Humanitarian Practice Network
HPN
Managed by
Humanitarian Policy Group

Number 64
December 2008

Network Paper

Livelihoods, livestock and humanitarian response: the Livestock Emergency Guidelines and Standards

Commissioned and published by the Humanitarian Practice Network at ODI

Cathy Watson and Andy Catley

In brief

• This Network Paper discusses livelihoods-based livestock programming and its role in humanitarian emergency response. It highlights the importance of taking livelihood assets, in particular livestock, into account in responding to emergencies and describes how the Livestock Emergency Guidelines and Standards (LEGS) Project has been developed to support this process.

• LEGS aims to promote the use of livelihood-based livestock responses to emergencies, through building the capacity of humanitarian actors to plan and intervene appropriately. LEGS can also be used to assist in the evaluation of emergency responses by providing a framework and benchmark against which interventions can be reviewed.

• There is much more that can and should be done to support people's livelihoods through livestock-based responses to emergencies. LEGS and the growing body of practical experience are an exciting way forward for improving and expanding livestock responses.

About HPN
The Humanitarian Practice Network at the Overseas Development Institute is an independent forum where field workers, managers and policymakers in the humanitarian sector share information, analysis and experience. *The views and opinions expressed in HPN's publications do not necessarily state or reflect those of the Humanitarian Policy Group or the Overseas Development Institute.*

odi
Britain's leading independent think-tank on **international development** and **humanitarian issues**

Overseas Development Institute
111 Westminster Bridge Road
London SE1 7JD
United Kingdom

Tel. +44 (0) 20 7922 0300
Fax. +44 (0) 20 7922 0399

HPN e-mail: hpn@odi.org.uk
HPN website: www.odihpn.org

Humanitarian Practice Network (HPN)
Overseas Development Institute
111 Westminster Bridge Road
London, SE1 7JD
United Kingdom

Tel: +44 (0)20 7922 0331/74
Fax: +44 (0)20 7922 0399
Email: hpn@odi.org.uk
Website: www.odihpn.org

Printed and bound in the UK

About the authors

Cathy Watson is the Livestock Emergency Guidelines and Standards (LEGS) Coordinator. She is a social development consultant based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, working on pastoral livelihoods.

Andy Catley is a member of the LEGS Steering Group and a Research Director at the Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, based in Addis Ababa. His interests include livelihoods-based policy processes and programming.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to acknowledge the assistance of Save the Children US in Ethiopia (Adrian Cullis), CARE Ethiopia (Fasil Demeke) and Action Against Hunger – International (Christine Kahmann) in the writing of this paper. The LEGS process is currently based on in-kind support from:

- The African Union/Interafrican Bureau for Animal Resources.
- The Feinstein International Center, Friedman School of Nutrition Science and Policy, Tufts University.
- The Food and Agriculture Organisation.
- The International Committee of the Red Cross.
- VSF-Belgium, on behalf of VSF Europa.

Specific LEGS activities are funded by:

- The Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance, USAID.
- The Animal Production and Health Division and the Pro-Poor Livestock Policy Facility, FAO.
- Oxfam GB.

The LEGS Steering Group would also like to acknowledge the assistance of Vetwork UK.

For further information about LEGS, or to join the LEGS mailing list, please contact the LEGS Coordinator: coordinator@livestock-emergency.net or visit the LEGS website: www.livestock-emergency.net.

LEGS will be published in January 2009

ISBN: 978 0 85003 893 4

Price per copy: £4.00 (excluding postage and packing).
© Overseas Development Institute, London, 2008.

Photocopies of all or part of this publication may be made providing that the source is acknowledged. Requests for the commercial reproduction of HPN material should be directed to the ODI as copyright holders. The Network Coordinator would appreciate receiving details of the use of any of this material in training, research or programme design, implementation or evaluation.

Contents

Chapter 1
Introduction: livestock and livelihoods in emergencies

This Network Paper discusses livelihoods-based livestock programming and its role in humanitarian emergency response. It highlights the importance of taking livelihood assets, in particular livestock, into account in responding to emergencies, and describes how the Livestock Emergency Guidelines and Standards (LEGS) Project has been developed to support this process.

The paper begins with a discussion of the role of livestock in livelihoods and the potential links between livestock and other emergency responses. Chapter 2 presents a summary of the LEGS Project, describing the origins, scope and contents of the guidelines. Chapter 3 contains case studies from Ethiopia and Iran of livestock-based emergency interventions, which are reviewed against the guidelines. Chapter 4 discusses the key issues arising from the development of the guidelines and standards and highlighted by the case studies.

Livelihoods-based emergency response

The role of livelihoods-based responses in emergencies has been debated within the humanitarian community for some time. Whilst the need to save lives is acknowledged as paramount in an emergency, the importance of taking into account the livelihoods of affected populations, and where possible protecting them, is increasingly recognised – in other words the need to 'save lives and livelihoods'.[1] Some take this a step further and talk of the role of 'saving lives *through* saving livelihoods', highlighting the importance of livelihoods for people's future survival.

The sustainable livelihoods framework developed by DFID and others is a commonly accepted basis for analysing livelihoods in the context of long-term development initiatives (see Figure 1). The framework illustrates how a household's capital assets – financial, physical, human, natural and social (and some sources add 'political') are the basis for their livelihood strategies. These strategies are impacted by the 'vulnerability context' in which people operate, and are also shaped by the policies, institutions and processes which form the external context.

In an emergency, livelihood strategies may be significantly affected and coping strategies may be employed which have a negative impact on the long-term livelihoods of affected populations (defined as 'irreversible' as opposed to 'reversible' coping strategies).[2] For example, key assets may be sold, businesses may be abandoned, or whole families may migrate away from their home area.

The 'vulnerability context' in the livelihoods framework therefore becomes more important. Vulnerability may be defined as 'the inability of communities or households to cope with contingencies and stresses to which they are exposed'.[3] The same source highlights three components of vulnerability: exposure to disasters and hazards; susceptibility to the hazard; and capacity to resist or recover. In livelihoods terms, the greater a household's assets, the less susceptible they may be to disaster (depending on the nature of the shock) and the greater their capacity to resist and/or recover.

It can therefore be argued that the protection and strengthening of livelihood assets should form a significant part of emergency response.[4] This approach is confirmed by the Sphere Handbook, which highlights the importance of 'supporting and promoting livelihood strategies', in particular through 'preserving productive assets or recovering those lost as a result of disaster'.[5]

Box 1

The impact of disasters on livestock-keepers: drought in Kenya

In the 1999–2001 drought in Kenya it is estimated that over 2 million sheep and goats, 900,000 cattle and 14,000 camels died. This represents losses of 30% of small stock, 30% of cattle and 18% of camel holdings among the affected pastoralist populations. There was also a significant social impact: families separated, damaging the social networks which provide a safety net for pastoralists, and many moved to settlements and food distribution centres. Without sufficient livestock to provide for their food needs, many pastoralists became dependent on food aid. Once the drought ended, some could not return to the pastoralist sector because their livestock losses were too great.

Source: Yacob Aklilu and Mike Wekesa, *Drought, Livestock and Livelihoods: Lessons from the 1999–2001 Emergency Response in the Pastoral Sector in Kenya*, Network Paper 40 (London: ODI, 2002).

Livestock and emergency response

Livestock play a key role in the livelihoods of many people worldwide – both rural and urban. For communities such as pastoralists, their livelihood focuses on their herds of animals – cattle, camels, sheep, goats, donkeys or yaks. For agro-pastoralists this dependence is shared with agricultural crops, while smallholder communities may depend largely on crops, but may also own some livestock (for example cows, pigs, goats or chickens) which provide an additional source of food or income. Local service providers such as mule or donkey cart owners depend on their animals for their livelihood, as do a range of traders, shopkeepers and other

Figure 1

The Sustainable Livelihood Framework[6]



Key
H = Human capital; **N** = Natural capital; **F** = Financial capital; **S** = Social capital; **P** = Physical capital

Box 2

The impact of disasters on livestock keepers: the tsunami in Indonesia

The Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 had a significant impact on the livestock of affected people. This included the loss of domestic farm animals (poultry, sheep, goats and also cattle and water buffalo). In Indonesia, for example, over 78,000 cattle and 61,000 buffalo were killed, together with 52,000 goats, 16,000 sheep and nearly 1.5 million chickens. Livelihoods were also affected by the destruction of livestock-related infrastructure such as barns, stores and processing facilities. The natural resource base on which the livestock depended was also affected, including the destruction of crop residues, straw and inland pasture.

