Somalia: The Humanitarian Trap, Part II…

(Opinions stated here do not necessarily reflect those of the Humanitarian Practice Network or the Humanitarian Policy Group, ODI)

Over the past few days, Somalia has made a noticeable return to the front pages of the media. The United Nations no longer hesitates to talk about famine in southern Somalia. Once again, shocking images of starving, skeletal children are to be seen everywhere in the media and are focusing the public’s attention on the fate of the deprived populations of the Horn of Africa. Even as a new international humanitarian operation gets under way to save the starving, it is worth looking to the past, especially as the scenario is a well-known and recurring one in this troubled region that suffers from regular cycles of malnutrition.

The food emergency that is blighting Somalia (and surrounding region) is the result of a lengthy and progressive deterioration arising from a combination of recurrent climatic stress and conflicts, which have ravaged the country since the beginning of the 1990s. Through successive schisms, political authority has blown apart like a grenade, and loose formations of rival groups divide the country, with matters made worse by the absence of a government since 1991. A host of external political and military interventions should not be overlooked either, ranging from the US military operation, Restore Hope, to more recent intervention by the Ethiopian army and deployment of African Union troops, as well as the setting up of foreign Islamic cells following the attacks in Nairobi and New York. A widespread and chronic state of anarchy has bolstered the predatory power of local chiefs and turned Somalia into a land where every kind of shady activity, including that of Islamist militiamen, is engaged in. For civilians, survival becomes a daily challenge.

Faced with this insecurity, aid workers, despite repeated attempts, have found it impossible to maintain an effective and permanent presence in the field, forcing the monitoring of operations from a remote base in Nairobi. This is the price paid for maintaining the drip feed of humanitarian assistance, but it is accompanied by a loss of control over aid. As Islamic militias gradually took control of southern Somalia and imposed their conservative vision of Islam, the World Food Programme (WFP) was forced to suspend food distribution, due to insecurity and alleged large-scale misappropriation of international food aid and widespread corruption that was severely testing the United Nations food distribution system. In other words, all the necessary conditions were in place to ensure that chronic poverty degenerated into a fresh disaster for populations particularly afflicted by deprivation and violence, and by the terrible drought that the war sometimes hid from view.

Is there anyone who really believes that Somalia is now, as if by magic, going to open up to international aid without there being any quid pro quo or risk involved? The challenge is enormous for aid workers already striving to consolidate their efforts to contain a disaster that has been widely broadcast and warned of in the media. While they must act quickly, they are going to have to deploy their resources extremely carefully in a region where they are not welcome and where nothing will be made easy for them. In other words, there is a huge risk of food aid being misappropriated. The mobilizing of funds currently underway, necessary as it is, will not be enough to ensure the aid missions are successful and to get Somalia out of its present-day vicious circle. There will be no humanitarian resolution to this crisis as there has not been for others. While the humanitarian response is, at this stage, the only conceivable one, given the gravity of the situation, it is far from satisfactory. In the absence of other more politically focused options, it will doubtless make it possible to contain, but not assuage, the raging food crisis. The Somali government may be moribund, but the current tragedy also points to the collective failure of the international community and governments in the region. Without a change of approach and “long-term investment”, as the FAO is demanding (on the issue of agriculture in particular), it will be impossible to escape from the trap that a humanitarian response represents, and impossible to avoid this type of crisis reoccurring.

The title refers to “The Humanitarian Trap” and “Humanitarianism and Politics after the wall came down” (“Le piège humanitaire” et “Humanitaire et Politique depuis la chute du Mur”) by Jean-Christophe Rufin. Collection Pluriel. 1992.