bound in the UK by Charlesworth.
ISSN: 1472-4847