Source: FAO, 'Tsunami Reconstruction', http://www.fao.org/ag/tsunami/assessment/animal.html.

Box 3

The impact of disasters on livestock-keepers: conflict and drought in Darfur

The Darfur region of Sudan has suffered from chronic conflict and recurrent drought for several years. Pastoralists and agro-pastoralists in the region derive up to 50% of their food/income from their livestock. However, the conflict and drought have together caused significant livestock losses. For example, some villagers reported losses of 70–100% due to looting. Overcrowding of livestock and the disruption of veterinary services (both the result of insecurity) have increased livestock mortality rates. The closure of the Sudan–Libya border has also severely affected livestock trade and hence had a significant impact on livelihoods. The natural resource base has been depleted by the drought and conflict has restricted access to traditional migration routes as well as to large tracts of grazing lands. Remaining livestock are sold only as a last resort as prices are very low.

Source: ICRC, *Food-Needs Assessment: Darfur Economic Security Unit*, 2006; Helene Berton, pers. comm.

business people involved in trading livestock or livestock products. For some urban communities livestock such as pigs or chickens may provide supplementary protein in the form of milk or eggs, and/or additional income.

In terms of the livelihoods framework, livestock are an important *financial asset* for all livestock owners, providing food (milk, meat, blood, eggs) and income (through sale, barter, transport, draught power, work hire and sale of products such as milk, meat, wool, hides and skins). For many livestock owners, particularly pastoralists and agro-pastoralists, livestock also constitute a significant *social asset*, forming the basis of social relationships through gifts, exchange, bridewealth and fines.

Disasters and other shocks often have a negative effect on livelihood strategies, in particular through the loss of assets, including livestock. Livestock assets may be lost (or injured or their condition weakened) as a direct result of the disaster – for example they may be killed in flooding or die as a result of drought. Livestock assets may also be lost as an indirect consequence: for example, livestock may be sold to purchase food as part of a coping strategy in response to the emergency, abandoned when their

owners flee the disaster or suffer the consequences of a breakdown in support services (such as availability of feed or livestock medicines) as a result of the disaster. As well as the loss of assets, livestock-based livelihood strategies may also be adversely affected by a disaster: markets may be closed, access to pasture or fodder may be restricted, water supplies may be affected and migration may limit opportunities to continue to pursue livestock-based livelihood strategies.

As the examples in Boxes 1–3 show, both rapid- and slow-onset disasters have a significant impact on livestock in regions around the world. Protecting and strengthening livestock assets can therefore provide valuable support to the livelihood strategies of livestock-keepers in an emergency. Taking a livelihoods-based approach may be complementary to other emergency initiatives which focus on saving lives or on other aspects of livelihood support, and hence combine to save lives and livelihoods.

Chapter 2
The Livestock Emergency Guidelines and Standards (LEGS)

The origins and objectives of LEGS

The Livestock Emergency Guidelines and Standards (LEGS) Project evolved from a growing recognition that, for many poor people around the world, livestock are a crucial asset, and that climatic trends are causing more frequent and varied humanitarian crises that have an adverse effect on livestock and consequently on the livelihood strategies of their owners. Livestock professionals were becoming increasingly concerned about repeated cycles of inappropriate and badly implemented livestock relief projects, characterised by poor analysis, the overlooking and at times undermining of local capacities and services, simple 'procure and disperse' programmes, failure to take livelihoods into account, poor timing resulting in late delivery of relief interventions and activities carried out in haste because of the urgent need to respond to the crisis at hand. At the same time there was little impact assessment of these initiatives to promote future learning, along with a growing shift in livestock funding from 'development' to 'emergency' and poor coordination between emergency and development activities (see Box 4).

In response to these concerns, a number of agencies began to document their experiences in livestock emergency intervention. These included, amongst others:

- Oxfam GB: livestock programming in emergencies, with a focus on pastoralism.
- Feinstein International Center (FIC), Tufts University: coordinating large-scale livestock programmes in complex emergencies, with a focus on community-based approaches in the Horn of Africa.
- Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance, USAID: internal guidelines on livelihoods-based approaches to livestock relief.
- FAO: guidelines on livestock relief interventions for non-livestock field staff.
- ICRC: regional analysis of livestock issues in the Horn of Africa.
- AU/IBAR and Feinstein International Center, Tufts University: multi-agency review of livestock interventions in complex emergencies.

The LEGS Project began with two activities: reviewing the process for developing the *Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response* (the Sphere Project); and consulting key agencies with experience in livestock interventions in humanitarian crises. The LEGS Project drew many key lessons from the process used to develop the Sphere guidelines, notably the inclusive and broad consultative approach, the commitment of a Steering Group involving both practitioners and policy analysts, funding drawn from multiple sources and significant effort invested in dissemination and promotion.

Box 4

Lack of coherence between emergency and development approaches: veterinary services in Ethiopia

Development approach	Emergency approach
• Privatisation of clinical veterinary services supported by government policy since 1993 • Numerous programmes to assist rural private practitioners (degree and diploma holders) to set up private clinics and pharmacies, funded by EC, World Bank, DFID, USAID and others • Enabling legislation for private para-veterinary professionals	• Designed without involvement of local private sector • 'Truck and chuck' – dumping of large quantities of free veterinary medicines • Limited epidemiological basis for intervention e.g. vaccination programmes targeting 20% of population • Funded by the same donors who fund development • Undermines local private practitioners i.e. the services needed for recovery

Like Sphere, LEGS is founded on a rights-based approach and links in particular to two key international human rights: the *right to food* and the *right to a standard of living*.[7] Livestock-keepers have a right to emergency support which protects and rebuilds their livestock, as a key asset that contributes significantly to their ability to produce food and maintain a standard of living that supports their families. International Humanitarian Law also highlights the importance of the protection of livestock as a key asset for survival in the event of conflict and war.[8]

Based on these rights, and in recognition of the role of livestock in livelihoods, LEGS is founded on three livelihoods-based objectives:

1. To *provide rapid assistance* to crisis-affected communities through livestock-based interventions.
2. To *protect the key livestock-related assets* of crisis-affected communities.
3. To *rebuild key livestock-related assets* among crisis-affected communities.

These objectives reflect the key focus of LEGS, namely livestock as a capital asset that contributes to both the short- and long-term wellbeing of people affected by crisis through its role in their livelihood strategies.

The development and scope of LEGS

The process of developing LEGS drew on the experiences of Sphere as much as possible. A small Steering Group was established in May 2005, comprising representatives from the African Union Department for Rural Economy and Agriculture (AU-DREA), the Feinstein International Center at Tufts University, the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and VETAID (a member of Vétérinaires sans Frontières Europa). Following a broad consultation process with over 1,700 individuals and agencies, a draft was field tested, and publication is scheduled for January 2009.

LEGS is targeted at all who are involved in livestock-based interventions in disasters. In particular it is aimed at NGOs, bilateral and multilateral agencies and governments implementing emergency interventions in areas where livestock make a contribution to livelihoods. LEGS is also relevant for policy- and decision-makers within donor and government agencies, whose funding and implementation decisions impact on disaster response.

LEGS focuses on the intersection between emergencies, livestock and livelihoods and as such specifically targets livestock professionals with little experience of emergencies, and emergency workers with little experience of the livestock sector. The focus on livelihoods means that the guidelines are concerned not only with immediate emergency response in acute situations, but also with recovery phase activities and the linkages with long-term development processes. This can present challenges, not least because, historically, relief and development initiatives have been separated both operationally and conceptually. Since LEGS aims to improve the quality of humanitarian interventions it is beyond the scope of the project to address the issues associated with linking relief and development in any depth; however, disaster preparedness, early warning and post-disaster rehabilitation all have an impact on livestock interventions in emergencies, and hence important linkages with these issues are highlighted in LEGS (see Chapter 6).

LEGS provides standards and guidelines for best practice and assistance in decision-making for livestock interventions. It therefore does not intend to be a detailed practical manual for implementation, but refers readers to other publications which contain more 'hands-on' advice. LEGS has a global reach, although it is recognised that the first edition has an initial leaning towards experience from Sub-Saharan Africa, largely because much of the easily available documentation on livestock-based responses is based on lessons learned in that region (see discussion in Chapter 7). It is hoped that future editions will include a broader perspective based on additional information and case studies.

Future plans for LEGS include regional training and awareness-raising in Africa, Asia and Latin America, translation into other languages, establishment of a technical support mechanism through email and a website and a revision process to develop future editions. Formal discussions with the Sphere Project are ongoing with a view to recognising LEGS as an official 'companion module' to Sphere.

The contents of LEGS

The LEGS guidelines and standards begin with an overview of key issues to consider when planning livestock-based interventions in emergencies, particularly in relation to livelihoods, and outline the stages of rapid and slow onset, and complex emergencies (see Figure 2). The second chapter on Assessment and Response highlights topics for initial assessment, namely an analysis of the role of livestock in livelihoods, in order to design interventions that will support and promote existing and previous livelihood strategies, the impact of the emergency on the population and on their livelihood and coping strategies and a situational analysis which includes the operating and policy environment. The chapter then outlines a decision-making tool (the LEGS Participatory Response Identification Matrix – PRIM) to help identify which technical interventions are most appropriate and at which stages of an emergency.

The third chapter of LEGS presents Minimum Standards Common to All Livestock Interventions, namely participation, assessment, response and coordination, targeting, monitoring, evaluation and livelihoods impact, technical support and agency competencies, contingency planning, preparedness and early response and advocacy and policy, as shown in Figure 3 (page 8).

The Common Standards are followed by chapters outlining each of the technical interventions covered by LEGS: destocking, veterinary services, provision of feed, provision of water, livestock shelter and settlement and provision of livestock (restocking). These chapters all follow a format similar to the Sphere Handbook, based on a set of Minimum Standards, Key Indicators and Guidance Notes. Each chapter also includes an introduction highlighting issues to consider and a decision-making tree to facilitate choices between different implementation options. For example, the destocking chapter discusses accelerated livestock off-take, slaughter destocking and destocking for disposal, highlighting how these different options fit within the phasing of an emergency, and the advantages, disadvantages and implications of each. Similarly, the water chapter considers the rehabilitation of existing water sources for livestock, the establishment of new water sources and water trucking.

An electronic tool has been designed to accompany the hard-copy publication of LEGS, and will be available as a CD-ROM. The tool supports the decision-making process, drawing on the PRIM and the decision trees from each chapter, together with additional questions and guidance.

Four important cross-cutting issues have also been identified. These are gender and social equity, HIV/AIDS, security and protection and the environment. Chapter 1 of LEGS discusses these issues in general, while each technical

Figure 2

Summary of the LEGS Standards



chapter presents particular considerations with regard to the selected technical intervention. For example, the restocking chapter highlights the importance of assessing gender roles in the ownership and management of livestock, including access to livestock products and disposal rights, prior to an intervention. The chapter on the provision of water encourages an assessment of the environmental implications of any planned water intervention, to avoid excessive extraction, high concentration of livestock around water points and contamination of human water supplies.

Figure 3
LEGS Common Standards



Chapter 3
Case studies

This chapter presents three case studies of livestock interventions in emergencies. A brief summary of each project is presented, followed by a review of the activity using the relevant LEGS standards. These reviews have been carried out using only the source documents listed in the end notes. As such they do not aim to represent a comprehensive analysis, but rather offer a discussion of the projects in the light of the LEGS Standards, and illustrate how the Standards can be applied in both planning and evaluation to help improve the quality of emergency response.

The review has been carried out against the specific technical standards contained in LEGS, and also against the LEGS Common Standards applicable to all interventions.

Case Study 1: Destocking[9]

Emergency response to drought in Somali Region

When drought struck southern Ethiopia in late 2005, the Pastoralist Livelihood Initiative (PLI) programme funded by USAID had just begun. The aim of the programme was to 'improve preparedness, livelihoods and incomes of pastoralists' in order to mitigate the impact of drought and other shocks. Although it was not designed as an emergency programme, PLI partners negotiated with USAID to use some of the funds for emergency interventions in response to the drought. One such initiative was the commercial destocking carried out by Save the Children US (SC US), whose funding proposal included a small emergency destocking fund, which was expanded through the allocation of additional money.

Moyale District lies in the south of Ethiopia, near the border with Kenya. The Borena and Somali pastoralists who live in the area generally sell their livestock to traders across the border through informal trade links, as the price is usually more favourable than within Ethiopia itself. Historically, Ethiopian livestock traders engaged in the formal export trade have sourced sheep and goat meat from the highlands. However, due to growing demand for chilled meat in the Gulf States and Egypt, traders have begun to purchase livestock in pastoral areas for these markets.

A drought assessment was carried out by SC US in December 2005. Following this a number of meetings were held with the Ethiopian Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and a multi-agency Commercial Destocking Working Group was established. Awareness-raising meetings were held with a number of livestock traders involved in the local and export market, following which 21 traders took part in a familiarisation visit to drought-affected areas in southern Ethiopia. As a result of this visit, two Addis Ababa-based traders were linked by SC US to pastoralist communities to plan the purchase of livestock. The traders and pastoralist representatives negotiated and agreed on the selection of market sites, livestock types and prices. With regard to livestock types, SC US suggested that cattle be the focus of the enterprise, since they are the most susceptible to drought and therefore less likely to survive; at the same time, the Ethiopian government was keen to promote cattle exports to Egypt. Livestock prices were agreed in some cases above 'normal' market prices, in other cases below them – as a result of the negotiations between the traders and the pastoralist representatives.

USAID also authorised the provision of loans to livestock traders to facilitate the off-take, and the Destocking Working Group developed application forms and guidelines. Two loans of $25,000 each were given to the two traders, although these were provided after most of the cattle had already been purchased. The loans were used to procure feed to help fatten the purchased livestock.

Impact of the destocking

According to initial records, in the three weeks following the negotiations between the traders and the pastoralists a total of 6,292 cattle were purchased and moved directly to holding grounds near Addis Ababa, or kept in fattening units near Moyale until they were healthy enough to travel. In addition, other traders were influenced by the activity and a further 3,778 cattle were purchased in the Moyale area. Later interviews with the traders suggested that these initial figures were underestimates and that approximately 20,000 cattle had been purchased in total.

An impact assessment carried out under PLI estimated that 3.7 cattle had been purchased per beneficiary household, with a total of 5,400 households (n=114). Setting the costs of the project against the purchase price received by the pastoralist households, the study calculated a benefit–cost ratio of 41:1.

The income received from the restocking was calculated to form 54% of total income during the drought, estimated at $184 per household – a significant cash injection. Of this income from destocking, 37% was reinvested in the remaining herds: animal feed, transporting stock to other grazing areas and veterinary care, thus protecting livelihoods for the future.

The impact assessment revealed that the destocking was considered favourably against other drought-related interventions such as food aid, particularly in relation to indicators such as 'helps us to cope with the effect of the drought' and 'helps fast recovery and herd rebuilding'.

Review of the response against the LEGS Standards

The LEGS Minimum Standards on Destocking are summarised in Figure 4 and cover both accelerated off-take

Figure 4

LEGS Minimum Standards for Destocking



and destocking for slaughter and meat or cash distribution. As for the Common Standards, for each of these destocking standards LEGS contains a set of Key Indicators accompanied by Guidance Notes.

Reviewed against the LEGS Livelihoods Objectives outlined in Chapter 2, the destocking activities appear not only to have provided *rapid relief* to drought-affected households, but also contributed to *protecting and rebuilding livestock assets* **(LEGS Livelihoods Objectives 1 and 2)**.

Most of the LEGS Common Standards appear to have been met by the destocking project: beneficiaries were consulted and were directly involved in negotiations and the initiative built on existing practice (off-take during stress times to realise cash income) and facilitated other coping mechanisms such as transporting remaining livestock to other grazing areas **(Common Standard 1: Participation)**. The creation of the Destocking Working Group provided a forum for coordinated planning, while complementarity with initiatives carried out by other agencies – both livestock-related such as supplementary feeding and veterinary services and other sector support, for example food aid and food-for-work schemes – was noted by respondents to the impact assessment study **(Common Standard 3: Coordination)**. Although this was apparently the first commercial destocking initiative in an emergency response in pastoralist areas in Ethiopia, staff had sufficient expertise to be able to initiate and manage the operation at short notice **(Common Standard 6: Technical Support and Agency Competencies)**. The timeliness and flexibility of the PLI funding enabled a swift response and included an element of contingency planning and preparedness **(Common Standard 7: Contingency Planning)**.

The destocking activity also appears to have met many of the LEGS Destocking Standards. The timing of the response was appropriate to enable traders to purchase livestock with some market value, and appropriate species for destocking were selected and agreed **(General Destocking Standard 1: Key Indicator 3 – timing; and Key Indicator 4 – appropriate livestock species selection)**, although if the intervention had been launched earlier, it is possible that the traders would have offered higher prices for the livestock they purchased. Most of the Key Indicators for commercial destocking were addressed, for example market potential was assessed and assured at the time, key traders were identified and consultations facilitated through a central forum, prices were agreed with communities and communication between traders and the communities was facilitated by the outside agency **(Accelerated Off-take Standard 1)**.

Despite these clear successes, a number of key issues and challenges remain:

- **Common Standard 2 – Assessment**. The initial assessment should ideally take into account the potential impact on local markets, which can then be analysed afterwards.
- **Common Standard 5 – Monitoring and Evaluation and Livelihoods Impact**. One of the challenges identified by the impact assessment was the absence of detailed information about poverty in the beneficiary area, and the extent to which cattle off-take benefits the poor. More detailed data on the livestock holdings of different wealth groups would have enabled the impact assessment to gauge the extent to which the initiative benefited the poor. Additional baseline data on livestock markets prior to the drought would also have contributed to the monitoring and evaluation of impact.
- **Common Standard 7 – Preparedness and Contingency Planning**. The speed with which the destocking operation was initiated was partly due to the efforts of the agency staff involved, but also to the fortuitous timing of the PLI grant. It is likely that, had these funds not been readily available, the process of applying for emergency funding from scratch would have taken too long to allow commercial destocking to take place.
- **Common Standard 8 – Advocacy and Policy**. The destocking initiative coincided with a period of high export demand from Egypt and other countries. Since then, following concerns about Foot and Mouth disease and Rift Valley Fever, Egypt and the Gulf States have banned live animal imports from Ethiopia. This highlights the need to address the wider policy and veterinary health issues that affect livestock marketing, and in particular livestock exports, in the long term.
- **Timing of destocking interventions**. Of all the interventions described in LEGS, timing is most important for commercial destocking. The LEGS Guidelines suggest that, in order to be effective, commercial destocking should take place in the Alert and early Alarm phases of a drought or other slow-onset emergency, before livestock condition has deteriorated significantly. Although SC US was able to respond relatively quickly through the diversion of PLI funds, the impact assessment noted that, had the initiative begun sooner, for example in January instead of March 2006, pastoralists might have received twice the price for their livestock (the price of cattle was approximately $138 per head in October 2005; the drought was declared in November 2005; by March/April 2006 the price had fallen to $50 per head).
- **Assessment of key support required (Accelerated Off-take Standard 1)**. Communication between traders and pastoralists was facilitated; however, the provision of credit was in the end either not necessary, or credit was made available too late, since most of the livestock were purchased before it was arranged. However, the facility, now it has been established, should be useful for destocking initiatives in the future.

Case Study 2: Supplementary Feeding[10]

Emergency response to drought in Afar

The Afar Region of Ethiopia is inhabited largely by nomadic Afar pastoralists, who are almost solely dependent on their herds of camels, cattle, sheep, goats and donkeys for their livelihood. Key livelihood strategies include maintaining a mix of livestock species, and migrating along seasonal routes to maximise the limited pasture in the area. Increasing conflict with neighbouring groups and the expansion of export crop farming zones in the riverine areas previously used as dry season grazing lands have significantly reduced the mobility of Afar pastoralists in recent years.

In March 2007, early warning reports suggested that parts of the Afar Region faced a drought. Rains were poor and in some areas failed altogether; by early June, it had become clear that, although government food distributions had averted significant human malnutrition, cattle were dying and the livelihood assets of pastoralists were being depleted, in particular those households who had not followed the usual migration patterns and were thus short of feed for their cattle. Some responded to this crisis by purchasing feed for their livestock, employing one of their indigenous coping strategies in response to drought.

In response to the drought a number of organisations initiated supplementary feeding activities for livestock. CARE, in conjunction with its partner the Afar Pastoralists Development Association (APDA), carried out supplementary feeding in three districts over a five-week period beginning in late July 2007, targeting 1,200 households. The distribution of the feed coincided with the onset of the rain that ended the drought.

Following community dialogue, and bearing in mind the project's funding constraints, it was decided not to feed all livestock, but to focus on core breeding stock. The plan was therefore to provide feed to five cattle from each of the household herds. According to a Participatory Impact Assessment of the initiative,[11] 85% of the beneficiaries surveyed gave the feed to their cattle, while 15% saved it for the future (because the feed arrived late, so some beneficiaries had already bought their own). Implementation of the initiative was hampered by slow distribution and the spoiling of some of the feed by rain.

Impact of the supplementary feeding

The Participatory Impact Assessment considered the impact of the CARE/APDA-supported supplementary feeding, together with indigenous feeding practices, compared to livestock which were given no feed at all.

During the drought, the main cause of death among cattle was starvation (as opposed to disease). The survival rates for cattle that were fed, whether through the project or not, were significantly higher compared to those that did not receive supplementary feed. Similarly, the rate of return of cattle to normal production levels (for example milk production) within two months of the drought's end was

Figure 5

LEGS Minimum Standards for the Provision of Feed



significantly higher for those cattle that received supplementary feeding through the project.

Mortality of camel calves and sheep during the drought was linked to starvation (as opposed to disease), while in contrast adult camels were more prone to an acute camel disease (a form of trypanosome) which killed a number of them.

The impact assessment highlights the need to ensure that adequate supplies of feed can be provided, whether by outside agencies or the pastoralists themselves, and also that timing is critical. Informants emphasised the importance of including livestock feed in emergency appeals, since it forms one of their key priorities, and some suggested the use of maize rather than wheat as emergency food aid, as maize rations are often shared with livestock.

Review of the response against the LEGS Standards

The LEGS Minimum Standards on the provision of livestock feed are summarised in Figure 5.

The Afar supplementary feeding initiative was reviewed against these Feed Standards and the Common Standards outlined in the previous chapter, and was found to have met many of the standards. In general it helped both to *protect* and *rebuild livestock assets* through preventing starvation of cattle and speeding their return to productivity **(LEGS Livelihoods Objectives 2 and 3)**. The activity clearly responded to a felt need of the Afar pastoralists for feed for their cattle during the drought **(Common Standard 2: Assessment)**, and built on and supplemented indigenous coping mechanisms **(General Feed Standard 1: Based on local practice)**.

The review also highlights a number of issues and lessons learned:

- **Common Standard 1 – Participation**. At a review workshop which used LEGS to analyse the Afar drought response mounted by a number of agencies, participants acknowledged that community members could have been more involved in the entire intervention, particularly in assessment and design.[12]
- **Common Standard 2 – Assessment**. Similarly, the workshop participants concluded that the assessment process could have been better coordinated between operating agencies, and carried out to a greater depth of detail.
- **Common Standard 3 – Coordination**. The importance of coordination in all aspects of the drought response was highlighted at the review workshop. Greater coordination between agencies engaged in the same activity (supplementary feeding) would have been beneficial, but it was also noted by all the workshop participants that greater coordination with other interventions, both livestock-based and in other sectors, could have improved the operation and increased impact (for example with other agencies engaged in emergency animal health support).
- **Common Standard 5 – Monitoring and Evaluation and Livelihoods Impact**. The impact assessment notes the difficulty of carrying out a full study because baseline beneficiary data was incomplete, and hence a random sample from among the total beneficiaries could not be made. This highlights the importance of initial data collection and the need to plan for monitoring and evaluation from the outset.
- **Timing of the interventions**. The LEGS guidelines suggest that, in a slow-onset emergency such as drought, supplementary feeding should be initiated towards the end of the Alarm phase and on through the Emergency phase. The delays in the implementation of the CARE/APDA activity meant that the feed arrived as the rains began, too late to save some livestock (although some of it was stored against future droughts).
- **Emergency Feeding Standard 1 – Feeding Levels**. The feed provided was considered by the impact assessment respondents to be inadequate for the beneficiaries targeted. Had the operation started on time, supplies would have been insufficient to support the target number of cattle up to the end of the drought.
- **Emergency Feeding Standard 2 – Storage**. Some of the feed was spoiled in the rains, highlighting the importance of adequate storage facilities.
- **Emergency Feeding Standard 3 – Procurement**. The review workshop highlighted the absence of local sources of feed, which meant that the feed had to be procured in Addis Ababa, thus adding to the costs of the operation and introducing further delays. The need to identify suitable local feed sources if possible was highlighted, together with the potential impact on local markets.

Case Study 3: Livestock Distribution[13]

Emergency response to the Bam earthquake

In late December 2003 an earthquake measuring 6.4 on the Richter scale hit the region of Bam, Kerman Province, in southern Iran. In a period of 15 seconds, over 70% of the buildings in the city and the surrounding villages collapsed, and more than 40,000 of the area's 130,000 people lost their lives.

The people of Bam did not depend solely on livestock. For the majority, their livelihoods were focused on farming dates and/or farm labour, but many kept a small number of animals to supplement their food supply and income, mainly cattle, sheep and goats. Before the earthquake it is estimated that the people of Bam kept around 7,000 cows and calves, and nearly 30,000 sheep and goats. Livestock-keeping is particularly important for poorer farmers who own either a small plot of land or none at all.

While many of the date palms remained intact, livestock losses in the earthquake were estimated at 31% for cattle and 26% for sheep and goats. Most of these animals were housed in simple shelters near their owners' homes, and many were killed when the buildings collapsed. Others ran away in panic following the earthquake, while some were stolen or sold to meet urgent cash needs.

In response to these losses, Action Against Hunger (ACF) designed a livestock distribution project to provide two goats together with 300kg of feed (barley) to 1,200 vulnerable families in 17 earthquake-affected villages. The figure of two goats was based on discussions with target communities regarding how many livestock they had owned before the earthquake, how many they needed to rebuild their herds and how many they might be able to purchase themselves. The amount of feed distributed was based on information from the Iranian Ministry of Agriculture, according to how much feed each goat would need to last until beneficiaries would be able to purchase or grow their own fodder. The aim of the project was to help target households to obtain milk for their families and an additional income. At the same time, ACF was involved in a food security assessment with OFDA, to identify vulnerable groups.

In planning the project, ACF also considered the alternative of providing cash to beneficiary households, to enable them to purchase livestock, feed or other basic requirements. It was decided to provide livestock directly for a number of reasons: at the time, food aid was widely available through Iranian Red Crescent distributions, so households had little need for cash to purchase food, local markets were very poor and there was limited opportunity for cash purchases, and it was anticipated that the provision of livestock would offer a significant psychological benefit to the target communities following the trauma of the earthquake (which, as noted below, proved to be the case).

The project targeted poor families who had lost livestock, in particular widows and other vulnerable people, but the selection criteria required that beneficiaries had experience with raising sheep and goats and had access to adequate shelter for the animals. Selection of beneficiaries and distribution, informed by the food security study carried out earlier, was done in collaboration with local councillors. The Iranian Veterinary Network was contracted to provide veterinary services to the purchased livestock before distribution, including vaccination against enterotoxaemia, disinfection, deworming and the provision of mineral and vitamin supplements.

ACF helped to establish weekly coordination meetings including government officials and NGO representatives involved in agriculture-based responses to the emergency. This offered a forum for ACF and others to provide regular reports on their activities to various stakeholders.

An intermediary from the Iranian Veterinary Network was hired to purchase the goats anonymously, as much as possible from within Bam District, in order to reduce the impact on local markets, since it was feared that prices might be inflated if it were known that an aid agency was a major purchaser.

The 1,200 target families each received two female goats, one local Mahali breed and one Rachti breed (mixed local Mahali and Pakistani high-quality breed), together with 300kg of barley for feed. The original plan was to distribute sheep rather than goats, but discussions with potential beneficiaries revealed that goats are easier to feed, require less intensive care and produce more offspring per pregnancy than sheep. It was also originally planned to distribute pregnant animals, but this proved logistically more challenging and it was determined that sufficient male goats had survived the earthquake to enable the distributed goats to reproduce quite quickly after distribution.

Distribution was organised through local councillors, who facilitated the targeting and distribution process. As councillors are elected and live within the target communities, they were considered a more appropriate choice then government officials based in the ministry in Bam, as it was anticipated that they would be more accountable to the local population. The councillors were given the responsibility of verifying the identity of target beneficiaries (using the Iranian Red Crescent ration booklets). Coupons were issued to agreed beneficiaries to facilitate the distribution process.

Impact of the livestock distribution

Post-distribution monitoring (one to two weeks after the distribution had been completed) focused on a sample of 70 selected randomly from the total of 1,200 beneficiary households. The monitoring results show that the vast majority of beneficiaries were satisfied with both the breed selected (84%) and the distribution process (87%). Only one of the goats from the sample of 70 households had been stolen and another sold, while six had been given to relatives to care for due largely to lack of appropriate housing.

At the time of the monitoring visits, nine of the beneficiaries were milking one goat, and two households were milking both the goats they had received. Twenty-seven had mated their goats to a buck. When asked about the impact of the livestock distribution project on their lives, beneficiaries listed economic benefits (milk and wool production – mostly considered to be potential benefits, as it was too soon for the livestock to have reproduced) and emphasised the psychological benefits (entertainment for children, increased motivation to get involved in other activities). Most were positive about the opportunity to resume livestock activities after losing some or all of their animals in the earthquake.

Review of the response against the LEGS Standards

The LEGS Minimum Standards on the provision of livestock are shown in Figure 6. They relate to both herd reconstitution (for communities largely dependent on livestock) and to other livestock distribution activities.

The ACF livestock distribution project appears to have met many of the LEGS Standards, both the Common Standards and those for the provision of livestock. In general, the project helped to *rebuild the livestock assets* of the people affected by the earthquake **(LEGS Livelihoods Objective 3)** in a context where animal husbandry forms the main livelihood activity for many of the poorest. More particularly, with regard to the Common Standards, the use of elected local councillors as intermediaries helped to increase accountability to the target communities **(Common Standard 1: Participation)**. The role of livestock in livelihoods prior to the earthquake was carefully assessed, particularly with regard to poorer households, and this formed the basis of the design of the project **(Common Standard 2: Assessment, Key Indicator 1 – assessment of the role of livestock and Key Indicator 2 – vulnerable groups)**. The goats were purchased in local markets to support local trade, but in a manner designed to reduce disruption and artificial impacts on prices **(Common Standard 2: Assessment, Key Indicator 4 – local services and markets)**. The intervention followed food, water and sanitation responses which prioritised humanitarian needs **(Common Standard 3: Response and Coordination, Key Indicator 4 – integration with other humanitarian assistance)**.

Figure 6

LEGS Minimum Standards for the Provision of Livestock



Vulnerable groups, in particular poorer households including widows, were targeted and selection criteria were discussed and shared with beneficiary communities **(Common Standard 4: Targeting)**. Baseline data on livestock holdings prior to the earthquake was collected; monitoring of a sample of beneficiaries was carried out two weeks after the distribution to obtain beneficiary views on the process and impact, as well as observations on the presence of the livestock and feed and the housing provided; and an external evaluation was carried out nine months after the earthquake **(Common Standard 5: Monitoring and Evaluation)**. Collaboration and coordination with the Iranian Veterinary Network and other government institutions, as well as with NGOs operating in a similar field, was considered to be one of the positive features of the implementation process **(Common Standard 3: Coordination** and **Common Standard 6: Technical support and agency competencies)**.

With regard to the specific standards on the provision of livestock, the project was based on an assessment of the capital assets of the potential beneficiaries (including knowledge and experience of livestock-keeping and availability of suitable shelter) **(Provision of Livestock Standard 1: Assessment – Key Indicator 3)**. As noted above, the selection of beneficiaries was based on local participation and practice **(Provision of Livestock Standard 2: Definition of the Package – Key Indicator 2)**. The selection of animal species and breeds was appropriate and based on local conditions and needs **(Provision of Livestock Standard 2: Definition of the Package – Key Indicator 3)**. The timing of the intervention – after the initial emergency response which addressed basic human food, shelter and survival needs, but before the first main date harvest – meant that the beneficiaries had time and energy for the livestock distribution **(Provision of Livestock Standard 2: Definition of the Package – Key Indicator 4)**. The project aimed to purchase the livestock locally to support local markets **(Provision of Livestock Standard 3: Procurement)**. Additional support was provided by the project in terms of veterinary care prior to distribution, and the provision of 300kg of feed with the goats **(Provision of Livestock Standard 4: Additional support)**.

A number of issues remain:

- **Common Standard 1 – Participation**. According to the project evaluation, the initiative did not directly involve beneficiaries in design and implementation, in particular

in the selection process. Whilst community participation is a challenging process in an emergency situation, LEGS encourages it in all aspects of project design and implementation. The timing of the livestock distribution meant that the initial crisis was over and therefore the potential for participation had increased compared to activities taking place during the immediate aftermath.

- **Common Standard 2 – Assessment**. Although the initial assessment identified the particular role livestock play in the livelihoods of poorer households and the subsequent targeting aimed to include widows in particular, the project data does not appear to have been clearly disaggregated by gender and other vulnerable groupings.
- **Common Standard 4 – Targeting**. The targeting process was generally very positive (see above), but encountered some difficulties. For example, government lists of the poorest households in the area had been lost in the earthquake and had to be redrawn. Obtaining new accurate lists presented a challenge for ACF, in particular because of the potential for corrupt officials to try and include their relatives and friends as beneficiaries. The lack of local participation in the selection of beneficiaries also meant that some of the recipients of the livestock already owned some livestock at the time of the distribution, or had other livelihood assets such as date palms. Improved targeting could have ensured that livestock was given to other families lacking any such assets.
- **Provision of Livestock Standard 4 – Additional Support**. Whilst the project arranged for veterinary inputs prior to the distribution of the livestock, LEGS also recommends that a system for the ongoing provision of veterinary care is established for the longer-term support of beneficiary livestock, as well as for other livestock in the community.

Chapter 4
Key issues in livelihoods-based livestock responses in emergencies

There is little doubt that, throughout the developing world, livestock are a key livelihood asset for many people. When communities are consulted about the type of support they require – in both development and emergency contexts – livestock-related assistance is often prioritised. The three case studies described here show how real and tangible benefits can be provided to emergency-affected communities through appropriate and timely livestock-based responses. For those agencies which have not previously considered livestock interventions as part of their emergency response, LEGS offers a basis for developing their capacity in livestock programming.

The process of developing the LEGS guidelines has emphasised a number of key issues in livelihoods programming for emergencies, particularly with regard to livestock responses, many of which have already been raised in the literature and which are also highlighted by the case studies.

Issue 1: the importance of a livelihoods approach in emergencies

The experience of developing the LEGS guidelines has highlighted the importance of taking a livelihoods approach to emergency response, particularly with regard to livestock interventions. As implied in the earlier discussion, saving lives without addressing livelihoods can leave communities destitute in the longer term and/or more vulnerable to subsequent disasters.

In order to apply a livelihoods approach, the livelihoods of the affected population need to be understood. This is greatly facilitated through collaboration with agencies already working in the area, for example on long-term development projects (see below). Livelihoods-based emergency responses, while not yet greatly developed, tend to focus on support to livelihood assets and/or support to the policies, institutions and processes that affect livelihoods.[14] In the case of livestock-keepers, support to livestock as a key livelihood asset offers the opportunity not only to provide immediate relief to meet basic needs (for example the transfer of cash or meat through destocking), but also to help protect and rebuild livelihoods following a disaster.

Livelihoods programming in emergencies contributes to the blurring of the boundaries between relief and development. There is increasing discussion about the need to increase coherence and synergy between the two, and growing interest in concepts such as disaster risk reduction and disaster preparedness. However, in reality many agencies continue to plan, design and implement their programmes completely separately, usually through independent departments with little policy coherence between them. If emergency responses are to take livelihoods fully into account, some of these barriers must be overcome. Practical options may include:

- Greater collaboration between emergency organisations and development agencies already on the ground in the affected area, in particular drawing on livelihoods information and programming experience which is already available (LEGS Common Standard 3: Coordination).
- The inclusion of a far greater element of disaster preparedness and disaster risk reduction in the projects of long-term development agencies working in disaster-prone areas (LEGS Common Standard 7: Preparedness).[15]
- Increased participation by beneficiaries in the assessment, design and implementation of emergency responses (LEGS Common Standard 1: Participation).
- Building on indigenous knowledge, practice and strategies, which can help to integrate emergency responses into existing livelihood strategies (LEGS Common Standard 1: Participation).

Issue 2: early warning and early response

Recent years have seen the emergence of a growing number of early warning and disaster classification systems.[16] These aim to anticipate disasters (particularly natural disasters) through the monitoring of specific indicators – generally food security and nutrition – and in some cases to organise this data to facilitate the identification of appropriate responses. Many focus on slow-onset disasters, and some use the Drought Contingency Planning model shown in Figure 7 to highlight interventions appropriate to the different stages of the emergency.

Contingency planning for disasters is also increasingly forming a part of long-term development funding – see for example the first case study on destocking above, where a small contingency fund for emergency response was included in the original funding proposal. Some organisations working in drought-prone areas are aiming to build drought preparedness and response activities into their ongoing development programmes, on the assumption that periodic droughts will inevitably occur during the project cycle (see for example Oxfam GB's Drought Cycle Management Learning Project in East Africa).

However, despite some improvements in the quality of EW information, timely and early response to disasters remains a challenge for many organisations. In the destocking case study above, it was essentially coincidence that enabled the swift implementation of the project, namely the availability

Figure 7

The Drought Contingency Planning model



of funds which could be diverted to the intervention. In the livestock feed case study, the feed only arrived once the rains had begun, thus missing the main crisis time when livestock were dying. Mobilising funds and obtaining bureaucratic permissions – both within organisations and with host governments – takes time, and frequently results in delayed implementation, missed opportunities and limited impact. This is particularly true in slow-onset emergencies such as drought, where increasingly sophisticated early warning systems are able to highlight the pending crisis in plenty of time, but political, operational and funding systems do not facilitate a timely response. Referring to the Horn of Africa crisis in 2005–2006, for instance, one analysis states that:

> *Unlike many similar crises … the quality and credibility of early-warning systems have not been called into question in this case … given the widespread consensus that the early warning was accurate, the delayed response highlights the limitations of early warning in the absence of direct links to plans that set out rapid and appropriate response options.*[17]

There appears little justification for continued investment in early warning without improvements in agencies' capacity to respond in time.

The LEGS Common Standard 7 on preparedness highlights the importance of disaster risk reduction, including the need for contingency fund planning and preparedness with clearly defined triggers for action and pre-agreed procedures for the release of funds and other resources. Communities should be a vital part of this process, in identifying trigger indicators, drawing up plans for disaster response and developing activities to reduce the risk or mitigate the effects of future crises.

Effective preparedness planning also contributes to reducing the disconnect between emergency response and long-term development initiatives.

Issue 3: phasing and timing

Whilst early response is often paramount in saving both lives and livelihoods, the appropriate phasing of initiatives

is also a key factor in improving the impact of emergency interventions, particularly with regard to supporting livelihoods. The Participatory Response Identification Matrix (PRIM) in the LEGS Guidelines is a simple tool to facilitate the analysis of initial assessment data and the identification of appropriate and timely responses. In addition to connecting potential activities with livelihood objectives, the PRIM highlights the phases of the emergency (which may vary for slow- and rapid-onset disasters) and links these to appropriate interventions. When this was applied retrospectively to the Afar drought response in 2007, the participants at the LEGS Review Workshop all adjusted the timing of their activities – mostly to begin at an earlier phase, but in some cases also to continue into later phases. For example, the agencies who had provided veterinary services intervened only in the Alarm or Emergency phases of the drought cycle model. Using the PRIM to review their activities, the participants all felt that the Alert phase would have been the most appropriate time to begin, and most agreed that support should have continued into the recovery phase.[18]

Issue 4: coordination and integration

Another key issue in livelihoods-based livestock responses to disasters is coordination. LEGS highlights the danger of competition and/or duplication, both within the livestock sector and with other sectors. For example, slaughter destocking projects operated by different agencies may offer different purchase prices for livestock, creating confusion and competition between communities and between the agencies themselves. Similarly, different systems of veterinary service provision can undermine interventions and increase confusion. For example, some agencies might use a cost recovery system, whereas others distribute medicines freely.

Coordination also applies to harmonised approaches: for example, in some emergencies the provision of only livestock feed and water may leave stock vulnerable to disease, and a combined livestock feed-water-health response may be required in order to save livestock and protect livelihoods; destocking combined with the provision of feed can help to ensure the survival of remaining herds. Coordination and sharing of information such as assessment findings between agencies can also save resources, as well as time and effort.

Integration of activities is also important to protect livelihoods while saving lives. The LEGS Common Standard on coordination highlights the importance of the humanitarian imperative, namely that livestock interventions should not hinder life-saving humanitarian responses. Whilst saving human lives remains a priority, there is often significant potential for complementarity between activities focused on saving lives and those aimed at protecting livelihoods, such as livestock-based interventions. Prioritising saving lives does not preclude the integration of interventions where possible to address both life and livelihood needs, for example backloading food aid trucks with destocked livestock, using refrigerators for storing both human and veterinary medicines and using discarded or damaged items intended for human shelter for animal shelter instead.

In terms of non-livestock activities such as food aid, cash grants or cash/food-for-work, these interventions have the potential to complement livestock-based responses. In one sense, approaches such as commercial destocking are an indirect cash transfer to households and provide similar types of impact as cash distributions, while also supporting livestock marketing. At present, we know relatively little about the specific combinations of livestock and non-livestock activities which are appropriate in different types of disaster and operational contexts, and this is an area needing more application and evaluation. In addition, in some situations approaches such as cash distribution might be preferable to a livestock project. For example, restocking projects are often hindered by a limited budget, and it is therefore possible that the lower transaction costs of cash distribution would allow more households to be reached for a given budget. At the same time, cash distributions are not always feasible due to government or organisational policies, market availability or operational context.

Failure to coordinate activities between agencies is commonly recognised as a factor in limiting positive impact and reducing the effectiveness of interventions. One analysis of the Indian Ocean tsunami response suggests that some agencies were unwilling to coordinate with others because they feared losing control over their operations, and felt the need to maintain their organisational profile for publicity and funding purposes. This led to inefficiency and duplication of assessments, amongst other problems.[19] Participants at the Afar LEGS Review Workshop also noted the inability of agencies to coordinate their efforts, with consequences for the quality of their responses.[20] Recognition of the importance of coordination between agencies is growing,[21] but much remains to be done to avoid duplication and unnecessary competition, and to improve impact.

Issue 5: evidence base to inform good practice

LEGS is founded on an evidence base drawn from experience around the world in responding to emergencies. However, one of the key challenges in developing the guidelines was obtaining sufficient information to identify best practice. While there are numerous examples of emergency livestock projects, impact assessments or evaluations were very limited, especially in terms of systematic assessments.

The frequent absence of credible impact information may reflect the fact that impact assessment of emergency responses is a relatively undeveloped field. During the LEGS process it was evident that, when assessments or evaluations were available, agencies focused on the measurement of project implementation and activity, rather than impact on livelihoods. Although agencies often

cite a range of methodological and organisational constraints to impact assessment of disaster response, LEGS draws on examples of rigorous yet resource-friendly impact assessment, and argues the need for far greater assessment of future interventions. Such commitment is needed to enhance institutional and cross-organisational learning and to avoid repeating mistakes.

The LEGS Common Standard on Monitoring, Evaluation and Livelihoods Impact notes that impact assessment (and monitoring and evaluation systems in general) must be planned from the outset. This early attention to measuring impact requires steps such as identifying suitable indicators, obtaining a baseline where possible and establishing monitoring systems. Where feasible, participatory approaches should be used to identify and measure impact indicators. Identifying livelihoods-based objectives at the start of the intervention is a key part of this process. Impact assessment is particularly important to ascertain the effect of emergency responses on livelihoods: an intervention may have been delivered efficiently and have resulted in positive short-term outcomes, but may at the same time have had a negative effect on livelihoods in the longer term.

Conclusion

This paper has shown how support to livelihood assets such as livestock should be part of integrated disaster response programmes, and can have a substantial impact on the medium- and long-term vulnerability of disaster-affected populations. LEGS aims to promote the use of livelihood-based livestock responses to emergencies, through building the capacity of humanitarian actors to plan and intervene appropriately. Whilst LEGS outlines processes for the assessment and design of interventions based on appropriate decision-making models, it can also be used – as the case studies show – to assist in the evaluation of emergency responses by providing a framework and benchmark against which interventions can be reviewed. The process of developing LEGS has also highlighted the need for more thorough impact assessment of emergency interventions in order to expand the evidence base and share learning on livestock-based emergency responses.

There is much more that can and should be done to support people's livelihoods through livestock-based responses to emergencies. LEGS and the growing body of practical experience are an exciting way forward for improving and expanding livestock responses.

Notes

1 Yakob Aklilu and Mike Wekesa, *Drought, Livestock and Livelihoods: Lessons from the 1999–2001 Emergency Response in the Pastoral Sector in Kenya*, Network Paper 40 (London: ODI, 2002).

2 Susanne Jaspars, Sorcha O'Callaghan and Elizabeth Stites, *Linking Livelihoods and Protection: A Preliminary Analysis Based on a Review of the Literature and Agency Practice*, HPG Working Paper, December 2007.

3 P. Trench, J. Rowley, M. Diarra, F. Sano and B. Keita, *Beyond any Drought: Root Causes of Chronic Vulnerability in the Sahel* (London: Sahel Working Group and IIED, 2007).

4 It should however also be noted that livelihood assets may in some emergency situations also become liabilities: for example in a conflict situation, the ownership or acquisition of livestock may increase vulnerability to attack or theft. Susanne Jaspars and Jeremy Shoham, *A Critical Review of Approaches To Assessing and Monitoring Livelihoods in Situations of Chronic Conflict and Political Instability*, Working Paper 191 (London: ODI, 2002).

5 Sphere Project, *Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response* (Geneva: The Sphere Project, 2004), pp. 112 and 120.

6 DFID Sustainable Livelihoods Guidance Sheets: www.livelihoods.org/info/guidance_sheets_rtfs/Sect2.rtf.

7 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 11(2), and Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 25(1).

8 Geneva Conventions of 1949: Additional Protocol on the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Protocol I (Art.54); Additional Protocol on the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, Protocol II (Art.14).

9 D. Abebe, A. Cullis, A. Catley, Y. Aklilu, G. Mekonnen and Y. Ghebrechristos, 'Livelihoods Impact and Benefit–Cost Estimation of a Commercial Destocking Relief Intervention in Moyale District, Southern Ethiopia', *Disasters*, 32/2, June 2008.

10 G. Bekele and A. Catley, *Impact Assessment of the CARE/APDA Emergency Livestock Feed Intervention in Mile District, Afar Region*, Pastoralist Livelihood Initiative (Addis Ababa: Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, 2008); and LEGS, *LEGS Afar Drought Review Workshop: Summary of Outputs*, 12 February 2008.

11 Bekele and Catley, *Impact Assessment*. n=65.

12 See LEGS, *LEGS Afar Drought Review Workshop*.

13 Action Against Hunger – Spain, *Livelihoods Recovery Project (Livestock Distribution), Bam, Iran: Final Report August 2004*; P. Leguene, *Evaluation Report: Restoration of the Livelihoods and Longer-term Food Security for the Earthquake-Affected Farmers and Agricultural Labourers in Bam, South-East Iran*, Project implemented by Action Against Hunger, 2004.

14 Jaspars, O'Callaghan and Stites, *Linking Livelihoods and Protection*.

15 See for example the recommendations of the *Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015*, www.unsdr.org, which include the prioritisation of disaster risk reduction for national governments, and international and local agencies.

16 For example the Coping Strategies Index developed by CARE; Famine Early Warning Systems (FEWS-NET) Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS) (www.fao.org/GIEWS); Save the Children's Household Economy Approach (HEA); the FSAU Integrated Food Security and Humanitarian Phase Classification (IPC); Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions (SMART) Protocol; and Vulnerability Assessment Committees (VAC).

17 *Saving Lives through Livelihoods: Critical Gaps in the Response to the Drought in the Greater Horn of Africa*, HPG Briefing Note, 2006.

18 LEGS, *LEGS Afar Drought Review Workshop*.

19 See for example Andrew Hewett, *Being Risky and Trustworthy: Dilemmas Facing a Non-Government Development Agency*, speech to the Deakin University Community Development in a Global Risk Society Conference, Melbourne, Australia, 20 April 2006.

20 LEGS, *LEGS Afar Drought Review Workshop*.

21 Sue Graves, Victoria Wheeler and Ellen Martin, *Lost in Translation: Managing Coordination and Leadership Reform in the Humanitarian System*, HPG Policy Brief 27 (London: ODI, 2007).

Network Papers 1997–2008

Network Papers are contributions on specific experiences or issues prepared either by HPN members or contributing specialists.

24 *Reproductive Health for Displaced Populations* by C. Palmer (1998)
25 *Humanitarian Action in Protracted Crises: the new relief 'agenda' and its limits* by D. Hendrickson (1998)
26 *The Food Economy Approach: a framework for understanding rural livelihoods* by T. Boudreau (1998)
27 *Between Relief and Development: targeting food aid for disaster prevention in Ethiopia* by K. Sharp (1998)
28 *North Korea: The Politics of Food Aid* by J. Bennett (1999)
29 *Participatory Review in Chronic Instability: The Experience of the IKAFE Refugee Settlement Programme, Uganda* by K. Neefjes (1999)
30 *Protection in Practice: Field Level Strategies for Protecting Civilians from Deliberate Harm* by D. Paul (1999)
31 *The Impact of Economic Sanctions on Health and Well-being* by R. Garfield (1999)
32 *Humanitarian Mine Action: The First Decade of a New Sector in Humanitarian Aid* by C. Horwood (2000)
33 *The Political Economy of War: What Relief Agencies Need to Know* by P. Le Billon (2000)
34 *NGO Responses to Hurricane Mitch: Evaluations for Accountability and Learning* by F. Grunewald, V. de Geoffroy & S. Lister (2000)
35 *Cash Transfers in Emergencies: Evaluating Benefits and Assessing Risks* by D. Peppiatt, J. Mitchell and P. Holzmann (2001)
36 *Food-security Assessments in Emergencies: A Livelihoods Approach* by H. Young, S. Jaspars, R. Brown, J. Frize and H. Khogali (2001)
37 *A Bridge Too Far: Aid Agencies and the Military in Humanitarian Response* by J. Barry with A. Jefferys (2002)
38 *HIV/AIDS and Emergencies: Analysis and Recommendations for Practice* by A. Smith (2002)
39 *Reconsidering the tools of war: small arms and humanitarian action* by R. Muggah with M. Griffiths (2002)
40 *Drought, Livestock and Livelihoods: Lessons from the 1999-2001 Emergency Response in the Pastoral Sector in Kenya* by Yacob Aklilu and Mike Wekesa (2002)
41 *Politically Informed Humanitarian Programming: Using a Political Economy Approach* by Sarah Collinson (2002)
42 *The Role of Education in Protecting Children in Conflict* by Susan Nicolai and Carl Triplehorn (2003)
43 *Housing Reconstruction after Conflict and Disaster* by Sultan Barakat (2003)
44 *Livelihoods and Protection: Displacement and Vulnerable Communities in Kismaayo, Southern Somalia* by Simon Narbeth and Calum McLean (2003)
45 *Reproductive Health for Conflict-affected People: Policies, Research and Programmes* by Therese McGinn et al. (2004)
46 *Humanitarian futures: practical policy perspectives* by Randolph Kent (2004)
47 *Missing the point: an analysis of food security interventions in the Great Lakes* by S Levine and C Chastre with S Ntububa, J MacAskill, S LeJeune, Y Guluma, J Acidri and A Kirkwood
48 *Community-based therapeutic care: a new paradigm for selective feeding in nutritional crises* by Steve Collins
49 *Disaster preparedness programmes in India: a cost benefit analysis* by Courtenay Cabot Venton and Paul Venton (2004)
50 *Cash relief in a contested area: lessons from Somalia* by Degan Ali, Fanta Toure, Tilleke Kiewied (2005)
51 *Humanitarian engagement with non-state armed actors: the parameters of negotiated armed access* by Max Glaser (2005)
52 *Interpreting and using mortality data in humanitarian emergencies: a primer* by Francesco Checchi and Les Roberts (2005)
53 *Protecting and assisting older people in emergencies* by Jo Wells (2005)
54 *Housing reconstruction in post-earthquake Gujarat: a comparative analysis* by Jennifer Duyne Barenstein (2006)
55 *Understanding and addressing staff turnover in humanitarian agencies* by David Loquercio, Mark Hammersley and Ben Emmens (2006)
56 *The meaning and measurement of acute malnutrition in emergencies: a primer for decision-makers* by Helen Young and Susanne Jaspars (2006)
57 *Standards put to the test: Implementing the INEE Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies, Chronic Crisis and Early Reconstruction* by Allison Anderson, Gerald Martone, Jenny Perlman Robinson, Eli Rognerud and Joan Sullivan-Owomoyela (2006)
58 *Concerning the accountability of humanitarian action* by Austen Davis (2007)
59 *Contingency planning and humanitarian action: a review of practice* by Richard Choularton (2007)
60 *Mobile Health Units in emergency operations: a methodological approach* by Stéphane Du Mortier and Rudi Coninx (2007)
61 *Public health in crisis-affected populations: a practical guide for decision-makers* by Francesco Checchi, Michelle Gayer, Rebecca Freeman Grais and Edward J. Mills (2007)
62 *Full of promise: How the UN's Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism can better protect children* by Katy Barnett and Anna Jefferys (2008)
63 *Measuring the effectiveness of Supplementary Feeding Programmes in emergencies* by Carlos Navarro-Colorado, Frances Mason and Jeremy Dhoham (2008)

Good Practice Reviews

Good Practice Reviews are major, peer-reviewed contributions to humanitarian practice. They are produced periodically.

1 *Water and Sanitation in Emergencies* by A. Chalinder (1994)
2 *Emergency Supplementary Feeding Programmes* by J. Shoham (1994)
3 *General Food Distribution in Emergencies: from Nutritional Needs to Political Priorities* by S. Jaspars and H. Young (1996)
4 *Seed Provision During and After Emergencies* by the ODI Seeds and Biodiversity Programme (1996)
5 *Counting and Identification of Beneficiary Populations in Emergency Operations: Registration and its Alternatives* by J. Telford (1997)
6 *Temporary Human Settlement Planning for Displaced Populations in Emergencies* by A. Chalinder (1998)
7 *The Evaluation of Humanitarian Assistance Programmes in Complex Emergencies* by A. Hallam (1998)
8 *Operational Security Management in Violent Environments* by K. Van Brabant (2000)
9 *Disaster Risk Reduction: Mitigation and Preparedness in Development and Emergency Programming* by John Twigg (2004)

A full list of HPN publications is available at the HPN website: www.odihpn.org. To order HPN publications, contact hpn@odi.org.uk.

Humanitarian Practice Network

The **Humanitarian Practice Network (HPN)** is an independent forum where field workers, managers and policymakers in the humanitarian sector share information, analysis and experience.

HPN's aim is to improve the performance of humanitarian action by contributing to individual and institutional learning.

HPN's activities include:

- A series of specialist publications: Good Practice Reviews, Network Papers and *Humanitarian Exchange* magazine.
- A resource website at www.odihpn.org.
- Occasional seminars and workshops to bring together practitioners, policymakers and analysts.

HPN's members and audience comprise individuals and organisations engaged in humanitarian action. They are in 80 countries worldwide, working in northern and southern NGOs, the UN and other multilateral agencies, governments and donors, academic institutions and consultancies. HPN's publications are written by a similarly wide range of contributors.

HPN's institutional location is the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), an independent think tank on humanitarian and development policy. HPN's publications are researched and written by a wide range of individuals and organisations, and are published by HPN in order to encourage and facilitate knowledge-sharing within the sector. *The views and opinions expressed in HPN's publications do not necessarily state or reflect those of the Humanitarian Policy Group or the Overseas Development Institute.*

Funding support is provided by Ausaid, the British Red Cross, CAFOD, CIDA, DANIDA, IrishAID, MFA Netherlands, Norwegian MFA, OxfamGB, SIDA and World Vision UK and International.

To join HPN, complete and submit the form at www.odihpn.org or contact the Membership Administrator at:

Humanitarian Practice Network (HPN)
Overseas Development Institute
111 Westminster Bridge Road
London, SE1 7JD
United Kingdom

Tel: +44 (0)20 7922 0331/74
Fax: +44 (0)20 7922 0399
Email: hpn@odi.org.uk
Website: www.odihpn.org

© Overseas Development Institute, London, 2008.